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1
Advances in Economic Forecasting
Matthew L. Higgins
Western Michigan University
The six chapters that follow this introduction are based on lectures
the authors gave at Western Michigan University as part of the 2009–
2010 Werner Sichel Lecture Seminar Series, organized under the same
title as the present volume. The lectures were given over an academic
year during a time when the U.S. economy was just beginning to recover
from the “Great Recession.” The economics profession’s inability to
predict this catastrophe may have seemed like an inauspicious background for a lecture series on economic forecasting. However, the economic distress and surrounding uncertainty actually benefited the series
because they heightened interest in the topic of economic forecasting.
The question-and-answer sessions following each lecture revealed that
some audience members had a healthy skepticism of economists’ ability to ever predict the future course of the economy. I think, however,
that each speaker’s candid and realistic assessment of opportunities to
improve economic forecasting left most attendees with some sense of
optimism.
Several common recommendations emerge from the following six
chapters for improving the reliability of economic forecasts. Authors
Dean Croushore, Kajal Lahiri, and H.O. Stekler all emphasize that
improvements in forecasting will require proper evaluation of the performance of forecasting methods, focusing particularly on the ability
of methods to forecast in real time and predict turning points in major
macro aggregates. David E. Rapach and Tae-Hwy Lee, in their chapters, argue that the abundance of economic data can be more efficiently
exploited through model and forecast combination. Rapach, Lee, and
coauthors Michael D. Bradley and Dennis W. Jansen each advocate
using models that are adaptive and perform well in the presence of
nonlinearity and structural change. Below, I briefly summarize each
author’s chapter to help direct the reader to these specific themes.

1
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In the book’s second chapter, Croushore addresses the complications that data revisions have on economic forecasts produced in real
time. He begins by advocating the use of forecasts provided by the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). He argues that these forecasts
are unbiased and efficient over long time periods. This survey is made
publicly available by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia in an
easily accessible format. (Croushore provides the Web address for this.)
Furthermore, because this survey can be easily matched to the real-time
macroeconomic data also maintained by the Philadelphia Fed, the survey provides a good data set for studying the role of data revisions in
the forecasting process.
Croushore asserts that many forecast evaluation studies are flawed
because real-time forecasts are compared to ex post forecasts that are
based on revised data that actual forecasters did not have access to. To
the real-time forecaster, recognition of the possible magnitude of data
revisions causes uncertainty about model inputs, structure, and coefficient values. Croushore’s research indicates that all three factors can
degrade the quality of forecasts. Based on his own work, and the work
of others, Croushore suggests that attempts to explicitly incorporate the
process of data revision into model construction have so far had limited
success in improving the quality of economic forecasts.
To illustrate these issues, Croushore examines forecasts in the 1990s
from the SPF. When compared to the 2001 vintage actual values, the
forecasts of gross domestic product (GDP) growth were consistently
too low, and forecasts of inflation and unemployment were consistently
too high. Forecasters appeared to be slow to recognize the effect of high
productivity growth in that decade. When the forecasts are compared
to actual values observed in real time for the variables, the forecasts
appear much better. This may explain why forecasters were slow to
adapt their models to the surge in potential output. Croushore’s chapter
demonstrates that research on the role of data revisions in economic
forecasts is at a very early stage and should prove to be productive in
the coming years.
In the third chapter, Lahiri addresses the intriguing question of how
far into the future forecasters can provide information about the growth
of GDP. He uses a survey of forecasts of the annual growth rate of GDP
for 18 countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), obtained from Consensus Economics Inc. The
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forecasts are monthly and begin at a 24-month horizon. For each country and forecast horizon, Lahiri calculates the Diebold-Kilian information statistic and Theil’s U-statistic. Although there is variation across
countries, he finds that the quality of the forecasts tends to continuously
improve as the forecast horizon declines. For many countries, he finds
a dramatic improvement in the information content of the forecasts
beginning at about an 18-month horizon. This striking finding suggests
that the current state of economic forecasting provides useful predictions only when the lead time is a year and a half or less.
Lahiri also examines the usefulness of the probability forecasts
contained in the SPF to predict downturns in U.S. GDP at different
horizons. These probability forecasts have been reported since 1968 but
have been greatly underutilized by the profession. Lahiri first demonstrates how to use a receiver-operating-characteristic (ROC) curve to
select a probability threshold for signaling the rare event of a downturn.
Selecting an appropriate threshold, he reports hit/miss frequencies,
Kuipers scores, and odds ratios for the implied predicted downturn. He
finds that the probability forecast contains useful information for predicting GDP declines for up to two quarters ahead.
Rapach, in Chapter 4, proposes forecasting methods to deal with
problems associated with forecasting regional and industry-level (RIL)
variables. When forecasting such variables, an economist is confronted
with a large number of potential aggregate and region/industry-specific
predictor variables. In such a scenario, a traditional regression approach
would tend to overfit the model, and the resulting model would likely
forecast poorly out of sample. To operate in this data-rich environment,
Rapach suggests forecasters consider three new methodologies: 1)
bagging, 2) forecast combination, and 3) factor models. Bagging is a
Monte Carlo technique that stabilizes the model selection of the traditional approach of choosing variables based on significant t-statistics.
Forecast combination averages forecasts from separate autoregressivedistributed lag models using each candidate predictor. A factor model
uses one model and a small number of aggregate input variables to forecast the cross section of RIL variables. A final forecast is obtained by
averaging the forecasts from the three methods. Rapach cites research
that shows such methods have been demonstrated to improve the forecasting of financial returns, another environment where a multitude of
potential predictors exists.
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To provide evidence that such methods improve forecasts of RIL
variables, Rapach applies the methods to forecast quarterly employment growth in Michigan and Missouri from the end of the first quarter
of 1990 to the end of the first quarter of 2010. He constructs forecasts
using the three methods and 11 predictor variables. He finds that the
three forecasts tend to outperform forecasts based on a simple autoregressive model and also tend to outperform those based on regression
models that use each predictor separately. The best forecast, however,
is obtained by averaging the bagging, forecast combination, and factor model forecasts. Seemingly, each method contributes some unique
information for forecasting state-level employment growth.
Chapter 5 is based on a Sichel lecture delivered by Jansen, in which
he summarized his paper (coauthored with Bradley) exploring the possibility of incorporating nonlinear structure to improve the forecasts of
financial and real variables. The authors conduct an exercise to forecast monthly observations on the index of industrial production, the
10-year Treasury yield, and the excess return on Standard and Poor’s
stock index (the S&P 500). They focus on the threshold autoregressive
(TAR), logistic smooth transition autoregressive (LSTAR), and exponential smooth transition autoregressive (ESTAR) models, which allow
the structure of the model to depend on an observable state variable.
They use lagged values of the series as the state variable. For the industrial production and stock returns series, they also introduce a “current
depth of recession” variable, which is the difference between the current value of the series and its previous peak. This variable allows the
series to have asymmetric dynamics, depending on whether the series
is contracting or expanding.
Although Bradley and Jansen find strong evidence of nonlinearity
in the estimation period, the performance of the forecasts based on
the nonlinear models is mixed. Depending on the evaluation criterion
used, some of the nonlinear models do outperform naive and simple
autoregressive models. Formal tests for forecast improvement suggest
that the nonlinear models marginally improve the quality of the forecasts of industrial production and excess stock returns. Bradley and
Jansen’s work demonstrates both the challenges and potential benefits
of exploiting nonlinear structure.
Stekler, in Chapter 6, presents a survey of methods for evaluating
macroeconomic forecasts. He begins by posing a list of questions that
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any evaluation strategy should answer. He briefly describes the common statistical measures that test for unbiasedness, efficiency, and performance relative to a benchmark. He then describes two new developments in forecast evaluation. First, he proposes a method for jointly
evaluating the directional accuracy of forecasts of both output growth
and inflation based on the predictive performance test of Pesaran and
Timmermann. Second, he furnishes an innovative method for appraising a forecast based on the benefit to the user. To measure the benefit
of forecasts produced by the Federal Reserve (the Fed), he proposes
comparing two things: 1) the targeted federal funds rate from a Taylor
rule that uses the Fed’s forecasts of output and inflation and 2) the targeted federal funds rate from a Taylor rule that uses the actual values
of output and inflation. He reports finding that the Fed’s forecasting
errors produce a 100-basis-point error in the targeted federal funds rate.
Although this error seems large, it is much smaller than errors produced
by naive forecasts.
Having described evaluation procedures, Stekler then examines
actual forecasts of output growth and inflation. Summarizing the findings of his previous research on forecasts for the Group of Seven (G7)
countries, he reports that the results are mixed but tend to suggest that
forecasts do have systematic biases and informational inefficiencies.
There is also only marginal evidence that the profession’s forecasts
have improved over time. Stekler suggests that the poor forecasting
performance can be attributed to the inability to forecast recessions.
Stekler concludes by describing the evaluation of labor market forecasts. U.S. unemployment is countercyclical and is coincidental with
the business cycle in expansions, but lags in contractions. He asserts
that the use of nonlinear models to represent this asymmetry has had
only limited success in forecasting unemployment. He proposes a new
method for evaluating the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) long-term
forecast of employment by age/gender categories and for evaluating
the Census Bureau forecast of population by state. He decomposes
the category/state forecast errors into components: errors that result
from forecasting the aggregate and those that result from forecasting the category/state share. He evaluates the share errors using a dissimilarity index. He finds some evidence that the BLS employmentshare forecasts outperform a naive forecast, but that the Census Bureau
population-share forecasts do not outperform a naive forecast.
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In the final chapter, Chapter 7, Lee presents a survey of the methods
to efficiently combine abundant economic data to produce an improved
forecast of a particular variable. He considers scenarios where there are
many input variables and possibly many forecasts of the variable of
interest. When many input variables exist, he presents recently developed methods for reducing the data using principal components and
then constructing a forecast using a factor model. When many forecasts
exist, he describes advanced methods for optimally combining the forecasts. This now-well-developed theory has mainly focused on producing point forecasts. Lee demonstrates that these techniques can also be
applied to quantile, density, interval, and binary forecasts.
To conclude, I would like to acknowledge some individuals who
made the 2009–2010 lectures a success and a pleasure for me to host.
First, I would to thank the six presenters for their enthusiastic and stimulating public lectures, which, again, formed the basis for the present
volume. The long success of this lecture series has always depended on
the quality of our speakers.
There are others who must be acknowledged as well. The W.E.
Upjohn Institute for Employment Research provided financial support
and made the publication of this volume possible. Connie Volenski’s
administrative skills made the organization of the lectures effortless
for me, and I am greatly appreciative. Werner Sichel deserves special
acknowledgement for initiating this lecture series nearly 50 years ago.
His nurturing of this series over the many years has made an invaluable
contribution to the WMU Economics Department. Finally, I would like
to thank my wife, Shohreh Majin, and my son, Bakhtyar, for allowing
me evenings away from home to contemplate the future of economic
forecasting over late dinners with the presenters.
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Real-Time Forecasting
Dean Croushore
University of Richmond and
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia

This chapter will discuss real-time forecasting in a macroeconomic
policy context. I will begin by talking about the Survey of Professional
Forecasters (SPF), a survey of private-sector forecasters. Next, I will
discuss research on real-time data analysis and its importance in forecasting. Finally, I will discuss real-time forecasting in the 1990s.
In a policy environment, such as the one I faced for 14 years at the
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, you have three basic choices
for developing forecasts in a real-time forecasting environment. One
possibility, used by many policy analysts, is simply to rely on forecasts
made by others, such as the consulting firm Macroeconomic Advisors.
After all, forecasting firms devote considerable resources to forecasting, so why not trust their forecasts? An alternative is to look at surveys
of forecasters, such as the SPF. This gives you a range of forecasts, and
you can base your decisions on the median forecast, which is usually a
better forecast than the forecast provided by any individual forecaster.
The third possibility is to create your own forecasting model. This gives
you the ability to tweak the forecast to your own needs and to specify
your own baseline underlying the forecast. You can do some simple
things such as I did at the Fed—for instance, forecasting GDP for the
current quarter based on the employment data that are released early in
the month. Or you can run time-series models of your own specification, which often hold their own against much larger, more sophisticated models. Or, you could buy a large-model forecasting software
program, such as the one provided by Macroeconomic Advisors, and
then modify some of its assumptions to your own liking to produce
your own forecast based on its model structure. Unless you have many
resources at your disposal, however, you probably do not want to produce a large-model forecast on your own. You are unlikely to do better

7

Higgins.indb 7

11/3/2011 10:22:08 AM

8 Croushore

than others, and almost certain to produce much worse forecasts, unless
you have a large number of economists working on it, such as the dozens that work on forecasting at the Federal Reserve Board.
The major concern that you should have about all these forecasting
models is the role of judgment in the outcome of the forecasting exercise. The more you study forecasting, the more you realize how much
impact judgment has—there is no such thing as a pure model forecast.
First, there is judgment in determining what model to use. Second, there
is judgment about the underlying key parameters of the model: how do
you determine the natural rate of unemployment, or the growth rate of
potential GDP, or the equilibrium real interest rate, which are generally
not determined within a model? Those factors tend to drive the forecast
much more than you might think.

THE SURVEY OF PROFESSIONAL FORECASTERS
My own involvement with forecasting began in 1990 with a research
paper in which I wanted to get data on inflation expectations. I used
a survey that was run by the American Statistical Association and the
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) and was known as the
Economic Outlook Survey. The survey contained much useful information, and I was impressed that the survey had begun in 1968 and was
the longest quarterly survey of forecasters in existence. But shortly after
using the survey myself, I read an announcement that the survey was
folding because of lack of interest and because there was no organization that was willing to run it. As an economist at the Federal Reserve, I
thought the survey was incredibly useful—it gave great insight into the
expectations of the country’s leading forecasters. I was determined that
the survey should not die, and so I contacted Robert Allison of the NBER
and Victor Zarnowitz of the University of Chicago about the possibility
of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia taking over the survey. They
were both enthusiastic about having an institution like the Fed running
the survey, and so we took over, missing only one quarterly survey in the
transition.
After taking over the survey, I, along with my coresearcher Leonard
Mills, began to rehabilitate it. We renamed it the Survey of Professional
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Forecasters. We increased the number of participants (the participant list
was down to 13 forecasters when we took it over), tightened procedures
for production of the survey results, and added questions to increase the
value of the survey to researchers and to policymakers. Today, the survey is used to provide forecasts to policymakers before the meetings of
the Federal Open Market Committee, as well as to provide a solid database of historical forecasts for use by macroeconomic researchers. The
Philadelphia Fed’s Web site provides complete details on the survey’s
history and all the individual responses to each survey, as well as writeups for each survey and both median and mean data across forecasters
for each macroeconomic variable included in the survey.1
If people wish to use a forecast, or a survey of forecasts, for making decisions, they would like to feel confident that the survey provides
valid forecasts. Hence, much research has been done on the accuracy
of forecasts from surveys, including the SPF. Two standard tests of the
accuracy of forecasts are tests of 1) unbiasedness (that forecast errors
have a zero mean over long periods) and 2) efficiency (that forecast
errors are uncorrelated with information known when the forecast was
made). If forecasts are unbiased and efficient, then people are likely to
find them useful. If forecasts are biased or inefficient, then it should be
possible for someone to improve on the forecasts in real time.
SPF forecasts generally pass the tests of unbiasedness—forecasts
are unbiased in long samples. However, over short periods, the forecasts
might have persistent errors. Figure 2.1 provides an example of SPF forecasts of inflation (based on the GDP deflator) compared with the measure
of the inflation rate that is released one month after the end of the quarter.2
In the short run, the forecasts sometimes exhibit patterns in which forecast errors persist for some time. But, as I point out (Croushore 2010),
forecasters adapt fairly quickly to structural changes in the economy that
lead to short-run persistence of forecast errors, and before long the errors
disappear. If the forecasts were perfectly accurate, all the points would
lie on the 45-degree line in Figure 2.1. Although many points are off the
45-degree line, on average over the 35 years of data shown here, the plotted points lie fairly symmetrically around that line.
Most research also shows that the SPF forecasts pass tests for efficiency. However, there are exceptions. Some of the exceptions found in
the literature are not valid because although they show that the forecast
errors are correlated with another variable, they don’t use the data that
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Figure 2.1 SPF Forecasts versus One-Quarter-Later Actuals
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SOURCE: Author’s calculations from data from the SPF and the Real-Time Data Set
for Macroeconomists, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.

the forecasters had at the time they made their forecasts. Instead, those
studies use revised data, which the forecasters would not have had, so
their tests are not really tests of efficiency.
Ball and Croushore (2003) show that there is a tendency for forecast errors to be correlated with changes in monetary policy. As Figure
2.2 shows, SPF output forecast errors are negatively associated with
changes in the real federal funds interest rate. When the Fed tightens
monetary policy (and thus the real federal funds rate increases), forecasters reduce their forecasts for output growth, but not by enough.
As a result, output growth falls more than the forecasters expect, and
thus there is a negative relationship between output forecast errors and
changes in the real federal funds rate.
For the most part, though, despite the Ball-Croushore findings, the
forecast errors in the SPF tend to be small. The survey’s forecasts are
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Figure 2.2 Output Forecast Errors and Change in Real Federal
Funds Rate
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SOURCE: Author’s calculations from data from the SPF, Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia; and the FRED database, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.

generally better than simple univariate time-series models at short horizons, as Stark (2010) notes in a recent review of the forecast accuracy
of the SPF. However, there are some imperfections in the survey forecasts, especially for long horizons and with respect to the survey’s efficiency in responding to changes in monetary policy.

REAL-TIME DATA
In evaluating forecasts of macroeconomic variables, researchers
must be aware of data revisions. Some researchers are not careful about
this issue, so they grab data from the current database and perform tests
on forecasts as if the data in their database were the same as the data
that were available to researchers in real time. This is a dangerous and
invalid practice. Many papers have been written that show that some
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new model or other provides better forecasts than the SPF, but in most
cases the forecasting advantage comes because the researcher is comparing forecasts from a model using a recent data set to forecasts made
by the SPF forecasters using a completely different data set. Of course,
the two sets of forecasts are not comparable.
To be able to compare forecasts made with a new model to the SPF
forecasts in a legitimate manner, one would need to have at one’s disposal a real-time database, showing what the data looked like at the
time the SPF forecasters were making their forecasts. This is, in fact, the
purpose of the Real-Time Data Set for Macroeconomists, which Tom
Stark and I developed in the late 1990s and early 2000s. (See Croushore
and Stark [2000, 2001] for details.) The data set was developed at the
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, and new variables are continuously being added to the data set, based on work that continues at the
Philadelphia Fed and work that my students have completed at the University of Richmond. A database of this nature needs good institutional
support, as it is a public good. The Federal Reserve is a natural institution for supporting such projects, as it falls under the domain of providing macroeconomic data to the public for no charge.
Following the success of the Real-Time Data Set for Macroeconomists, other real-time databases have been developed all over the world.
In the United States, the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis developed
the ALFRED database, keeping successive vintages of the FRED (Federal Reserve Economic Data) database and making the data available
in a convenient form. The Bureau of Economic Analysis has also, since
2002, kept all the vintages of its Excel files containing National Income
and Product Accounts data and made that data available. The OECD
now has a large real-time data set containing data for all the countries in
the OECD, and the Euro Area Business Cycle Network recently made
a real-time database available for all the countries in the Euro area. The
United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Japan also maintain their own realtime databases.3
Some government statistical agencies in some countries have been
reluctant to help researchers develop real-time data sets: they fear that if
data revisions are examined by researchers, the statistical agencies will
be subject to criticism because of systematic revisions. But research
on data revisions is not intended to be critical of those agencies. The
research findings might help the agencies strengthen their procedures
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to avoid having predictable revisions, for example. Economists understand that data agencies have limited resources and cannot produce perfect data releases given their constraints. The goal of research is to help
people understand the limitations of the data and to explore the implications of those revisions for structural macroeconomic modeling, forecasting, and policy analysis. In addition, data revisions often reflect new
information that cannot be known any earlier. For example, tax returns
give the government statistical agencies much better data on income
for the preceding year than the agencies had during that year, so GDP
and income statistics are improved dramatically. Or, take the example
of inflation measures: by construction, the consumer price index is not
revised (except for changes in the seasonal pattern), whereas the personal consumption expenditures price index is revised; yet the latter is
a much superior measure of inflation precisely because the revisions
reflect changes in weights applied to different sectors that provide a
more accurate view of the economy.
The typical structure of real-time data sets is shown in the data
matrix in Table 2.1, which illustrates real-time data on real U.S. output. Each column reports a data vintage—that is, the date at which the
data are observed. So, the column labeled “Nov. 1965” tells you what
someone in November 1965 would have observed at the time. Each
row shows the data for a date for which real output is measured. Thus
the upper left value of 306.4 (in billions of real dollars) is the value
for real output in the first quarter of 1947 as someone in November
1965 would have observed in the government’s database. As you move
across a given row in the table, you see how data are revised. For example, in November 1965, the first release of the data on real output for
1965Q3 was 609.1 (as before, in billions of real dollars). That number
was revised to 613.0 in the data set of February 1966 and remained at
that level in the data set of May 1966. The large increase seen in later
vintages of the data of 3636.3 is not because of revisions to data but
because of changes in the base year, from 1958 in the vintages of 1965
and 1966, to a base year of 2005 in vintages of 2009 and 2010. Moving down the main diagonal of the table, we see that the last recorded
observation in each column shows the initial release of the data for each
date: 609.1 for 1965Q3, 621.7 for 1965Q4, 633.8 for 1966Q1, 13,014.0
for 2009Q3, 13,155.0 for 2009Q4, and 13,254.7 for 2010Q1.
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Table 2.1 Data Matrix for Real U.S. Output (billions of real dollars)
Vintage Nov. 1965 Feb. 1966 May 1966 Nov. 2009 Feb. 2010 May 2010
Quarter
1947Q1 306.4
306.4
306.4
1,772.2
1,772.2
1,772.2
1947Q2 309.0
309.0
309.0
1,769.5
1,769.5
1,769.5
1947Q3 309.6
309.6
309.6
1,768.0
1,768.0
1,768.0
1965Q3
1965Q4
1966Q1
2009Q2
2009Q3
2009Q4
2010Q1

609.1

613.0
621.7

613.0
624.4
633.8

3,636.3
3,724.0
3,815.4

3,636.3
3,724.0
3,815.4

3,636.3
3,724.0
3,815.4

12,901.5
13,014.0

12,901.5
12,973.0
13,155.0

12,901.5
12,973.0
13,149.5
13,254.7

SOURCE: Real-Time Data Set for Macroeconomists, Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia.

If data revisions were small and random, we would not worry about
them affecting the structural modeling, forecasting, and policy analysis.
But a look at the revisions should convince you that the revisions may
be large and consequential. For example, Figure 2.3 shows the revisions
to real output growth for the first quarter of 1977. From the data set’s
initial release at 5.2 percent, it was revised upward a few months later to
7.5 percent, and ultimately was revised upward as high as 9.6 percent.
But later it was revised down as low as 4.7 percent in the benchmark
revision of July 2010. So the revisions can be large and can occur even
three decades after the first release of the data for a particular date.
You might think that such large revisions are rare and affect output
growth for just one quarter, but even in the long run, data revisions can
be large. For instance, if you average real output growth over five-year
periods, you will find large revisions, which could potentially affect
your view of long-run economic growth. As Table 2.2 shows, however,
the five-year growth rate can be revised by as much as 0.6 percentage
points, which is a large revision for a growth rate that is as low as 1.9
percent. For example, the growth rate in the first half of the 1970s was
initially released as 2.1 percent, but by 1999 it was revised upward to
2.6 percent, nearly a 25 percent increase.

Higgins.indb 14

11/3/2011 10:22:12 AM

Real-Time Forecasting 15
Figure 2.3 Real Output Growth for 1977, Quarter 1 (as viewed from the
perspective of 133 different vintages)
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SOURCE: Real-Time Data Set for Macroeconomists, Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia.

In modeling data revisions, a key question for which an answer is
needed for modeling or forecasting is whether the data revisions can
be modeled as providing news or reducing noise. Data revisions that
provide news are those that come about when the government’s data
releases are optimal forecasts of later releases. Under that situation,
data revisions will not be predictable in advance from data known (by
anyone) at the time the data are released. Providing such data revisions
requires the government statistical agency to not report its sample information alone, but to use judgment and forecasting models to optimally
forecast the values of missing data, so that the data release is an optimal
forecast of later data releases. However, often data releases are not constructed in this manner, but rather fill in the missing source data with
forecasts in such a way that the data release is not an optimal forecast
of later data releases—usually because today’s data release is correlated
with other data known at the time. In such a situation, future data revisions will be predictable, and data revisions reduce measurement error,
but each data release is not an optimal forecast of future data releases.
For example, we know that there is a strong correlation between GDP
data and employment data. If the government reports the GDP data
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Table 2.2 Five-Year Average Annual Growth Rate of Real Output across
Vintages
Vintage
1975 1980 1985 1991 1995 1999 2003 2009 2010
Five-year period
’49Q4 to ’54Q4 5.2 5.1 5.1 5.5 5.5 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3
’54Q4 to ’59Q4 2.9 3.0 3.0 2.7 2.7 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2
’59Q4 to ’64Q4 4.1 4.0 4.0 3.9 4.0 4.2 4.2 4.3 4.3
’64Q4 to ’69Q4 4.3 4.0 4.1 4.0 4.0 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4
’69Q4 to ’74Q4 2.1 2.2 2.5 2.1 2.3 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6
’74Q4 to ’79Q4
3.7 3.9 3.5 3.4 3.9 4.0 3.9 3.9
’79Q4 to ’84Q4
2.2 2.0 1.9 2.2 2.5 2.5 2.5
’84Q4 to ’89Q4
3.2 3.0 3.2 3.5 3.6 3.5
’89Q4 to ’94Q4
2.3 1.9 2.4 2.5 2.5
’94Q4 to ’99Q4
3.9 4.0 4.1
’99Q4 to ’04Q4
2.2 2.4
’04Q4 to ’09Q4
1.2
SOURCE: Author’s calculations from Real-Time Data Set for Macroeconomists, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.

based on its sample of the elements of GDP but ignores the information
contained in the employment data, then its data release will contain
measurement error, and data revisions will reduce noise. If I were a
forecaster interested in predicting future data revisions, I would look
at the data on employment and form a forecast of future GDP releases
using a model combining the data from the GDP release and the data
from the employment release. Such a forecast would be a better forecast
of future releases of GDP than the government’s release of GDP data.
This discussion raises a key question: should the government use
the limited source data that it knows, combined with other information such as data on employment and industrial production, to form an
optimal forecast of GDP? Or should the government follow a simple
rule to fill in its missing data on forecasts of GDP and produce a noisy
measure, ignoring data on other variables? You might think that the
first method would be preferable, which seems intuitively clear. But
the danger is that once you start forecasting with extraneous variables,
since forecasting is more of an art than a science, the data releases for
GDP will become very subjective. As an employee of a government
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statistical agency, you then open yourself up to the criticism that you
are manipulating the data for political means. On the other hand, if you
follow standard and well-established procedures for filling in missing
data, you avoid any possibility of people thinking that you are manipulating the data for political reasons, because anyone can replicate your
results, even though your data releases are not optimal forecasts of later
data releases. In this situation, noise trumps news.

FORECASTING
How does a forecaster produce optimal forecasts in real time?
First, any forecaster needs good data; a forecast is only as good as the
data used to generate the forecast. The literature on forecasting mainly
focuses on model development—trying to build a better forecasting
model, especially comparing forecasts from a new model to other models or to forecasts made in real time.4
The first question in this literature is, “Are data revisions large
enough to affect forecasts in a meaningful way?” We have seen that
data revisions may be substantial, but what is the impact of those revisions on forecasts? Stark and Croushore (2002) suggest three ways this
can occur: 1) by changing the data that are input into a model; 2) by
changing the coefficient estimates of the model; and 3) by changing the
structure of a model, such as changing the number of lags that provide
the model’s best fit. Stark and Croushore (2002) illustrate these ideas
using repeated observation forecasting (ROF), which uses different
real-time data vintages for the same sample period to see how forecasts change as the vintage of the data changes. By running these ROFs
allowing changes in the lags in the model, allowing coefficient estimates to change, and changing vintages, we can observe all three ways
in which forecasts change. To isolate which reason is the main cause of
changes in the forecasts, we can run another set of ROFs that keeps the
number of lags unchanged. A comparison of the baseline result and this
one reveals the importance of changes in the lag structure in the model.
To isolate the effect of changes in parameter estimates, we can keep the
parameter estimates fixed and generate forecasts based on the different
vintages of data, to see how much the forecasts are affected by param-
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eter changes. Everything else must be due to changes in the data input
into the model. Looking at the literature on forecasting with real-time
data reveals no broad, general tendency. For some variables and for
some forecasting methods, the forecasts change significantly because
of data revisions. However, other variables and forecasting methods are
more robust to data revisions, as Croushore (forthcoming) shows.
Because data revisions have mixed effects on forecasts, we might
ask, “Is there an optimal method for forecasters to adjust their forecasts
in the face of data uncertainty?” This is a much more difficult question to answer, and there have not been very many research papers that
have tried to tackle it. A few papers seem to find some degree of ability to improve forecasts by accounting for data revisions (see Koenig,
Dolmas, and Piger 2003), but the predictability of data revisions is fairly
small, and larger forecasting gains may be found by pursuing aspects of
modeling other than modeling data revisions. Some researchers model
data revisions with time-series models, but the evidence in Croushore
and Stark (2001) suggests that this will be problematic because benchmark revisions cannot be characterized as autoregressive moving average (ARMA) models, and benchmark revisions are the most significant
type of data revisions. This explains why sophisticated filtering methods
and state-space models often fail to deliver improvements in forecasts.
In summary, forecasters face difficult issues in forecasting in real
time in the face of data revisions. It is not clear that the payoff to optimally handling data revisions exceeds the benefits of working on other
aspects of forecast modeling, especially if data revisions are difficult to
predict, as is generally the case.

APPLICATION: FORECASTING IN THE 1990s
To illustrate real-time forecasting problems, I will demonstrate with
a real-life example from my own forecasting experience at the Federal
Reserve. This example uses forecasts from the SPF to show the effects
of data revisions. In the 1990s, the tech boom provided an unexpected
burst of productivity, increasing output growth, reducing the unemployment rate, and causing forecasters to rethink key aspects of their models. In this section, I will look at the forecast errors made in the 1990s
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and show how forecasters eventually caught up to the change in productivity growth, although it took some time.
In my analysis, I will look at one-year-ahead forecasts of various
macroeconomic variables. Each of the SPF forecasts is made in the
middle of the quarter, shortly after the first release of the GDP data for
the previous quarter. After that, data revisions occur once a year for data
over the past three years, and benchmark revisions every five years or
so cause significant data revisions for many years’ worth of data.
Forecasts for real GDP growth made in the mid-1990s were wrong
for many years in a row (Figure 2.4). The forecasters had expected real
GDP growth to be just a bit over 2 percent for those years, and it turned
out to be double that number. Forecasters were slow to realize that the
tech boom had brought a persistently high growth rate of productivity, which translated directly into higher GDP growth. After persistent
forecast errors from 1996 to 1998, the forecasters began to raise their
forecasts for GDP growth in 2000. By 2001, the forecasts called for
GDP growth close to 3 percent, just in time for the tech bubble to burst,
driving GDP growth substantially lower as the United States experienced a mild recession.
With GDP growth occurring much faster than the forecasters
expected, you might think that inflation would be higher than the forecasters thought, but in fact the opposite was true (Figure 2.5). Because
the source of the increase in GDP growth was productivity growth, this
was a classic supply shock, causing faster real GDP growth and slower
growth of the price level. So the forecasters were again persistently
incorrect in their inflation forecasts from the early 1990s until the end
of 1999. They thought that output was above potential output, so they
kept thinking that inflation would rise in the future. But in fact the forecasters had pegged potential output too low, and inflation fell almost
continuously throughout the decade.
For the most part, the forecast errors on real GDP growth translated
into errors in unemployment forecasts (Figure 2.6). The stronger-thananticipated growth of GDP meant that the unemployment rate would
decline more than was forecast, to be sure. But the forecasters were
also very unsure of what the natural rate of unemployment was. Several
years after the economic recovery from the 1990–1991 recession, they
thought the unemployment rate might have bottomed out at 5.5 percent.
But the tech boom kept the demand for workers growing throughout

Higgins.indb 19

11/3/2011 10:22:13 AM

20 Croushore
Figure 2.4 Real GDP Growth Forecasts and Actuals
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SOURCE: SPF, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia; and FRED database, Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis.

Figure 2.5 Inflation (GDP Price Index) Forecasts and Actuals
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SOURCE: SPF, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia; and FRED database, Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
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the decade, and the forecasters were wrong almost continuously that
decade. They gradually ratcheted down their view of the natural rate of
unemployment, but they were always behind the curve until the 2001
recession.
In describing these forecast errors, I have used a data set of vintage
November 2001, which could be deceptive because of data revisions. In
real time, the forecasters did not see the line labeled “Actual” that I have
shown in these charts. Rather, they observed early releases of the data,
which may have looked quite different. So, the forecasts in Figures 2.4,
2.5, and 2.6 look pretty bad, as they clearly made severe and persistent
errors. But, if you knew only what the forecasters knew at the time they
made their forecasts, the forecast errors would not have looked as bad,
which is why the forecasters were slow to adjust their methods. For
example, Figure 2.7 shows the same data as Figure 2.4 for real GDP
growth forecasts but adds in a line labeled “Real-time actual” showing
at each date what the last data point looked like when the forecasters made their forecasts. Of course, because these are one-year-ahead
forecasts, the forecasters are always a year behind, so they still appear
to make persistent forecast errors. But the “Real-time actual” line is
Figure 2.6 Unemployment Rate Forecasts and Actuals
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SOURCE: SPF, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia; and FRED database, Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
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generally closer to the forecast line than is the “Actual” line. The point
is, of course, that the forecasters did not know how severe their forecast
errors were in real time; they only realized it much later.
Another way to see how slow the forecasters were to change their
outlook is in their long-term forecasts for real output growth. The SPF
forecasters are asked to provide a forecast for average real GDP growth
for the next 10 years. As Figure 2.8 shows, the forecasters seemed to
be reluctant to change their views about real GDP growth in the future,
despite persistent real GDP growth rates of about 4 percent throughout
the second half of the 1990s. In fact, the forecasters had lowered their
forecasts of real GDP growth over the coming decade in 1996, just as
the productivity boom was starting. They finally changed their view in
2000 and 2001, just as a mild recession was beginning.

CONCLUSION
Forecasters face a difficult task in real time. As we have seen, data
revisions can wreak havoc with forecasts. As the example from the
1990s shows, when structural change occurs in the economy, it may
take forecasters a long time to adjust their models. That situation is
exacerbated when data are revised and the initial releases of the data are
much different from the later data, as was the case with real GDP growth
in the second half of the 1990s. The key to good forecasting is probably the use of judgment, rather than technical expertise. In the 1990s,
some forecasters recognized the permanent (or at least persistent) shift
in productivity growth, including Fed chairman Alan Greenspan. The SPF
forecasts took a long time to catch up to the productivity boom, but
some individual forecasters performed much better.
If you want to become a real-time forecaster, you should think
about major elements of your model, such as the growth rate of potential output (and the growth rate of productivity) and the natural rate of
unemployment. If you can make a better guess about changes in these
variables over time, you can outperform forecasters who have greater
technical expertise. But every forecaster, no matter how talented, will
have trouble dealing with data revisions, which are largely unforecastable, and which can make forecast errors surprisingly large.
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Figure 2.7 Real GDP Growth Forecasts and Real-Time Actuals
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SOURCE: SPF, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia; and FRED database, Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis.

Figure 2.8 Real GDP: 10-Year Forecasts
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Notes
1. http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/real-time-center/survey-ofprofessional-forecasters/ (accessed January 21, 2011).
2. See Croushore (2010) for more details on the data shown here.
3. See my Web page at https://facultystaff.richmond.edu/~dcrousho/data.htm for
links to all of these data sets.
4. In this section, I will report the main results in two survey papers, Croushore
(2006) and Croushore (forthcoming).
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Limits to Economic Forecasting
Kajal Lahiri
University at Albany, State University of New York
Economic forecasting is not a very reputable profession. There
is skepticism not only by laymen but by most academic economists
regarding the true capability of macroeconomic forecasters. The conventional wisdom is that economic forecasters are mere charlatans.
However, there are numerous reasons why economic forecasts are
so hard to get right. Not only do we not understand the continuously
changing economic processes that generate the variable we want to
predict, but we do not always have the appropriate measurements to
identify the effects of sudden structural breaks that are due to economic
and noneconomic factors. One way to make forecasts more useful—
though not necessarily more accurate—might be to follow the “truth
in labeling” often used in the marketing of many products. By this I
mean every forecast should come with the associate expected errors
like forecast uncertainty, so that both the forecasters and their clients
would know what level of confidence to place in a forecast. This aspect
of any forecast should be communicated, in addition to the forecasts
themselves. Makridakis, Hogarth, and Gaba (2009) forcefully make
the point that not having a proper estimate of the underlying uncertainty means succumbing to the illusion of control and experiencing
surprises, often with negative consequences. It is in this spirit that since
the mid-1990s the Bank of England and Sveriges Riksbank of Sweden
have been reporting fan charts that show subjective confidence bands
surrounding official forecasts. Since November 2007, each member of
the U.S. Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) has also been publishing information about uncertainty associated with that committee’s
economic outlooks. As Granger (1996) points out, in many disciplines
there seem to be horizons beyond which useful forecasting is not possible; for instance, in weather forecasting it is four or five days. An
essential element of forecasting is to extract useful signals from noisy
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data, and to project them into the future. Certainly, an aspect that provides limits to how far ahead one can forecast is when the forecastable
signals get lost in the noise. It would also be helpful to be aware of these
kinds of limits to economic forecasting in cases where the underlying
uncertainty is hopelessly high.
Against this backdrop, in this chapter I will evaluate the capability of a large number of professional forecasters to forecast real GDP
growth at different horizons and will determine how far ahead they can
really forecast. The advantage of analyzing the predictions made by a
large number of professional forecasters is that abrupt structural and
policy changes that are hard to pick up by estimated forecasting models
can possibly be incorporated into the subjective judgments of experts.
There seems to be a widely held expectation that the economy can be
forecast over a typical business cycle, which is about five to seven years
long. I will contrast two types of forecasts: 1) the actual growth rate and
2) whether the growth will be negative in some specified quarter in the
future. I find that forecasts for the actual GDP growth do not have much
value when the horizon goes beyond 18 months. However, the probability forecasts for negative GDP growth have no value when the horizon
exceeds six months. I explore reasons why the directional probability
forecasts perform worse than the quantitative real GDP forecasts.

INFORMATION CONTENT OF REAL GDP FORECASTS
In this section I analyze the quantitative forecasts using 15 years
of monthly private-sector forecast data for 18 developed countries,
reported over 24 different forecast horizons. The real GDP forecasts
come from Consensus Economics Inc., an international economic
survey organization. Since October 1989, Consensus Economics Inc.
has been polling more than 600 forecasters each month and recording
their forecasts for principal macroeconomic variables (including GDP
growth, inflation, interest rates, and exchange rates) for a large number
of countries. Forecasts are made for the current year (based on partial information about developments in that year) and for the following
year. The number of forecasters ranges from 10 to 30 for most of the
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countries, and for the major industrialized countries the panelists are
based in the countries for which they forecast.
We study the consensus forecasts of average annual real GDP
growth. Survey respondents make their first forecasts when there are 24
months to the end of the year being forecast; that is, they start forecasting GDP growth in January of the previous year, and their last monthly
forecast is reported at the beginning of December of the target year,
23 months later. So for each country and for each target year I have 24
forecasts of varying horizons. Our data set ranges from October 1989
to June 2004. The countries we study are the 18 industrialized countries
for which forecasts are available from Consensus Economics Inc.1
In order to evaluate the forecast errors correctly, the forecasts should
be matched with the actual data being forecast. It is well documented
in the literature that data revisions may have an important impact on
the perceived performance of the forecasters. Since forecasters cannot
possibly be aware of data revisions after they report their forecasts, we
use an early revision as the actual value, which is compiled from the
midyear reports of the issue of OECD Economic Outlook immediately
following the target year. However, because of the changes in variable
definitions (i.e., GNP to GDP, or West Germany to unified Germany),
some of the data are not available in the June issue of OECD Economic
Outlook. We collected these data from the original sources, such as the
May and June issues of the Bureau of Economic Analysis’s Survey of
Business, or issues of Deutsche Bundesbank’s Monthly Report in the
year immediately following the target year.
The information value of a forecast is related to how accurate the
forecast is. In this section, we will provide statistics such as mean squared
error (MSE), mean absolute error (MAE), and Theil’s U-statistic,
along with another statistic recently proposed by Diebold and Kilian
(2001). Whereas MSE and MAE depend on the variability of the actual
process, Theil’s U-statistic scales the root mean square error (RMSE)
by the variability of underlying data and has the advantage of being
independent of the variance of the actual process. Formally,
T
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Equation (3.1) compares the forecast errors with a naive forecast, yn . If
Uh is more than one, the forecast does not beat the naive forecast. An
important issue in calculating the Uh is the selection of the naive forecast. In this study, we will follow the literature and use the forecast of
no change as the naive forecast, i.e., yn  yt 1 .
To see the improvement in the performance of forecasts over
decreasing horizons, we also provide an R2 measure, which is based
on the idea of a predictability measure proposed by Diebold and Kilian
(2001). They propose the measure of predictability as

ps , k  1 

E  L(es ) 

E  L(ek ) 

,

where E  L(ek )  denotes the expected loss in the long-run forecasts and
E  L(es )  denotes the expected loss in the short-run forecasts. If MSE
is used as the loss function, then we have
ps , k  1 

MSEs
.
MSEk

Diebold and Kilian (2001) use this measure to compute the predictability of several macro variables using the realized data. Using
k-period-ahead survey forecasts as the naive forecast, ps,k will give the
improvement in the forecasts as horizon decreases.
Table 3.1 presents MAE, MSE, and Theil’s U-statistics for 12- and
24-month-ahead forecasts. Later we also provide the Theil’s U-statistics
for all horizons. For 24-month-ahead forecasts, Theil’s U-statistic is less
than one for only Canada, Denmark, Germany, and the United States.
The worst performers in 24-month-ahead forecasts are Portugal, Ireland, and the Netherlands, which have Theil’s U-statistics of 1.45, 1.41,
and 1.39, respectively. For 12-month-ahead forecasts, all the countries,
with the exception of Ireland and Portugal, have Theil’s U-statistics of
less than one, implying that the forecasts have value over the no-change
forecast.
Figure 3.1 presents Diebold and Kilian’s ph,24 and Theil’s U h ( yt 1 )
for each forecast horizon and country. Notice that large values of
Theil’s U imply large forecast errors. On the other hand, large values
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Table 3.1 Goodness of Fit of Forecasts (MAE, RMSE, and Theil’s U)
12-month-ahead forecasts
24-month-ahead forecasts
Country
MAE
RMSE Theil’s U MAE
RMSE Theil’s U
Austria
0.98
1.16
0.81
1.24
1.48
1.01
Belgium
0.99
1.15
0.72
1.28
1.68
1.02
Canada
1.21
1.36
0.70
1.44
1.70
0.88
Denmark
0.72
0.99
0.75
0.96
1.14
0.84
Finland
2.24
2.89
0.87
2.70
3.37
1.07
France
0.79
0.99
0.73
1.15
1.50
1.08
Germany
0.79
1.03
0.60
1.49
1.96
0.99
Ireland
2.35
2.76
1.08
2.98
3.67
1.41
Italy
0.77
0.87
0.65
1.39
1.61
1.19
Japan
1.41
1.58
0.74
1.90
2.30
1.04
Netherlands
0.89
1.06
0.88
1.38
1.72
1.39
Norway
0.92
1.13
0.73
1.14
1.33
1.00
Portugal
0.98
1.31
1.02
1.40
1.89
1.45
Spain
0.61
0.86
0.66
1.18
1.58
1.20
Sweden
0.90
1.13
0.69
1.46
1.84
1.13
Switzerland
1.22
1.45
0.92
1.71
2.04
1.26
United Kingdom 0.77
1.02
0.70
1.08
1.62
1.12
United States
0.96
1.09
0.64
1.28
1.59
0.96
SOURCE: Author’s own research.

of ph,24 imply that forecasts improve significantly over the 24-monthahead forecast ft ,24 . The right axes in the figures show ph,24 , whereas the
left axes show the values of U h ( yt 1 ) . Since 1.0 is the threshold value
of U h ( yt 1 ) for determining whether the forecast can beat the naive
forecast of no change, the plots in Figure 3.1 include a horizontal line
through 1.0. In addition, to pinpoint the longest horizon at which the
forecasts beat the naive forecast, the graphs also include a vertical line
through the longest horizon at which the estimated U h ( yt 1 ) is lower
than one. This provides an easy way to compare the countries with each
other. For all the countries, as the forecast horizon decreases, the quality of the forecasts increases, as expected. The graphs also point out
significant heterogeneity across countries.
When we look at the performance rankings based on Theil’s
U h ( yt 1 ) , we observe that in addition to the four country forecasts that
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Figure 3.1 Information Content of Forecasts over Horizons, October
1989–June 2004
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Figure 3.1 (continued)

NOTE: U(h) = Theil’s U; P(h,24) = Diebold-Kilian predictability statistic.
SOURCE: Author’s analysis of data from the SPF.
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beat the naive forecast when horizon is 24 months (i.e., the American,
Danish, German, and Canadian forecasts given in Table 3.1), we now
see that Austrian and Norwegian forecasts beat the naive forecast when
the horizon is 23 months. In terms of the worst performances in beating
the naive forecast, we find that the Irish and Portuguese forecasts beat
the naive forecast at horizons of 10 and 11 months, respectively. These
are followed by Switzerland and the Netherlands, which beat the naive
forecast when the horizon is 13 months.
The Diebold-Kilian measure of predictability, ph,24 , shows the
improvement in the information content of the forecasts as measured by
the decrease in the mean squared errors over the MSE of the 24-monthahead forecasts. As shown in Figure 3.1, the predictive ability of GDP
forecasts for some countries (e.g., France, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
Japan, and the United States) does not improve over the 24-monthahead forecasts when the horizon is relatively long, but for some other
countries (e.g., Germany, Ireland, and Spain), each additional month
increases the information content of the forecasts over the previous
month, even in longer-run forecasts. For most of the countries, we see
that MSE substantially decreases in the short-run forecasts, causing ph,24
to be close to 100 percent when the forecast horizon is one month. Two
exceptions are the Norwegian and Irish GDP growth forecasts, where
the final values of ph,24 are less than 80 percent.

EXPLORING THE DATA-GENERATING PROCESSES
We find that, historically, real GDP has been a difficult variable to
predict beyond 24 months at the maximum. One might think that this
can be attributed to the variability of the underlying series. However, it
is not the variability but rather the predictability of the target variable
that is one of the important factors in the analysis. This is the focus of
this section.
Following Galbraith (2003) and Galbraith and Tkacz (2007), we
calculate the forecast content and content horizons for the quarterly
GDP growth rate for all seven countries in our sample over the period
1990–2007. The forecast content is defined as the proportionate gain
in the MSE from the best-fitting autoregressive model over the uncon-
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ditional mean of the series as the benchmark. The forecast content
horizon is defined as the horizon beyond which the forecast content is
close to zero. Galbraith (2003) has characterized the content function of
AR(p) models analytically, taking into account the uncertainty associated with parameter estimation. We allow p to be no greater than 4 for
quarterly GDP data. The value of p is chosen by the Schwarz information criterion, using an upper bound. The benchmark values were the
unconditional means of the individual series during 1990–2007. All the
data used in this section are downloaded from Datastream, a financial
statistical database from Thomson Reuters.
The results of the estimation of forecast content functions for seven
industrialized countries are presented in Figure 3.2. For annual GDP
growth using quarterly data, the forecast content becomes less than 0.05
when the horizon exceeds six quarters. These findings are consistent
Figure 3.2 Real GDP Predictability Based on AR(p) Models
(quarterly horizons)
1.00

0.80

Canada

France

Germany

Italy

Japan

US
U.S.

U.K.
UK

0.60

0.40

0.20

0.00
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

SOURCE: Author’s analysis of SPF data.
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with the results reported in Galbraith (2003), who has looked at the
predictability of GDP and inflation for Canada and the United States.
We should point out that our forecast content functions are based
purely on linear autoregressive models of the target variables. In reality, forecast content and predictability can be and possibly are improved
upon by incorporating additional information and using more complicated models.2 In addition, the forecast content functions are typically
estimated using currently available revised data. For variables like real
GDP that go through a substantial amount of data revision, their predictability in real time can be quite different. Since the variance of the early
revisions of a variable is necessarily less than that of the revised series,
the predictability of a series may seem to be less attractive than what
one may get using real-time data. In that sense, the forecast content
from the simple AR model provides an overall lower bound on the true
predictability of a series. For real GDP, Croushore (2006) reports mixed
evidence as to the effect of data revisions on predictability, depending
on the sample period. Since data revisions are relatively small for inflation, they have very little effect on predictability. In our analysis, the
relative ranking of different countries in terms of RMSE does not match
the relative ranking of those countries in terms of forecast content horizons that one obtains from Galbraith’s method for the variable. The
ranking can also depend on the specific benchmark used in the analysis.
Thus it is necessary to study the predictability of real GDP by professional forecasters in real time with respect to a more natural benchmark.

EVALUATING PROBABILITY FORECASTS FOR REAL
GDP DECLINES
In this section I report on the value of the subjective probability
forecasts that are obtained from the SPF as predictors of GDP downturns. Even though these forecasts have been available since 1968 and
have drawn media attention, very little systematic analysis has been
conducted to look into their usefulness as possible business cycle
indicators.3
One purpose of this section is to illustrate that an evaluation of
recorded probability forecasts by professional economists can suggest
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reasons for forecasting failures and can help define limits to the current
capability of macroeconomic forecasts. The traditional and the most
popular way of evaluating probability forecasts is the MSE type of measure, such as Brier’s quadratic probability score (QPS), which evaluates
the external correspondence between the probability forecasts and the
realization of the event. This approach, however, can fail to identify the
ability of a forecasting system to evaluate the odds of the occurrence of
an event against its nonoccurrence, which is a very important characteristic to the users of forecasts. A high performance score can be achieved
by totally unskilled forecasts having little information value. Thus, the
traditional approach can be inadequate in evaluating the usefulness of
probability forecasts, particularly for rare events.4
The SPF has been collecting subjective probability forecasts of
real GDP/GNP declines during the current and four subsequent quarters since its inception in 1968.5 At the end of the first month of each
quarter, the individual forecasters in the SPF form their forecasts. The
survey collects probability assessments for a decline in real GDP in the
current quarter and in each of the next four quarters, conditional on the
growth in the current period. The number of respondents has varied
between 15 and 60 over the quarters. Since our aim in this study is to
evaluate the SPF probability forecasts at the macro level, we use forecasts averaged over individuals. Using the July revisions, during our
sample period from the fourth quarter of 1968 to the second quarter of
2004, there were 20 quarters of negative GDP growth spread out over
six periods, variously beginning in 1969:4, 1973:4, 1980:1, 1981:3,
1990:3, and 2001:1. These made up six separate episodes of real GDP
declines. Thus, only about 14 percent of quarters in the entire sample of
143 quarters exhibited negative GDP growth. The annualized real-time
real GDP growth issued every July is used as the forecasting target,
against which the forecasting performance of the SPF forecasts will be
evaluated.
As noted above, the traditional way of evaluating probability forecasts for the occurrence of a binary event is to assess the calibration of
the forecasts against realizations—that is, to assess the external correspondence between the probability forecasts and the actual occurrence
of the event. A measure-oriented approach simply compares the forecast probabilities with the realization of a binary event, which is represented by a dummy variable taking value 1 or 0, depending upon the
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occurrence of the event. The most commonly used measure is Brier’s
QPS, a probability analog of mean squared error. Thus,
T

(3.2) QPS  1 / T  ( f t  x t ) 2 ,
t 1

where f t is the forecast probability made at time t, xt is the realization of
the event (1 if the event occurs and 0 otherwise) at time t, and T is the
total number of the observations—or forecasting quarters in our case.
The QPS ranges from 0 to 1, with a score of 0 corresponding to
perfect accuracy, and is a function only of the difference between the
assessed probabilities and realizations. The calculated quadratic probability scores for each forecasting horizon from the current quarter (Q0)
to the next four quarters (Q1, Q2, Q3, and Q4) are calculated to be
0.077, 0.098, 0.103, 0.124, and 0.127, respectively. Thus, even though
these scores deteriorate as the forecast horizon increases, all seem to
suggest good calibration and are close to zero.

RECEIVER (OR RELATIVE) OPERATING
CHARACTERISTIC (ROC)
In evaluating rare event probabilities, it is crucial to minimize the
impact of the predominant outcome on the outcome score. More specifically, the impact of correctly identifying the frequent event, which
is the primary source of the hedging, should be minimized. So a better
approach to forecast performance should concentrate on the hit rate and
false alarm rate of the infrequent event, instead of the “percentage correctly predicted” that is the very basis of QPS (Doswell, Davies-Jones,
and Keller 1990; Murphy 1991).
A simple and often-used measure of forecast skill, the Kuipers score,
or KS—sometimes referred to as the Pierce skill score—is obtained by
taking the difference between the hit rate (H) and the false alarm rate
(F), where H is the proportion of the number of times an event was
forecast to the number of times it occurred, and F is the proportion of
the number of times the event was forecast to the number of times it did
not occur. Given a decision threshold w, the contingency table for successes and failures for the event can be written as in Table 3.2. Then the
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Table 3.2 Schematic Contingency Table
Event
Event
occurred
did not occur
Event forecast

Total

Yes
No

a (hit)
c (miss)

b (false alarm)
d (correct
rejection)

a+b
c+d

Total

a+c

b+d

a+b+c+d=T

NOTE: T = total number of observations.
SOURCE: Author’s own research.

KS can be calculated as H − F = (ad − bc) / ([a + c] [b + d]). Assuming
independence of the hit and false alarm rates, the asymptotic standard
error of the KS is given by
[ H (1  H ) / (a  c)]  [ F (1  F ) / (b  d )] .

(See Agresti [1996].) Alternatively, based on the market-timing test of
Pesaran and Timmermann (1992), Granger and Pesaran (2000a,b) have
suggested an alternative test for the significance of the Kuipers test,

PT

_

_

T KS / Px (1  Px ) / x(1  x) , where Px

_

_

x H  (1  x) F .

Stephenson (2000) notes that if one of the two elements in a column of
the contingency table (e.g., d) is very large, then the Kuipers skill score
effectively disregards the other element (e.g., b) almost completely.
This can be a limitation of the KS in evaluating rare event forecasts.
Instead, the forecast skill can better be judged by comparing the
odds of making a good forecast (a hit) to the odds of making a bad
forecast (a false alarm)—i.e., by using the odds ratio θ = [H/(1 − H)]/
[F/(1 − F)], which is simply equal to the cross-product ratio (ad)/(bc)
obtainable from the contingency table. The odds ratio is unity when
the forecasts and the realizations are independent or KS = 0, and can
be easily tested for significance by considering the log odds, which are
approximately normal with a standard error, given by
1/ a  1/ b  1/ c  1/ d .
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Note that each cell count should be at least 5 for the validity of the
approximation. KS and θ are reported in Table 3.3 for relevant values of
the decision threshold w.
One important but often overlooked issue in the evaluation of probability forecasts is the role of the selected threshold. The performance
of a probability forecast in terms of discrimination ability is actually
the result of the combination of the intrinsic discrimination ability of
a forecasting system and the selection of the threshold. In this regard,
the receiver (or relative) operating characteristic (ROC) is a convenient
descriptive approach, but unfortunately has drawn little attention in
econometrics.6
The decision to issue a forecast for occurrence or nonoccurrence of
an event is typically made based on a predetermined threshold (say, w)
on the weight of evidence scale W. The occurrence forecast is announced
if W > w; the nonoccurrence is announced otherwise. ROC can be represented by a graph of the hit rate against the false alarm rate as w varies, with the false alarm rate plotted as the x axis and the hit rate as the
y axis. The location of the entire curve in the unit square is determined
by the intrinsic discrimination capacity of the forecasts, and the location
of specific points on a curve is determined by the decision threshold
w that is selected by the user. As the decision threshold w varies from
low to high, or the ROC curve moves from right to left, H and F vary
together to trace out the ROC curve. Low thresholds lead to both high
H and high F, found toward the upper-right-hand corner. Conversely,
high thresholds make the ROC points move toward the lower-left-hand
corner along the curve. Thus, a perfect discrimination is represented
by an ROC that rises from (0,0) along the y axis to (0,1), then straight
right to (1,1). The diagonal H = F represents zero skill, indicating that
the forecasts are completely nondiscriminatory. ROC points below the
diagonal represent the same level of skill as they would if they were
located above the diagonal and are merely mislabeled—i.e., a forecast
of nonoccurrence should be taken as occurrence.
Figures 3.3A–3.3E display the ROC curves, together with their 95
percent confidence intervals for the current quarter and the next four
quarters. The confidence interval was calculated using the formula
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for each w, where za / 2 = z0.025 = 1.96 for a standard normal variate. It can
be seen that the ROC for the current quarter (Q0) is located maximally
away from the diagonal towards the left upper corner, demonstrating
the highest discrimination ability of the SPF forecasts, followed by the
one-quarter-ahead forecasts. For longer-term forecasts, ROCs become
rapidly flatter as the forecasting horizon increases. For the four-quarterahead (Q4) forecasts, the ROC mildly snakes around the diagonal line,
and the associated confidence band suggests that practically none of the
values are statistically different from the values on the diagonal line.
This means that the Q4 forecasts have no skill or discrimination ability
for any value of the threshold. In situations where the analyst may have
only a vague idea about the relative costs of type I and type II errors
(e.g., in the problem of predicting the turning point in a business cycle),
he or she can pick a comfortable hit rate (or false alarm rate) of choice,
and the underlying ROC curve will give the corresponding false alarm
rate (or hit rate). This will also give an optimal threshold for making
decisions. When the relative costs of the two types of errors are known
exactly, the decision-theoretic framework developed by Zellner, Hong,
and Min (1991) and Granger and Pesaran (2000a,b) can be used to issue
recession signals. However, before using the probability forecasts in
decision making, the significance of their skillfulness should first be
established.
The hit rates and false alarm rates for selected threshold values in
the range 0.50–0.05 are reported in Table 3.3, where one can find the
mix of hit and false alarm rates that is expected to be associated with
each horizon-specific forecast.7 For example, for achieving a hit rate of
90 percent with Q0 forecasts, one should use 0.25 as the threshold, and
the corresponding false alarm rate is expected to be 0.16. Table 3.3 also
shows that at this threshold value, even though the false alarm rates are
roughly around 0.15 for forecasts of all horizons, the hit rate steadily
declines, from 90 percent for Q0 to only 21 percent for Q4. This clearly
documents the rapid speed of deterioration in forecast capability as the
forecast horizon increases. Though not reported in Table 3.3, for the
same hit rate of 90 percent, the false alarm rates for Q1–Q4 forecasts
are 0.189 (w = 0.237), 0.636 (w = 0.13), 0.808 (w = 0.115), and 0.914
(w = 0.10), respectively. Thus, for the same hit rate, the corresponding
false alarm rates for Q3–Q4 forecasts are so large (80 percent and 91
percent, respectively) that they can be considered useless for all practical purposes, and thus may have very little value in decision making.
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Figure 3.3 Trade-Off between Hit Rates and False Alarm Rates at
Different Horizons
Panel A: ROC for Q0 ± 95 Percent Band
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Panel B: ROC for Q1 ± 95 Percent Band
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Figure 3.3 (continued)
Panel C: ROC for Q2 ± 95 Percent Band
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Panel D: ROC for Q3 ± 95 Percent Band
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Figure 3.3 (continued)
Panel E: ROC for Q4 ± 95 Percent Band
1.0

Hit rate

0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

False alarm rate
NOTE: ROC = receiver (or relative) operating characteristic.
SOURCE: Author’s analysis of SPF data.

In Table 3.3 we have also reported the Kuipers scores (KS) and the
odds ratios (θ) for selected w. The rapid decline in these values as the
forecast horizon increases is remarkable, and for Q4 forecasts these values are close to zero and unity, respectively, suggesting no skill. Using
the critical value 1.645 for a one-sided normal test at the 5 percent level,
the KS and θ values were found to be statistically significant for Q0–Q2
and insignificant for Q4 forecasts.8 For Q3 forecasts, there is some conflicting evidence, depending on the tests we use. Based on the standard
error formula
[ H (1  H ) / (a  c)]  [ F (1  F ) / (b  d )]

for KS reported in Agresti (1996), KS values for Q3 were insignificant at the 5 percent level for all allowable values of w. However, the
Pesaran-Timmermann (PT) test and the test based on the log odds ratio
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for Q3 were statistically significant only for w = 0.25, even at the 1
percent level. Notwithstanding this result, the weight of our previous
evidence suggests that Q3 forecasts have very little skill. We should,
however, emphasize that statistical significance or insignificance does
not mean the forecasts have utility or value in a particular decisiontheoretic context.9
I find overwhelming evidence that Q0–Q2 forecasts have good
operating characteristics. Given the relative costs of two types of classification errors, the end user can choose an appropriate threshold w
to minimize the total expected cost of misclassification. This type of
optimal decision rule cannot be obtained by only studying QPS. More
importantly, for forecasting relatively rare events like recessions, ROC
and odds ratios are useful for making sure that the probability forecasts
have operational value. This is because, in this approach, the success
rate in predicting the predominant event is not part of the goodness of
fit measure.

CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this chapter I first report the characteristics of fixed-target monthly
GDP growth forecasts for 18 developed countries during the period
1989–2004. I show how forecasting performance improves as the forecast horizon decreases, and at what horizons forecasts start to become
informative. Since there are many forecasting organizations around the
world that provide forecasts for many macroeconomic variables, with
horizons of up to 12 quarters or more, it is interesting to explore the
value of these forecasts and thereby try to understand the limits to how
far ahead today’s professional forecasters can reasonably predict these
variables. Since the panel of forecasters in Consensus Economics Inc.
are all private-market professionals, the limits to forecasting that these
professionals exhibit can safely be taken as indicative of the current
state of economic forecasting. I find wide diversity in the quality of
the forecasts across countries, and in the horizons at which forecasts
start becoming useful—possibly reflecting the forecast difficulty of the
underlying series.
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Q0
w

H

F

Q1

Kuipers Odds
score ratio

H

F

44

Table 3.3 Measures of Forecast Skill: Quarter 0 to Quarter 4
Q2

Kuipers Odds
score ratio

H

F

Q3

Kuipers Odds
score ratio

H

F

Q4

Kuipers Odds
score ratio

H

F

Kuipers Odds
score ratio

0.50 0.55 0.07 0.48 17.57 0.25 0.05 0.20

6.44

0.05 0.03 0.02

1.54

0.00 0.00

0.00

—

0.00 0.00

0.00

—

0.45 0.60 0.07 0.53 19.00 0.30 0.07 0.23

5.38

0.10 0.05 0.05

2.13

0.00 0.00

0.00

—

0.00 0.00

0.00

—

0.40 0.60 0.08 0.52 16.95 0.40 0.08 0.32

7.47

0.10 0.07 0.03

1.57

0.00 0.00

0.00

—

0.00 0.00

0.00

—

0.35 0.70 0.10 0.60 21.58 0.50 0.10 0.40

9.17

0.15 0.07 0.08

2.20

0.00 0.03 −0.03

0.00

0.00 0.00

0.00

—

0.30 0.85 0.11 0.74 44.12 0.75 0.14 0.61 18.53

0.35 0.11 0.24

4.47

0.10 0.08

0.03

1.37

0.00 0.05 −0.05

0.00

0.25 0.90 0.16 0.74 46.35 0.80 0.18 0.62 18.18

0.50 0.15 0.35

5.72

0.25 0.12

0.13

2.52

0.21 0.16

0.06

1.45

0.20 0.95 0.20 0.75 74.48 0.95 0.25 0.70 58.27

0.70 0.26 0.44

6.77

0.45 0.36

0.09

1.47

0.32 0.43 −0.12

0.61

0.15 1.00 0.23 0.77

—

0.95 0.37 0.58 32.51

0.85 0.53 0.32

5.05

0.80 0.66

0.14

2.08

0.74 0.66

0.07

1.42

0.10 1.00 0.40 0.60

—

1.00 0.66 0.34

—

1.00 0.81 0.19

—

1.00 0.86

0.14

—

0.89 0.93 −0.04

0.63

0.05 1.00 0.68 0.32

—

1.00 0.94 0.06

—

1.00 0.99 0.01

—

1.00 1.00

0.00

—

1.00 1.00

NOTE: w = decision threshold; H = hit rate; F = false alarm rate; — = not defined.
SOURCE: Author’s own research.
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I use Theil’s U-statistic with the lagged GDP growth as the benchmark, as well as another measure of predictability recently suggested
by Diebold and Kilian (2001) with the two-year-ahead forecast as the
benchmark. In terms of Theil’s U, for only 7 of the 18 countries (Austria,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Norway, and the United States)
did the initial 24-month-ahead forecasts beat the naive forecast. In terms
of the worst performance, the Irish, Portuguese, Swiss, and Dutch forecasts beat the naive forecast at horizons as late as 10–13 months.
In terms of the Diebold-Kilian skill measure, I find that for the majority of the countries, the long-term forecasts for up to 18 months are as
good as the initial 24-month-ahead forecasts. That is, over these longer
horizons, forecasters do not receive dependable information with which
to adjust their forecasts systematically. I also observe a similar pattern
when I look at the horizons at which the survey forecasts beat the naive
no-change forecast. These findings imply that the survey forecasts do
not have much value when the horizon goes beyond 18 months or so.
I then go on to evaluate the subjective probability forecasts for
real GDP declines during the period 1968–2004, using methodologies
developed in psychology and meteorology. The SPF records probability
forecasts for real GDP declines during the current and next four quarters. I find overwhelming evidence that the shorter-run forecasts (Q0–
Q2) possess significant skill. In contrast, Q3 and Q4 forecasts exhibit
poor performance, as measured by ROC measures. It is clear from my
analysis that our professional forecasters do not have adequate information to forecast GDP declines meaningfully at horizons beyond two
quarters; they lack relevant discriminatory cues. Since the SPF panel is
composed of professional economists and business analysts who forecast on the basis of models and informed heuristics, their failure in the
long-term forecasts may indicate that, at the present time, forecasting
real GDP growth beyond two quarters may not be possible with reasonable type I and type II errors. Since survey probabilities embody
important additional information over point forecasts, an analysis of the
probability forecasts provides us with a unique opportunity to understand the reasons for forecast failures. Our analysis of probability forecasts suggests that it is more challenging to predict a GDP decline or a
recession than quantitative growth rate. This is because in predicting a
relatively uncommon event like real GDP decline, the time series property and the persistence of the series are less useful than forecasting the
quantitative GDP growth rate.
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I have emphasized that for forecasting rare events like recessions,
it is important to examine the ROC curves, where the relative odds for
the event can be studied in depth. The analysis also helps find an optimum probability threshold for transforming the probability forecasts to
a binary decision rule. In many instances the selection of the threshold
is quite arbitrary. In this regard, ROC analysis provides a simple but an
objective criterion, incorporating the end user’s loss function for missed
signals and false alarms. The ROC analysis in our case reveals that for a
preassigned hit rate of, say, 90 percent, the associated false alarm rates
for the Q3–Q4 forecasts are so high that they may be considered useless
for all practical purposes.
One wonders if the professional forecasters can be trained to do
better. In the current situation, forecasting improvement may not be
possible for various reasons. In most psychological and Bayesian learning experiments, the outcomes are readily available and are known with
certainty; thus, prompt feedback for the purpose of improvement is possible. In contrast, the GDP figures are announced with considerable lag
time, and are then revised repeatedly. Also, as I have mentioned before,
correct and dependable cues for predicting recessions a few quarters
ahead may not be available to economists. The excess variability of
forecasts and the observed lack of discriminating ability may just be
a reflection of that hard reality. It may be the same reason that modelbased forecasts over business-cycle frequencies have not succeeded in
the past.
Finally, I should point out that the relative inferiority of real GDP
forecasts can also be determined by the demand side of the forecasting
market—i.e., the professional forecasters may devote more efforts to
generating better forecasts if their clients demand that. It is interesting
that as part of the Fed’s major changes in its communication strategies,
which took effect in September 2007, the horizon of the projections for
GDP growth and inflation by all FOMC members has been extended
from two years to three.10 As I report earlier in this chapter, currently the
real GDP growth forecasts do not seem to have any value beyond the
18-month horizon. If the demand side of the forecasting market has any
effect on forecast quality, we may expect that, as a result of this change
in FOMC policy, the content horizon for these forecasts will lengthen
in the future.
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Notes
1. See Isiklar and Lahiri (2007) and Isiklar, Lahiri, and Loungani (2006) for further
details on the data.
2. Galbraith and Tkacz (2007) have, however, found that forecast horizons do not
improve even when dynamic factor models with many predictors are used in place
of simple univariate autoregressive models.
3. Notable exceptions include Braun and Yaniv (1992), Graham (1996), Lahiri and
Wang (2006), and Stock and Watson (2003). However, these studies emphasized
different aspects of the data. More recently, Clements (2009) has studied the relationship between intrapersonal uncertainty and interpersonal disagreement in
these forecasts. Details of this data set are described in Lahiri and Wang (2008).
4. See Doswell, Davies-Jones, and Keller (1990), Lahiri and Wang (2006), Murphy
(1991), and Stephenson (2000) for more discussion on this issue.
5. See Croushore (1993) for an introduction to the SPF.
6. This approach has a long history in medical imaging, and has also been used
in evaluating loan default and rating forecasts (Hanley and McNeil 1982; Stein
2005). See Jolliffe and Stephenson (2003), Stephenson (2000), and Swets and
Pickett (1982) for additional analysis of the use of ROC.
7. In order to save space, we did not report in Table 3.3 the values of w greater than
0.5. Moreover, these values were less relevant in our context.
8. Note that the cell counts were in excess of 5 only in cases of w values (0.50–0.35)
for Q0, (0.45–0.35) for Q1, (0.30–0.20) for Q2, (0.25–0.20) for Q3, and (0.20–
0.15) for Q4. The significance tests were conducted only for these cases.
9. Granger and Pesaran (2000a) show how, under certain simplifying assumptions,
the Kuipers score can be used as an indicator of economic value.
10. See Bernanke (2007).
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4
Forecasting Regional and
Industry-Level Variables
Challenges and Strategies
David E. Rapach
Saint Louis University

Forecasting regional and industry-level (RIL) variables is an important task for a wide variety of economic agents. Policymakers at all
levels of government utilize such forecasts, including local and state
governments when planning budgets and the Federal Reserve when
formulating U.S. monetary policy (e.g., the Beige Book). Businesses
in the private sector also rely on such forecasts as inputs when taking
employment, production, and investment decisions. The recent “Great
Recession” highlights the relevance of forecasting RIL variables for
policymakers and businesses: revenue reductions make accurate forecasts imperative for planning purposes and the efficient allocation of
now-more-limited resources.
Forecasting almost any economic variable is, of course, extremely
challenging. Nevertheless, forecasting RIL variables exacerbates typical forecasting difficulties. In particular, there are usually a plethora
of potential predictors—global, national, regional, and industry variables—that are relevant for forecasting RIL variables. While theoretical
models help to identify key determinants of a given RIL variable, such
models are usually highly stylized and thus do not necessarily provide
the most appropriate forecasting specifications, especially given the
various idiosyncrasies surrounding individual RIL variables. A forecaster thus faces substantial model uncertainty. While the forecaster
could include all potential predictors in a single forecasting model,
such highly parameterized models usually fare very poorly in terms of
out-of-sample forecasting, due in no small part to model uncertainty.1
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Alternatively, the forecaster could preselect a relatively small number
of predictors, but this ignores the potentially useful information available in the excluded variables. In this chapter, I outline some tractable
approaches for incorporating information from a large number of potential predictors that avoid overly parameterized specifications. Recent
research indicates that such approaches are quite beneficial for improving forecasts of RIL variables.
In addition to model uncertainty, model instability is a serious concern for forecasting RIL variables. Changes in institutions, public policy,
and technology, among many other factors, can precipitate structural
breaks that cause the predictive power of individual variables to vary
significantly over time. Moreover, it is extremely difficult to predict the
occurrence of structural breaks. Similar to model uncertainty, model
instability causes highly parameterized models to break down in out-ofsample forecasting, so that a forecaster of RIL variables needs tractable
approaches that are reasonably robust to structural breaks. Fortunately,
approaches useful for dealing with model uncertainty also appear helpful for mitigating structural instability when forecasting RIL variables.
I outline three approaches—1) general-to-specific modeling with
bagging (GETS-bagging), 2) forecast combination, and 3) factor models—for improving forecasts of RIL variables. GETS-bagging and
forecast combination are methods for utilizing, in a tractable manner,
information from a large set of potential predictors that are reasonably
robust to model uncertainty and instability. Factor models focus on
potentially strong relationships between RIL and national variables. I
provide intuition and guidance on implementing these approaches. In
addition, I discuss empirical results from recent research on forecasting
RIL variables, highlighting examples pertaining to forecasting employment growth for Michigan and Missouri.
It is important to stress that the present chapter is relatively brief and
is not meant as an exhaustive literature survey. Instead, it is intended
to introduce the reader to strategies for improving forecasts of RIL variables from the recent literature—strategies designed to address the keen
challenges posed by model uncertainty and instability.2
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FORECASTING STRATEGIES
This section outlines forecasting approaches aimed at improving
forecasts of RIL variables. I begin with a general (“kitchen sink”) model
that serves to illustrate some of the pitfalls that the GETS-bagging,
combination, and factor model approaches are designed to avoid.
Kitchen-Sink Model
Consider the following general model specification:
(4.1)

N

ykh,t  h  ak  bk yk ,t   ck ,i xi ,t  ekh,t  h ,
i 1

denotes the time period, ykh,t  h  (1/ h) j 1 yk ,t  j ,
yk ,t  yk ,t  yk ,t 1 , yk ,t is in log-levels, and ekh,t  h is a zero-mean disturbance term. The left-hand side of Equation (4.1) is a cumulative growth
rate for the variable of interest that we wish to forecast.3 The k subscript
indicates that yk ,t is an RIL variable, where k indexes the region or industry. The xi ,t variables (i = 1, . . . , N) on the right-hand side of Equation
(4.1) represent N potential predictors of ykh,t  h , where N can be large.
For expositional and notational simplicity, the right-hand side of Equation (4.1) includes only a single lag of yk ,t and each xi ,t variable; it is
straightforward to allow for additional lags and thus a more general
dynamic structure.
Consider forming a forecast of ykh,t*1 using information available
through t * based on the general model given by Equation (4.1):
where

(4.2)

h

t

N

yˆ kh,t * h  aˆk , t *  bˆk , t *yk , t *   cˆk , i , t * xi , t * ,
i 1

where aˆk ,t* , bˆk ,t* , and ĉk,i,t* (i = 1, . . . , N) are ordinary least square (OLS)

estimates of the corresponding parameters in Equation (4.1) based on
data from the beginning of the sample through t*. When N is large,
a serious drawback to this approach is that it can entail substantial
in-sample overfitting, which translates into very poor out-of-sample
forecasting performance. Intuitively, a highly parameterized model—a
model with many xi ,t variables—can deliver a substantial R 2 statistic for
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the in-sample period, but because of model uncertainty and structural
instability, the good fit is specific to the sample and not robust.
Goyal and Welch (2008) and Rapach, Strauss, and Zhou (2010)
provide recent examples of the poor forecasting performance of kitchensink models in the context of forecasting U.S. stock returns. Many potential predictors of aggregate market returns have been proposed in the
finance literature, and different theoretical models emphasize different
predictors. Goyal and Welch, as well as and Rapach, Strauss, and Zhou,
find that general models with a large number of potential predictors
from the literature substantially underperform when measured against
the simple random-walk model with respect to U.S. stock returns. This
type of result is common in the literature, so one can conclude that very
simple models are almost always better than very general models for
forecasting purposes. When forecasting RIL variables, one should thus
avoid kitchen-sink models.4
GETS-Bagging
Pretesting provides a method for paring down Equation (4.1) into
a more parsimonious model that includes only the important predictors of ykh,t  h . This is often referred to as general-to-specific (GETS)
modeling. Consider again the problem of forming a forecast of ykh,t* h
using information available through t*. Instead of including all N of the
xi ,t variables in the forecasting model, as in Equation (4.2), we first estimate Equation (4.1) and compute the t-statistic associated with each xi ,t
. We then drop any variable from the forecasting model with a t-statistic
whose absolute value is below a certain threshold, for example, 1.96 or
1.645. The forecasting model thus becomes a reduced version of Equation (4.2) that contains only the significant predictors. In this way, we
attempt to identify a more parsimonious forecasting model that only
includes what we deem to be important determinants of ykh,t  h .
While pretesting reduces the dimension of the forecasting model,
the selection of the predictors to include in the forecasting model can be
sample-specific, thereby representing in-sample overfitting in another
guise. Breiman (1996) introduces the idea of bootstrap aggregating
(bagging) as a procedure for stabilizing the pretesting decision rule. In
essence, we harness the power of the computer to generate a large number of pseudo samples of observations for ykh,t  h and xi ,t (i = 1, . . . , N)
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using bootstrapping techniques. For each pseudo sample, we apply
the decision rule and select the predictors to include in the forecasting
model, forming a forecast based on the selected predictors under the
pseudo sample. The GETS-bagging forecast is then a simple average of
the forecasts corresponding to each of the pseudo samples. Intuitively,
the pseudo samples provide new learning sets for the decision rule,
thereby reducing the instability of the decision rule and its dependence
on a specific sample and improving forecasting performance.5
Inoue and Kilian (2008) were the first to employ GETS-bagging
in a macroeconomic forecasting context (the U.S. inflation rate). They
find that GETS-bagging produces significant forecasting gains relative to a simple autoregressive (AR) time-series model and a general
model similar to Equation (4.1), as well as relative to pretesting without bagging. More to the theme of this chapter, Rapach and Strauss
(forthcoming) find that GETS-bagging produces consistent and significant out-of-sample gains for forecasting U.S. state-level employment
growth. Results for forecasting Michigan and Missouri employment
growth are discussed in more detail in the next section.
Forecast Combination
Instead of beginning with a general model, forecast combination
takes a weighted average of forecasts generated by a large number
of individual models. In the context of macroeconomic forecasting,
Stock and Watson (1999, 2003, 2004) have popularized a combination
approach that pools information from N individual autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) models:
(4.3)

ykh,t  h  ak  bk yk ,t  ck ,i xi ,t  ekh,t  h (i  1, , N ) .

Analogous to Equation (4.2), we can form a forecast of ykh,t* h at t* for
each ARDL based on estimates of the parameters in Equation (4.3) derived from data available through t*.6 A combination forecast of ykh,t* h
is then given by
(4.4)

N

yˆ kh,,tC* h   i ,t*yˆ kh,,ti* h ,
i 1
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where yˆ kh,,ti* h (i = 1, . . . , N) is the forecast of ykh,t* h based on the
individual ARDL model with xi ,t , i ,t* (i =N 1, . . . , N) is the combining weight corresponding to yˆ kh,,ti* h , and  i 1 i ,t*  1 . As stressed by
Timmermann (2006), the intuition behind forecast combination is the
same as that behind portfolio diversification: we reduce forecasting
“risk” by averaging across a large number of individual forecasts, rather
than by relying on a single forecasting model.
To implement the combination forecast, we need to determine the
combining weights. There are a myriad of methods available for doing
this, which are nicely surveyed by Timmermann (2006). An interesting
result from the literature is that relatively simple schemes typically outperform more elaborate schemes, even though more elaborate schemes
are theoretically optimal under certain assumptions. The problem is that
model uncertainty and instability frequently render these assumptions
inaccurate, limiting the usefulness of theoretically optimal weights in
practice.
A simple combining scheme that often works well in practice is
equal weighting: i ,t*  1/ N for all i. In the context of the general
model, Equation (4.1), Rapach, Strauss, and Zhou (2010) show that
equal weighting can be viewed as a type of “shrinkage” estimator. Intuitively, shrinkage limits the parameter space and prevents overfitting,
thereby improving out-of-sample forecasting performance. While equal
weighting often produces very consistent forecasting gains, additional
gains can be realized by “tilting” the combining weights toward particular individual forecasts. For example, we could select the combining
weights based on the performance of the individual forecasting models over a reasonably long holdout out-of-sample test period. The key,
however, is not to overdo it. That is, it is typically best to hew fairly
closely to equal weighting; otherwise, we have another manifestation
of overfitting, and the forecasts become overly susceptible to model
uncertainty and instability.7
Rapach and Strauss (forthcoming) find that combination forecasts
outperform AR benchmark forecasts of U.S. state-level employment
growth for 49 of the 50 individual states for a first-quarter 1990 to
fourth-quarter 2010 forecast evaluation period, demonstrating the usefulness of the forecast combination approach for RIL variables. Specific
results for Michigan and Missouri employment growth forecasts are
presented on pp. 59–61.8 In another recent application, Rapach and
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Strauss (2009) show that combination forecasts improve upon AR
benchmark forecasts of real housing price growth for a number of interior states for the period from first-quarter 1995 to fourth-quarter 2006.
However, combination forecasts do not outperform the AR benchmark
forecasts for a number of coastal states during this period, which could
indicate that these coastal states experienced housing price bubbles.
Factor Models
Another potentially useful approach for forecasting RIL variables
is factor modeling. If RIL variables have strong links to a national
variable, factor models can exploit these links to generate improved
forecasts. Consider the following simple factor model:
(4.5)

yk ,t   k   k f t   k ,t ,

where ƒt is an economy-wide or aggregate factor and  k ,t is a zero-mean
disturbance that may be serially correlated. The coefficient on the factor
(  k ) is referred to as the factor “loading” or “exposure.” This coefficient captures the strength of the relationship between the RIL variable
and the aggregate factor, with a larger  k indicating a stronger response
of yk ,t to fluctuations in ƒt . Perhaps the best-known example of a factor model in economics and finance is the canonical capital asset pricing
model, where yk ,t is the excess return on a particular stock and ƒt represents the excess return on the market portfolio. The return on a stock
with large  k value, or “beta,” responds more strongly to changes in the
market return and thus has greater systemic risk exposure in the context
of the capital asset pricing model.9
While ƒt can be treated as an unobserved latent variable to be
estimated (using, e.g., principal component analysis), ƒt frequently
coincides with an observable aggregate variable. It is then straightforward to construct a forecast of an RIL variable based on Equation (4.5).
Consider, for example, forecasting U.S. state-level employment growth
using the following factor model specification:
(4.6)
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h
ˆ k ,t *
where yˆUS
,t * h is a forecast of aggregate U.S. employment growth; 
and ˆk ,t* are OLS estimates of the intercept and slope coefficients,
respectively, in a regression of state k employment growth on U.S. employment growth based on data through t*; and ˆkh,t* h is a forecast of the
disturbance term in Equation (4.5) that takes into account the possible
serial correlation in the disturbance term.10 The forecast given by Equation (4.6) requires a forecast of U.S. employment growth to plug into
the right-hand side. A GETS-bagging or combination forecast of U.S.
employment growth is a natural choice.
Building on Owyang, Rapach, and Wall (2009), Rapach and Strauss
(forthcoming) forecast U.S. state-level employment growth using
Equation (4.6). They show that factor model forecasts outperform AR
benchmark model forecasts for the vast majority of states. The forecasting gains are very sizable for a number of states (including Michigan
and Missouri, as described in more detail in the next section). There are
a few states, however, where the factor model performs much worse
than the AR benchmark, so that factor model forecasts appear to offer gains on a somewhat less consistent basis than GETS-bagging and
combination forecasts. Rapach et al. (2011) provide another application
in the context of forecasting stock returns for industry-sorted portfolios. They find that a conditional version of the popular Fama-French
three-factor model (Fama and French 1993) delivers statistically and
economically significant out-of-sample gains for forecasting industry
returns.

Estimation Window
The discussion thus far has assumed that the parameters of the
forecasting model are estimated using data from the beginning of the
available sample through the time of forecast formation. If we suspect
the existence of substantial structural breaks, at first blush it may seem
appropriate to use an estimation window that excludes prebreak data. As
shown by Pesaran and Timmermann (2007) and Clark and McCracken
(2009), however, it can be optimal to include prebreak data according
to a mean-squared-error criterion; this is a manifestation of the classical bias-efficiency trade-off. Furthermore, Pesaran and Timmermann
(2007) and Clark and McCracken (2009) show that the theoretically
optimal estimation window is a complicated function of the timing and
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magnitude of structural breaks. A forecaster will not know these things a
priori, so they must be estimated from the data. Estimating the timing of
breaks is notoriously difficult. Moreover, by estimating these additional
parameters, we again run the risk of having an overly parameterized
forecasting model that performs poorly out-of-sample. In practice, it is
thus often advisable to employ an expanding window (as assumed in
the discussion above). Another strategy is to combine forecasts across
models estimated using a variety of window sizes, since this approach
recognizes that an expanding window is not necessarily optimal but still
avoids the overfitting problem associated with trying to estimate the
precise timing of structural breaks.
Amalgamating the Approaches
Finally, it is also worth considering amalgamating the GETSbagging, forecast combination, and factor model approaches. We can
straightforwardly accomplish this by taking an average of the GETSbagging, combination, and factor model forecasts of an RIL variable.
Indeed, Rapach and Strauss (forthcoming) find that such an amalgam
forecast performs very well with respect to state-level employment
growth: it outperforms the AR benchmark forecast for nearly every
state, does not produce the outliers of the factor model approach, and
delivers larger gains than the three individual approaches for the clear
majority of states. Results for Michigan and Missouri are discussed in
the next section.

FORECASTING MICHIGAN AND MISSOURI
EMPLOYMENT GROWTH
This section reports more detailed results from Rapach and Strauss
(forthcoming) on forecasting Michigan and Missouri state employment growth. The quarterly data composing the full sample span the
first quarter of 1976 to the fourth quarter of 2010. Employment data
are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), and annualized employment growth is computed as 400 times the difference in the log
levels of employment. As emphasized in this chapter, there are a host
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of potential predictors of RIL variables. Rapach and Strauss consider
11 potential predictors, which are given in Table 4.1. These predictors
are representative of the types of national and regional determinants of
state employment growth suggested by economic intuition and more
formal models.11
Table 4.1 reports forecasting results for the first-quarter 1990–
fourth-quarter 2010 forecast evaluation period and a forecast horizon of
two quarters ( h  2 in the notation of the previous section). The “AR
MSFE” row provides the mean squared forecast error (MSFE) for an
AR benchmark model. This is a popular benchmark forecasting model
that only relies on lagged values of the variable to be forecasted. While
it is a seemingly naive time-series model, such simple time-series models are often difficult to beat in practice. The other rows in Table 4.1
report the ratio of the MSFE for the forecasting model specified in the
row heading relative to the AR MSFE. A ratio below (above) unity thus
indicates that the competing model outperforms (underperforms) the
AR benchmark in terms of MSFE.
As seen in Table 4.1, the AR model produces an MSFE of 4.44
percent (2.57 percent) for Michigan (Missouri). The next rows report
MSFE ratios for 11 ARDL models, each based on an individual predictor, as in Equation (4.3). Individual ARDL model results are reported to
illustrate the difficulties in identifying a priori the most relevant predictors for a given RIL variable. While all 11 predictors appear plausible,
they often vary significantly in their forecasting ability. For example, the
ARDL model based on real housing price growth generates an MSFE
that is 13 percent higher than the AR benchmark for Michigan, so the
AR benchmark provides substantially more accurate forecasts. Housing permit growth, in contrast, reduces MSFE by 6 percent relative to
the AR benchmark. In general, as emphasized throughout this chapter,
model uncertainty and instability make it extremely difficult to determine a priori the most relevant variables for forecasting RIL variables.12
The “GETS-bagging,” “Forecast combination,” and “Factor model”
rows in Table 4.1 report results for the forecasting strategies outlined
on pages 54–58.13 Finally, the “Amalgam” row reports results for an
amalgam forecast that takes the form of a simple average of the GETSbagging, combination, and factor-model forecasts (page 59). Table 4.1
shows that the suggested strategies produce MSFE ratios that are always
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Table 4.1 Forecasting Results, State-Level Employment Growth, TwoQuarter Horizon, First-Quarter 1990 to Fourth-Quarter 2010
Evaluation Period
Forecasting model
AR MSFE
ARDL models
State unemployment rate, differences
State real income growth
State real housing price growth
State housing building permit growth
U.S. manufacturing hours, differences
U.S. unemployment claims, log levels
U.S. new consumer good order growth
U.S. building permit growth
U.S. real stock price growth
U.S. real oil price growth
Average adjacent state employment growth
Suggested strategies
GETS-bagging
Forecast combination
Factor model
Amalgam

Michigan
4.44

Missouri
2.57

1.02
1.15
1.13
0.94
0.99
0.96
0.93
0.86
0.82
1.09
1.08

1.01
1.02
1.02
1.07
1.01
0.79
0.83
0.93
0.88
1.13
1.02

0.91
0.91
0.76
0.78

0.80
0.86
0.65
0.68

NOTE: The AR (autoregressive) MSFE (mean squared forecast error) row reports the
MSFE for the AR benchmark model. Other rows report the MSFE ratio for the forecasting model indicated in the row heading relative to the AR benchmark model.
SOURCE: Adapted from Rapach and Strauss (forthcoming).

below unity, so they consistently deliver forecasting gains relative to
the AR benchmark.
Among the GETS-bagging, combination, and factor model forecasts, the factor model forecast performs the best for both Michigan and
Missouri. The factor model forecast reduces MSFE by 24 percent (35
percent) relative to the AR benchmark for Michigan (Missouri).14 For
both states, the amalgam forecast also performs well: the MSFE reduction for the amalgam forecast relative to the AR benchmark is a very
sizable 22 percent (32 percent) for Michigan (Missouri).
Overall, the results in Table 4.1, together with other results from
recent research, illustrate the usefulness of the strategies suggested in
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this chapter for forecasting RIL variables. Of course, it is important
not to read too much into these results and overgeneralize them. Forecasters of RIL variables should thus employ thorough back-testing of
these strategies for a given application.15 Nevertheless, the positive
results in recent applications are very promising, so the suggested strategies should form an integral part of a forecaster’s toolbox for dealing
with the model uncertainty and instability inherent in forecasting RIL
variables.

Notes
1. There also may simply be an inadequate number of time-series observations to
feasibly estimate a model that includes a very large number of potential predictors.
2. For more extensive coverage of some of the topics covered in this chapter, see
the volumes edited by Elliott, Granger, and Timmermann (2006) and Rapach and
Wohar (2008), as well as the references at the end of this chapter.
3. The disturbance term will be serially correlated when h > 1.
4. Indeed, as mentioned in note 1, OLS estimation of the kitchen-sink model may not
even be feasible if the timespan is limited relative to the large number of potential
variables that exist for RIL variables.
5. See Inoue and Kilian (2008) and Rapach and Strauss (forthcoming) for more detailed expositions of the construction of bagging forecasts.
6. Again, we can include additional lags of the right-hand-side variables in Equation
(4.3) to allow for a more general dynamic structure.
7. Hendry and Clements (2004) provide theoretical insight on how forecast combination can improve forecasting in the presence of structural breaks.
8. Also see Rapach and Strauss (2005), who investigate the performance of a large
number of combining methods with respect to forecasting Missouri employment
growth.
9. Under the capital asset pricing model, the intercept term should actually be zero in
Equation (4.5), since it represents the abnormal, risk-adjusted return (or “alpha”),
which will be zero in an efficient market.
10. See Rapach and Strauss (forthcoming) for details on the construction of the disturbance term forecast.
11. Rapach and Strauss (forthcoming) provide data sources for the predictors.
12. In addition, in unreported results, the kitchen-sink model performs very poorly
for each state.
13. The combining weights in Equation (4.4) for the combination forecasts are selected based on the performance of the individual models over a relatively long
holdout out-of-sample period, as discussed on page 56.
14. With respect to the factor model forecast for Michigan, the average estimate of
βk in Equation (4.5) used in the computation of the factor model forecasts is 1.45,
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among the largest for individual U.S. states. Michigan employment thus has large
“exposure” to national employment cycles, likely due in large part to the automobile industry’s strong link to the national business cycle.
15. Even if back-testing provides positive results, as it says in the fine print, past performance is no guarantee of future success.
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5
Forecasting Asset Prices
Using Nonlinear Models
Michael D. Bradley
George Washington University
Dennis W. Jansen
Texas A&M University
Over the past 25 years, a substantial body of research has produced
evidence indicating the presence of nonlinearities in the behavior of
both financial and real variables. Nonlinearity can arise for a variety
of reasons. First, frictions and transaction costs can exceed gains from
arbitrage when market deviations are small. Thus, the dynamic reaction
to disequilibria may be dependent upon the size of the price change
required to restore equilibrium. In other words, transaction costs may
be large enough to preclude a complete price response to a small shock
but not to large shocks, making the size of the reaction state-dependent.
Another source of nonlinearity is asymmetric dynamics, in which a
variable’s generating process following declines in its value may differ
from the process following increases in its value. For example, the effects
of positive shocks may be more persistent than the effects of negative
shocks, which may be more rapidly offset. Similarly, herd behavior may
cause market participants to overreact during periods of market stress,
generating movements in asset prices that exceed normal dynamics. This
is another reason a variable’s dynamics would be state-dependent.
Still another source of nonlinearity is a variable’s volatility. On
one level, volatility may be a state variable, with a variable’s dynamics
changing depending on the state of volatility. Alternatively, volatility
itself may be state-dependent, changing because of changes in a state
variable such as the state of the economy (expansion, recession) or the
state of the financial market (bear market, bull market). These examples show that nonlinearity can arise in the variance or in the mean of
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the variable. Nonlinearity in the variance typically arises because the
variance is time-varying, such as in a generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model, whereas nonlinearity in the
mean arises because the equation generating the evolution of the mean
is nonlinear.
There are a variety of approaches and specific classes of econometric models that have been developed to capture nonlinearities in
economic relationships. These include the threshold models (e.g.,
threshold autoregressive (TAR) models—see Chan and Tong [1986],
Tong [1990], and Tsay [1989]); smoothed versions of threshold models
(e.g., smooth threshold autoregressive (STAR ) models—see Granger
and Teräsvirta [1993] and Teräsvirta [1994]); linear models with nonlinear appendages (e.g., the current depth of the recession (CDR)
model—see Beaudry and Koop [1993]); the Markov switching model
(see Hamilton [1989]); various artificial neural network models (see
Cheng and Titterington [1994]); and various nonparametric models in
general (see Li and Racine [2007]). These various models have all been
employed in estimating nonlinear economic relationships, and most
have seen some success as forecasting models.
Many of these models have been applied to business cycles. Neftçi
(1984) and Falk (1986) ask whether business cycle dynamics are asymmetric. Teräsvirta and Anderson (1992) and Granger, Teräsvirta, and
Anderson (1993) apply smooth transition models to capture business
cycle nonlinearities including asymmetries. Van Dijk and Franses
(1999) add multiple-regime smooth transition models. Beaudry and
Koop (1993) take a different approach, which Potter (1995), Pesaran
and Potter (1997), Jansen and Oh (1999), and Bradley and Jansen
(1997, 2000) follow up on. However, few of these papers look in-depth
at forecasting issues.
Even though nonlinear models have been successfully applied to
model a wide variety of financial and macroeconomic variables, the
results from using those models to forecast has been mixed. Nonlinear
models generally improve upon linear models in terms of in-sample
forecasting, but they often show little improvement in terms of outof-sample forecasting. This somewhat disappointing performance has
been ascribed to a number of causes. First, the nonlinearity may not
occur in the forecast period. The forecasting advantage of a nonlinear
model could arise from its ability to accurately capture the dynamics of
a series during periods of time when it exhibits nonlinear behavior. If
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the out-of-sample forecasting period does not include any such periods,
there will be no forecasting advantage for the nonlinear model.
This characteristic of nonlinear models to capture periods of time
with “normal” dynamics as well as with exceptional dynamics can lead
to other forecasting issues. One such issue is the need to forecast the
regime switch or structural break in which the dynamics change. In an
out-of-sample forecast, the moment of switch is unknown and may in
itself be difficult to forecast, thus reducing the utility of the nonlinear
model. Similarly, nonlinear forecasts may be state-dependent, meaning
that an accurate out-of-sample forecast will require accurate forecasts
of the state of nature over the period of the forecast. For linear models
the impact of a shock is the same regardless of the state of the world in
which the shock occurs. For nonlinear models this is not true—a disturbance or shock will have different impacts depending on the state of
the world in which the shock occurs. Finally, if periods with exceptional
dynamics are relatively rare but empirically significant, there may be
a tendency for nonlinear models to overfit the sample, reducing their
value in an out-of-sample forecast.
A last challenge for out-of-sample forecasting comes from the difficulties in using nonlinear models in multistep forecasts. Linear models
can be solved recursively, making the calculation of multistep forecasts
relatively straightforward. This is not true for nonlinear models. The
nonlinearity makes multiple-step-ahead forecasting intrinsically more
difficult. We will outline some of the difficulties with multiple-stepahead forecasts later in this paper.
These problems notwithstanding, we believe it is important to continue the research into nonlinear forecasts so we can make better use of
our ability to model the nonlinear aspects of the economy. We find the
problems not to be drawbacks of nonlinear models so much as challenges that must be overcome to improve the accuracy of forecasts. The
problems lead to inaccuracy in both linear and nonlinear forecasts, and
the task is to better understand nonlinear forecasting in order to overcome these obstacles.
We thus examine an ongoing research question as to whether
financial-sector variables help forecast real-sector variables, or realsector variables help forecast financial sector variables—or both. We
use nonlinear models to investigate this question. We do so because this
allows us to investigate the out-of-sample forecasting ability of these
nonlinear models in a multivariate context.
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THEORETICAL PRELIMINARIES
The specific relationship that we investigate is between a key
cyclical real-sector variable (industrial production) and two financialsector variables, the 10-year Treasury bond rate and excess returns for
Standard and Poor’s 500. We model that relationship using nonlinear
approaches and then examine the out-of-sample forecasting properties
of those models. Before estimating the models and evaluating the forecasts we present three important definitions and a description of the
data we use. What follows here is just the briefest of introductions to
ideas of financial economics that provide the backdrop to any financial
forecasting exercise.
The first definition is the asset pricing equation. A typical first-order
condition from an asset allocation problem (i.e., a typical Euler equation for an asset pricing problem) is found in Equation (5.1):
(5.1)

u '( ct )   Et u '( ct 1 ) Rt 1  ,

where u(ct) is a utility function, u'(ct) indicates the derivative of the utility function, R t+1 is real gross return on stocks purchased at time t and
held until time t + 1, and ct is real consumption at time t. Typically, optimization requires equating the marginal utility of current consumption
(the left-hand side of Equation [5.1]) to the marginal utility of deferring
consumption to the next period (the right-hand side of Equation [5.1]).
The marginal utility of current consumption is straightforward and is
written as u'(ct ). The marginal utility of deferring consumption to the
next period is calculated as the product of three terms: 1) the rate of
return on a unit of deferred consumption, R t+1; 2) the marginal utility
of consumption that is deferred to the next period, u ' (ct+1); and 3) the
discount factor β (used to calculate the present value of this additional
future marginal utility).
Equation (5.1) is potentially highly nonlinear, and any variable affecting consumption can potentially affect forecasts of stock returns.
This asset pricing condition provides a theoretical basis for nonlinear
econometric modeling.
The second definition is of excess returns. Common models of equity returns focus on modeling excess returns, which are returns over
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and above a risk premium. Often the risk premium is a government
bond yield, in which case excess returns are returns on equity over and
above returns on the government bond. We thus define excess returns as

St 1  Dt 1
 I t  Rt 1  I t .
St
Here, ERt+1 is the excess return on stocks purchased at time t and
held until time t + 1, and Rt+1 is the gross return on stocks purchased at
time t and held until time t + 1. The gross return on bonds purchased at
time t and held until time t + 1 is It .
The third and last definition is that of the information set used for
forecasting. It is important to think carefully about what should be
included in the information set when investigating the forecasting performance of various models. The excess return formula indicates that,
at time t, an investor knows the nominal return on bonds between t and
t + 1. If one were to buy a bond at time t, one would know what its
interest payments were between t and t + 1. But when one buys equity,
one won’t know the equity’s return between t and t + 1 until time t + 1
occurs and one can observe the price of stock at time t + 1. With this
definition of the information set, Ω, we can define the forecast for an
excess return as
(5.2)

ERt 1 

(5.3)

 S  Dt 1

E ( ERt 1 |  t )  E  t 1
| t   It .
St



DATA DESCRIPTION
We estimate models of excess returns on equities and bond interest
rates using monthly data for the United States. The two sources for our
data are 1) Shiller’s monthly data set on stocks and associated variables
and 2) Federal Reserve System data on industrial production. We also
employ a measure of the general price level, the Consumer Price Index
calculated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Our data include the value of the Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 500
index at the end of each month, calculated as the monthly average of
daily closing prices. We represent this variable as the stock index value
St . Dividends are represented by the symbol Dt , and according to Shiller
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(2011) are “computed from the S&P four-quarter tools for the quarter
since 1926, with linear interpolation to monthly figures.” The price index, Pt , is the CPI-U series. Industrial production is yt . Finally, we use
Shiller’s 10-year government security rate (GS10) as our measure of the
gross long-term nominal interest rate, It .
Below are plots of the key variables. Figure 5.1 graphs the log
of industrial production (left scale) and the growth rate, calculated as
changes in the log of industrial production (right scale). The general
upward trend in industrial production is clearly visible, as are various
periods when industrial production was declining. These periods are
typically recessions, such as the period around 1975 and the period at
the end of our sample, 2009. The plot of the growth rate indicates periods of greater volatility, especially at the beginning of our sample,
1955–1960, and again at the end of our sample. The impact of the recession in 1974–1975 is clear. The long period of relatively low volatility
in the growth rate of industrial production from the mid-1980s until
2005 is also apparent.
Figure 5.1 U.S. Industrial Production, January 1955–December 2009
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Figure 5.2 graphs the log of the stock price index, both its level
(left-hand scale) and its growth rate (right-hand scale). Again the general upward trend in the stock price index is clear, as are periods of
declining stock prices after 2000 and again at the end of our sample.
The growth rate of stock prices shows considerably more volatility
than the growth rate of industrial production. For stock prices, monthly
changes of plus or minus 0.1 (10 percent) occur at times, whereas we do
not see such large movements in industrial production.
Figure 5.3 graphs our interest rate data, where we have converted
this series to monthly net interest rates. Interest rate levels are shown on
the left-hand scale, while changes in the interest rate levels, calculated
as simple differences, are shown on the right-hand scale. Most apparent
is the secular increase in interest rates from the beginning of our sample
until the very early 1980s, and the secular decline from the early 1980s
until the end of our sample. Interest rates begin our sample at about 0.2
percent per month (roughly 2.4 percent per year), increase to a rate of
Figure 5.2 U.S. Stock Price Index, January 1955–December 2009
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Figure 5.3 U.S. Interest Rate, January 1955–December 2009
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almost 1.2 percent per month (roughly 14.4 percent per year), and then
return by the end of our sample to a rate near 0.2 percent per month.
This run-up and subsequent decline in rates is most often blamed on
inflation rates, which increased from the mid-1960s through the 1970s,
peaking in the early 1980s before declining gradually throughout the
next several decades. Of course, the large secular movements contain
many shorter periods of ups and downs in interest rates, as the graph of
interest rate changes makes clear. Also apparent in the graph of interest
rate changes is the high volatility from the late 1970s through the early
1980s.
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ESTIMATING THE NONLINEAR MODELS
In this section we describe how we estimate the nonlinear models
that we use for producing our out-of-sample forecasts. Our estimation
proceeds in three steps. First we test for linearity in our three variables.
The null hypothesis will be that the modeled relationship is linear, and a
rejection leads to continued estimation of a nonlinear model. The idea is
not to estimate a nonlinear model if that is unnecessary. Second, when
nonlinearity is detected, we will estimate a threshold model. Third, we
will also estimate a second nonlinear model, which we will call a “current depth of recession” model.
Threshold models capture the possibility that the dynamics of a
variable may be state-dependent. They allow the data-generating process to vary across two or more states of nature. For this reason, they
are also often called “regime-switching” models. Seasonal models for
industrial production or “day of week” models for stock returns are
examples of deterministic threshold models. For these models the occurrence of a regime switch is known with certainty. However, many
interesting cases involve stochastic threshold models, in which the regime switch is unknown. An example is given by a model in which
stock market returns are driven by a different dynamic process after
large declines in stock prices. Bradley and Jansen (2004) provide one
attempt at forecasting stock returns in a nonlinear framework.
Threshold models are an example of a model in which the state
variable is observable. In a deterministic threshold model it is clear that
we observe the day of the week and that we can allow our model to
behave differently on different days of the week. In a stochastic threshold model we can observe that there has been a large decline in stock
prices, and then we can allow our model to behave differently after such
a large decline. The key feature is that the state variable, either the day
of the week or the decline in stock prices, is observable. This stands in
contrast to models with unobserved state variables, such as the various Markov switching models. In those models the state variable is an
unobserved variable, and changes in the underlying hidden state variable lead to changes in the behavior of the variable we are modeling.
Thus a key modeling decision is between using a nonlinear model with
observable state variables and using a nonlinear model with hidden
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or unobserved state variables. The choice depends in part on whether
there are observed variables that can adequately indicate or represent
the state of the world. Here we estimate and forecast with observable
state variables.
We investigate two types of threshold models, the threshold autoregressive (TAR) model and the smooth transition autoregressive (STAR)
model. A TAR model specifies (at least) two sets of dynamics for the
variable of interest, y, with the regime switch dependent upon the value
of a “transition” variable, labeled z. The threshold model can be written
as follows:
yt

 a0

where
(5.4)

t

p
 p

   i yt i     i yt i   t   t ,
i 1
 i 1


0 if zt d  c

 
1 if z  c
.
t d


In this threshold model, the behavior of the variable yt is a pth order
autoregressive model governed by the coefficients αi when the transition variable zt−d is below the threshold value, c. When the transition
variable is greater than the threshold value, the behavior of the variable
yt is an autoregressive model governed by the coefficients αi + βi . Thus
the variable yt changes behavior depending on the relationship between
the transition variable and the threshold.
The transition variable is the observable state variable we mentioned above. Changes in this variable lead to changes in the behavior
of yt . The transition variable has a subscript t − d to indicate that it is a
lagged value, and d is an integer value of 1 or higher. The parameter d
is known as the “delay” and indicates the delay between changes in the
transition variable and changes in the behavior of yt .
The TAR model seems simple, with an indicator variable δ switching from zero to one as the transition variable crosses a threshold value.
This is a step function, with δ equaling zero when zt−d is on one side of
the threshold and one when zt−d is on the other side of the threshold.
Yet, despite this simplicity, the TAR model has proven useful as a
model to capture nonlinear behavior.

Higgins.indb 74

11/3/2011 10:22:41 AM

Forecasting Asset Prices Using Nonlinear Models 75

The STAR model generalizes the threshold approach by allowing a
smooth transition between the two regimes. This transition is governed
by a function of the threshold variable, z, and the transition function
is usually specified as being either logistic (LSTAR) or exponential
(ESTAR). The shape of the transition function governs the nature of
the movement from one regime to another. The main difference is that
logistic specification is one-sided, in the sense that there are alternative
dynamics for either large or small values of the transition function, and
an intermediate range where the dynamics are a combination of the dynamics at the two extremes. The exponential specification is two-sided,
in the sense that there is a set of dynamics for both large and small values, and a different set of dynamics for intermediate values.
The structure of the STAR model is given by
yt

 a0

p
 p

   i yt  i    i yt  i  F ( zt  d )   t ,
i 1
 i 1


where
(5.5)

F ( zt  d )  1  e  ( zt d  c ) 

1

(LSTAR)

or
F ( zt  d )  1  e  ( zt d  c )  ,   0


^2

(ESTAR).

We illustrate the nature of a STAR model transition function in Figure 5.4. In a TAR model there is a discrete switch between the two
regimes, as illustrated by the line that goes almost straight up. The transition function takes a value of zero before the period of the switch
and a value of one afterward. In a STAR model the switch between
the regimes is more gradual, with the degree of smoothness depending
upon the size of the transition parameter, γ. When gamma takes a small
value the transition is very gradual, as illustrated by the dotted line. As
gamma gets larger, the STAR model begins to approximate the discrete
switch of the TAR model, as illustrated by the curved lighter line. Thus,
one advantage of the STAR model is that it permits, but does not require, a relatively abrupt switch between regimes.
There are four steps involved in identifying and estimating a STAR
model. The first step is the identification and estimation of a linear auto-
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Figure 5.4 STAR Transition Functions—Role of Gamma
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regressive model. The primary purpose of this step is to determine the
lag lengths that will be used for linearity testing and, if nonlinearity is
detected, for estimating the STAR model. Step two is to test for linearity, to make sure that a nonlinear model is needed. If linearity is not
rejected, there is often no need to continue the process of estimating
a nonlinear model. If linearity is rejected, the third step is to identify
the STAR model specification. Here identification is used in the time
series sense and is meant to specify the various features of the model,
such as lag lengths. It is in this third step that one determines whether
an exponential or a logistical star model is appropriate. The last step is
the actual estimation of the specified STAR model. This can be done
with various nonlinear optimization procedures, and we use nonlinear
least squares.
In this exercise we will identify and estimate three models: one for
industrial production, one for a long-term bond rate, and one for excess equity returns. We begin the estimation of the linear models with
stationarity testing. We perform both the Augmented Dickey-Fuller
(ADF) and the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) tests, and
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the results are presented in Table 5.1. Note that the ADF test has a null
hypothesis of nonstationarity or “integrated of order one,” written as
I(1). The KPSS test has a null hypothesis of stationarity, or I(0).
Our ADF tests fail to reject the null of I(1) for the levels of the log
industrial production [Log(IP)] and the bond interest rate (INT), but reject that null for the level of excess returns (ER). This indicates that log
industrial production and the bond interest rate should be differenced,
while excess returns are stationary as calculated. We note that the ADF
test fails to reject the null of I(1) for the S&P 500, which is consistent
with the result that excess returns, calculated in part from differencing
the log S&P 500 index [Log(S)], are I(0). The ADF results are corroborated by the KPSS tests, which reject the null of I(0) for the levels of
the log of industrial production and the bond rate, but fail to reject that
null for excess returns.
Table 5.1 Testing for Stationarity
ADF testa
ADF testa
series in first
Variable series in levels
differences
Log(IP)
−2.55
−12.25
(p = 0.31)
(0.00)
(2 lags, trend)
(1 lag)
Fail to reject
Reject
−19.29
Log(S)
−1.71
(p = 0.00)
(p = 0.75)
(0 lags)
(1 lag, trend)
Fail to reject
Reject
INT
−1.73
−18.08
(p = 0.42)
(0.00)
(2 lags)
(1 lag)
Fail to reject
Reject
ER
−19.20
(p = 0.00)
(0 lags)
Reject

KPSS testb
series in levels
0.42
(5% CV = 0.15)
(trend)
Reject
0.63
(5% CV = 0.15)
(trend)
Reject
0.96
(5% CV = 0.15)
Reject
0.09
(5% CV = 0.15)

KPSS testb
series in first
differences
0.14
(5% CV = 0.46)
Fail to reject
0.10
(5% CV = 0.46)
Fail to reject
0.27
(5% CV = 0.46)
Fail to reject

Fail to reject

NOTE: Blank = not applicable.
a
ADF test: Null hypothesis is I(1).
b
KPSS test: Null hypothesis is I(0).
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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Based upon these two tests, we estimate linear models in the first
differences of the log of industrial production (DLIP) and the bond interest rate (DINT), and in the level of excess returns (ER). We proceed
to determine the appropriate lag length for these linear models, and here
we select the lag lengths using a standard goodness of fit criterion, the
Schwartz Information Criterion (SIC). Using the SIC to pick lag lengths
involves searching over a range of possible lag lengths selected a priori
and finding the lag length within that set that will minimize the SIC.
Here we searched over a range from 1 lag to 12 lags.
Our models will possibly contain multiple right-hand-side variables at various lags, and not just lags of the dependent variable. This
raises a few issues with lag selection. One procedure is to search over
the entire lag space, with 1 through 12 lags of each variable. If there
are three right-hand-side variables, as there are in some of our models,
this involves 12 cubed regressions. An alternative is to use an iterative procedure, first picking the lags of the dependent variable and then
proceeding with the other explanatory variables. We follow this latter
approach. We first selected the best univariate model, then the best lags
of the second variable, holding constant the lags specified for the dependent variable in the univariate specification, and then the best lags
of the third variable given the lags of the first two variables. The results
are provided in Table 5.2.
The linear model for the change in the log of industrial production
contains two lags of the change in the log of industrial production, two
lags of excess stock returns, and one lag of the change in the interest
rate. The linear models for the asset returns are more parsimonious.
Neither one contains any lags of change of the log of industrial production, so the real sector variable will not be included in the models for
the financial variables.
Table 5.2 Determining the Lag Length for the Linear Models
DLIP

ER

DINT

Univariate

AR(2); −6.74

AR(1); −3.93

AR(2); −14.14

Bivariate

2 lags ER; −6.75

0 lags DLIP; −3.93

2 lags ER; −14.15

Trivariate

1 lag DINT; −6.75

1 lag DINT; −3.94 0 lags DLIP; −14.15

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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The estimated linear models are presented in Table 5.3. Estimation
was by ordinary least squares. Excess returns have a positive effect on
current growth in industrial production. Interestingly, increases in the
interest rate also have a positive effect on current growth in industrial
production. As for excess returns, increases in the interest rate have a
decidedly negative impact on excess returns. Finally, changes in the
interest rate are affected positively by excess returns.
The next step is to test for linearity. We use the approach derived
by Luukkonen, Saikkonen, and Teräsvirta (1988) and Teräsvirta and
Table 5.3 Linear Model Estimates
DLIP
Constant
0.0015
(0.0004)
p = 0.0000
DLIP(−1)
0.3098
(0.0404)
p = 0.0000
DLIP(−2)
0.1028
(0.0399)
p = 0.0103
ER(−1)
0.0231
(0.0100)
p = 0.0211
ER(−2)
0.0308
(0.0099)
p = 0.0020
DINT(−1)
4.6626
(1.5652)
p = 0.0030
DINT(−2)
—
—
—
0.1951
R2
Std. error
0.0081
SIC
−6.7509

ER
4.43E-04
(1.36E-03)
p = 0.7440
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.2086
(0.0397)
p = 0.0000
—
—
—
−26.5785
(6.2857)
p = 0.0000
—
—
—
0.0842
0.0332
−3.9441

DINT
1.20E-06
(8.18E-06)
p = 0.8829
—
—
—
—
—
—
6.27E-04
(2.50E-4)
p = 0.0122
6.31E-04
(2.50E-04)
p = 0.0119
0.3863
(0.0404)
p = 0.0000
−0.1925
(0.0406)
p = 0.0122
0.1720
0.0002
−14.1487

NOTE: — = data not available.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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Anderson (1992), in which linearity is tested with the “approximating
equation.” The advantage of this approach is that it simultaneously tests
for linearity and provides guidance about the specification of the nonlinear model. The approximating equation is given as follows:
(5.6)

p

p

p

i 1

i 1

i 1

yt   0   1,i yt  i    2,i yt  i zt  d   3,i yt  i zt2 d
p

   4,i yt  i zt3 d   t ,
i 1

where yt is the variable being modeled, zt−d is the transition variable, and
d is the delay between when the transition variable crosses the threshold
value and the variable of interest’s alternative dynamics become active.
The null hypothesis of linearity is a test of β2i = β3i = β4i = 0.
We take a general approach to testing for linearity by using five
possible transition variables and up to a three-period delay. We start by
using the dependent variable as the transition variable to see if the variable’s own values indicate the source of nonlinearity. This would mean,
for example, that the change in the log of the industrial production
would be the transition variable for itself. We then look at the possibility that one of the other two variables being modeled could be the
transition variable. For the change in the log of industrial production,
this means testing whether the change in the bond rate or excess returns
is the transition variable. Finally, we consider two external variables.
The first, called current depth of the recession, or CDR, is the distance
from the past peak in industrial production and its current value. This
variable would capture a situation in which recessions and expansions
had alternative dynamics. A variable similarly defined for the stock index, CDB (current depth of stocks), measures the difference between
the previous peak in the S&P 500 index and index’s current value. This
variable would capture a situation in which rising and falling S&P 500
index values generated different dynamics.
The results of estimating the approximating equation and testing
for linearity are given in Table 5.4. First, there is no evidence suggesting rejection of linearity for excess returns. No tests for any threshold
variable for any delay are close to suggesting a rejection of linearity. We conclude that excess returns are best modeled here as a linear
process. There is abundant evidence, however, to support rejecting
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Table 5.4 Testing for Linearity
Dependent variables for linearity test
ER
DINT
DLIP
Threshold
variables
Chi-sq. P-value
Chi-sq. P-value
Chi-sq. P-value
CDB(−1)
35.59
0.0020
5.03
0.5402
18.27
0.1076
CDR(−1)
30.63
0.0098
4.34
0.6302
28.47
0.0047
ER(−1)
22.08
0.1056
2.43
0.8764
52.13** 0.0000
DINT(−1)
16.59
0.3442
8.68
0.1925
51.96* 0.0000
DLIP(−1)
52.25** 0.0001
8.77
0.1871
25.80
0.0114
CDB(−2)
CDR(−2)
ER(−2)
DINT(−2)
DLIP(−2)

41.87*
28.53
29.70
17.23
25.84

0.0002
0.0185
0.0131
0.3052
0.0398

2.73
7.91
5.36
6.83
5.03

0.8424
0.2445
0.4985
0.3369
0.5400

20.88
30.83
24.30
43.54
19.52

0.0522
0.0021
0.0185
0.0000
0.0768

CDB(−3)
CDR(−3)
ER(−3)
DINT(−3)
DLIP(−3)

29.04
14.45
19.50
31.66
17.54

0.0159
0.4917
0.1921
0.0072
0.2878

1.68
5.75
5.20
3.48
6.50

0.9467
0.4515
0.5182
0.7469
0.3692

15.93
35.18
39.93
40.05
9.66

0.1944
0.0004
0.0001
0.0001
0.6459

NOTE: * significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed test); ** significant at the 0.05 level
(two-tailed test).
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.

linearity for both the change in the log of industrial production and
the change in the bond rate. Of the 15 different tests for linearity, 9
of them support rejection, suggesting that a finding of nonlinearity is
not dependent upon a very specific combination of threshold variable
and delay. A review of all instances that show rejection indicates that
a single lag of the change in the log of industrial production should
be chosen as the threshold variable. Similar results are found for the
change in the bond rate, in that 11 of the 15 tests produce evidence
indicating rejection of linearity. A review of those tests indicates that a
single lag of excess returns should be chosen as the threshold variable
for the change in the bond rate.

Higgins.indb 81

11/3/2011 10:22:44 AM

82 Bradley and Jansen

Given that we find evidence rejecting linearity for two of the variables, the next step is to identify which STAR model is appropriate for
each, the LSTAR or the ESTAR model. This is done through a series of
hypothesis tests on the coefficients in the approximating equation. The
null hypothesis of linearity is tested through setting to zero all of the estimated coefficients on the threshold variable. The identification of the
model specification looks at similar tests for subsets of the coefficients.
Teräsvirta and Anderson (1992) specify a set of three hypotheses:
(5.7)

H1 :  4,i  0, i ,
H 2 :  3,i  0 |  4,i  0, i , and
H 3 :  2,i  0 |  3,i   4,i  0, i .

Rejection of H1 indicates that an LSTAR model is appropriate. Failure to reject H1 but rejection of H2 indicates that an ESTAR model is
appropriate. Finally, failure to reject H1 or H2 but rejection of H3 indicates that an LSTAR model is appropriate.
The results of testing theses hypotheses for our models are presented in Table 5.5. The table shows that H1 is rejected for both variables, indicating an LSTAR specification is appropriate for both the
change in the log of industrial production and the change in the bond
rate.
At this point we estimated the LSTAR model for changes in the
log of industrial production by nonlinear least squares, with results reported in Table 5.6. There are some important issues in estimating TAR
and STAR models that have to do with discontinuities in the likelihood
function, and these have been documented and discussed in Hansen
(1997). Our solution is to conduct a grid search for various values of the
threshold value in the TAR model, and the parameter estimates of the
TAR model are used as starting values for the STAR estimation.
In Table 5.6 we will first examine the transition variable and its role
in our model. The transition variable is one lag of the change in the log
of industrial production. Here the estimated value for the threshold is
−0.0035, which suggests that, roughly, the dynamics of the growth in
industrial production will differ when that growth is positive (specifically, above −0.0035) as compared to when it is negative (specifically,
below −0.0035).

Higgins.indb 82

11/3/2011 10:22:44 AM

Forecasting Asset Prices Using Nonlinear Models 83
Table 5.5 Identifying the STAR Model Specifications
Dependent variable: Dependent variable:
DLIP
DINT
Hypothesis tests
Chi-sq.
Prob.
Chi-sq.
Prob.
Threshold variable: Threshold variable:
DLIP(−1)
ER(−1)

H 0 :  2,i   3,i   4,i  0, i

52.25

0.0000

52.13

0.0000

H1 :  4,i  0, i

16.90

0.0047

13.85

0.0078

H 2 :  3,i  0 |  4,i  0, i

14.01

0.0155

3.14

0.5340

H 3 :  2,i  0 |  3,i   4,i  0, i 21.34

0.0007

35.13

0.0000

Threshold variable: Threshold variable:
CDB(−2)
DINT(−1)

H 0 :  2,i   3,i   4,i  0, i

41.87

0.0002

51.96

0.0000

H1 :  4,i  0, i

12.79

0.0254

9.91

0.0420

2.60

0.7611

17.62

0.0015

26.48

0.0001

24.43

0.0001

H 2 :  3,i  0 |  4,i  0, i
H 3 :  2,i  0 |  3,i   4,i  0, i
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.

One important issue to examine is whether one regime of the STAR
model is just being estimated on a single or a very few data points, so
that the model is really just showing that a few data points are a special
case. To examine this issue we use the following histogram, Figure 5.5,
which shows that the estimated threshold does not simply identify a few
observations at the extreme tail of the distribution. Instead, we see that,
over the history of the variable, many observations occur above, and
below, the threshold. Thus both regimes occurred with some regularity.
The estimated value of the transition parameter, γ, is relatively large
at 262.04, suggesting a relatively sharp transition between the regimes,
as DLIP(−1) varies around −0.0035. We thus also estimate a TAR
model for the change in the log of industrial production to serve as a
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Table 5.6 LSTAR for DLIP, January 1955–December 2004
Constant
0.0018 (0.0004);
DLIP(−1)
0.1795 (0.1034);
DLIP(−2)
0.3527 (0.1265);
ER(−1)
−0.0116 (0.0313);
ER(−2)
0.1109 (0.0381);
DINT(−1)
9.0912 (3.4673);
DLIP(−1) × F[DLIP(−1)]
0.1581 (0.1325);
DLIP(−2) × F[DLIP(−1)]
−0.3357 (0.1508);
ER(−1) × F[DLIP(−1)]
0.0502 (0.0407);
ER(−2) × F[DLIP(−1)]
−0.1145 (0.0486);
DINT(−1) × F[DLIP(−1)]
−7.3670 (4.9938);
Gamma
262.04 (187.44);
Threshold for DLIP(−1)
−0.0035 (0.0032);
0.2283
R2
Std. error
0.0079
SIC
−6.7184
Log likelihood
2,057.110

p = 0.0001
p = 0.0830
p = 0.0055
p = 0.7115
p = 0.0037
p = 0.0090
p = 0.2331
p = 0.0263
p = 0.2173
p = 0.0189
p = 0.1407
p = 0.1626
p = 0.2758

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.

basis for comparison with the STAR model. The estimated value for the
threshold for the TAR model is reported in Table 5.7 and is very close to
that of the STAR model. Figure 5.6 graphs the transition functions for
the TAR and STAR model. Of course this is a step function for the TAR
model, and, as the graph makes clear for the STAR model, there is a
large range where the two extreme regimes are “smoothly” combined to
generate the dynamics that we observe. As the following graph shows,
the switch between regimes takes place just below zero.
The estimated LSTAR model for the change in the bond rate is presented in Table 5.8. The coefficients on lags of the changes in the bond
rate in the lower regime were statistically insignificant in initial estimates of both the STAR and TAR models, and their inclusion caused
convergence difficulties for the STAR model, so we set these two coefficients to zero for the results reported in Table 5.8 (and for the TAR
model reported in Table 5.9).
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Figure 5.5 Histogram for DLIP
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For the bond rate the transition variable is one lag of the change in
the bond rate, or DINT(−1). The estimated threshold value is −0.00048,
a value that falls far to the left in the distribution of changes in the bond
rate between positive and negative values, suggesting that changes in
the bond rate are largely governed by one regime, with occasional large
declines in the bond rate leading to alternative dynamics. Figure 5.7
presents the histogram of excess returns. We see that there are only a
small, though not trivial, number of observations in the lower regime.
The estimated value for the transition parameter is also large for this
model, 464.7, so we again estimate a TAR model for comparison, with
results reported in Table 5.9. In the TAR model, the estimated threshold
value is −0.00048, nearly the same as the STAR model. Given this and
the size of the transition variable in the LSTAR model, the two models
provide very similar results in terms of the region around the switch, as
seen in Figure 5.8.
So far, we have estimated four nonlinear models to be used in outof-sample forecasting, an LSTAR and a TAR for both the change in
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Table 5.7 TAR For DLIP, January 1955–December 2004
Constant
0.0018 (0.0005);
p = 0.0001
DLIP(−1)
0.2199 (0.0818);
p = 0.0074
DLIP(−2)
0.2635 (0.0823);
p = 0.0014
ER(−1)
0.0013 (0.0190);
p = 0.9461
ER(−2)
0.0800 (0.0178);
p = 0.0000
DINT(−1)
9.3324 (2.6351);
p = 0.0004
DLIP(−1) × δ
0.0971 (0.1095);
p = 0.3755
DLIP(−2) × δ
−0.2099 (0.0932);
p = 0.0246
ER(−1) × δ
0.0303 (0.0222);
p = 0.1727
ER(−2) × δ
−0.0679 (0.0213);
p = 0.0015
DINT(−1) × δ
−7.1795 (3.2521);
p = 0.0277
Threshold for DLIP(−1)
−0.003
0.2258
R2
Std. error
0.0079
SIC
−6.7365
Log likelihood
2,056.135
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.

the log of industrial production and the change in the bond rate. We
now supplement these models with an alternative approach to capturing nonlinearity among the real and financial variables. We specify and
estimate CDR models for the change in the log of industrial production,
for excess returns, and for the change in the bond rate.
Beaudry and Koop’s (1993) CDR model is designed to capture the
asymmetric dynamic caused by the fact that negative shocks to real and
financial variables tend to have temporary effects but positive shocks
tend to have permanent effects. This asymmetry is embodied in the
model through the inclusion of a CDR term, which measures the distance from the previous peak of the variable to the current value. This
term is positive when the current value is below the previous peak:
(5.8)

CDRt = max(Yt − j)j ≥ 0 − Yt .

Inclusion of this CDR term converts an otherwise linear model (like
an AR model) into a nonlinear model:
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Figure 5.6 DLIP Models: Transition Functions TAR and STAR
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(5.9) Θ(L)t ΔYt = δ + [Ω(L) − 1]CDRt + εt .
Here Θ(L) and Ω(L) represent polynomials in the lag operator L, a
convenient way to represent that there are lags of ΔY and lags of CDR
in the equation. If the coefficient on the CDR term is positive, then ΔY
grows faster when CDR increases—that is, when the recession is deeper.
In other words, ΔY grows fasters after a negative shock has placed the
economy in a deep recession. When the economy recovers and is growing above its previous peak, this extra growth in ΔY is eliminated. In
this case, positive shocks will have longer-lasting positive effects on ΔY
than negative shocks. Of course, if the coefficient on the CDR term is
< 0, the opposite case holds: a negative shock leads to more persistent
performance below the previous peak.
To allow for possible nonlinear effects from the financial markets
and the real sector, we investigate two versions of a CDR-type model,
one for industrial production and one for stock prices. The CDR term has
a positive value when industrial production is below its previous peak,
and the CDB term has a positive value when the S&P 500 is below its
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Table 5.8 LSTAR for DINT, January 1955–December 2004
Constant
1.95E-06 (8.07E-06);
DINT(−1)
—
—
DINT(−2)
—
—
ER(−1)
−0.0118
(0.0028);
ER(−2)
0.0083
(0.0017);
DINT(−1) × F
0.3995
(0.0461);
DINT(−2) × F
−0.2235
(0.0409);
ER(−1) × F
0.0129
(0.0029);
ER(−2) × F
−0.0078
(0.0170);
Gamma
464.68 (183.01);
Threshold for DINT(−1)
−4.81E-04 (4.78E-05);
0.2276
R2
Std. error
1.94E-04
SIC
−14.1756
Log likelihood
4,281.459

p = 0.8090
—
—
p = 0.0000
p = 0.000
p = 0.0000
p = 0.0000
p = 0.0000
p = 0.0000
p = 0.0014
p = 0.0000

NOTE: — = data not available.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.

Table 5.9 TAR for DINT, January 1955–December 2004
Constant
1.29E-06 (7.97E-06);
DINT(−1)
—
—
DINT(−2)
—
—
ER(−1)
−0.0099 (0.0014);
ER(−2)
0.0086 (0.0014);
DINT(−1) × δ
0.3869 (0.0439);
DINT(−2) × δ
−0.2159 (0.0401);
ER(−1) × δ
0.0108 (0.0014);
ER(−2) × δ
−0.0080 (0.0014);
Threshold for DINT(−1)
−0.00048
2
0.2245
R
Std. error
1.94E-04
SIC
−14.1928
Log likelihood
4,280.239

p = 0.8710
—
—
p = 0.0000
p = 0.0000
p = 0.0000
p = 0.0000
p = 0.0000
p = 0.0000

NOTE: — = data not available.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 5.7 Histogram for Changes in the Interest Rate
160
140
120

Frequency

100
80
60
40
20
0
í0.001300

0.000000

0.001300

Values for DINT

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.

Figure 5.8 DINT Models: Transition Functions TAR and STAR
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previous peak. The two graphs in Figure 5.9 display the values for CDR
and CDB and illustrate the differences in their time series histories.
To investigate this specification of nonlinearity, we took the linear
models presented in Table 5.3 and augmented them with both terms—
CDR and CDB. Neither the CDR term nor the CDB term was significant
for the change in the bond interest rate, indicating that the CDR class
of models was not appropriate for that variable. In contrast, both the
CDR and the CDB terms were significant in the model for the change
in the log of industrial production (see Table 5.10). The sum of the coefficients on the CDR term is positive, meaning that industrial production
grows faster after a negative shock to industrial production. This means
that negative real shocks have shorter lasting effects than positive real
shocks and industrial production tends to grow relatively rapidly after
Figure 5.9 Current Depth of Recession and Current Depth of Stocks,
January 1955–December 2004
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 5.10 CDR Model for DLIP
Constant
DLIP(−1)
DLIP(−2)
ER(−1)
ER(−2)
DINT(−1)
CDR(−1)
CDR(−2)
CDB(−1)
CDB(−2)
R2
Std. error
SIC
Log likelihood

0.0023
0.1296
0.1229
0.0770
—
4.9270
−0.1840
0.2241
0.0611
−0.0722

(0.0006);
(0.0872);
(0.0411);
(0.0258);
—
(1.5277);
(0.0997);
(0.0958);
(0.0286);
(0.0278);
0.2274
0.0079
−6.7599
2,056.741

p = 0.0001
p = 0.1378
p = 0.0029
p = 0.0030
—
p = 0.0013
p = 0.0655
p = 0.0197
p = 0.0335
p = 0.0096

NOTE: — = data not available.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.

recessions. In contrast, the sign of the sum of the coefficients on the
CDB term is negative. This suggests that industrial production grows
more slowly after stock market declines.
Only the CDR term was significant in the excess returns equation,
and the estimated model is presented in Table 5.11. The coefficient on
the CDR term is positive, suggesting that excess returns grow faster
Table 5.11 CDR Model for ER
Constant
ER(−1)
DINT(−1)
CDR(−1)
R2
Std. error
SIC

1.19E-03
0.1996
−26.4039
0.0960

(1.59E-03);
(0.0399);
(6.2711);
(0.0486);
0.0902
0.0331
−3.9400

p = 0.4529
p = 0.0000
p = 0.0000
p = 0.0486

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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when industrial production is in its “recovery” phase and expanding out
of a recession.

FORECAST EVALUATION
The above models were all estimated over a sample period from
January of 1955 to December of 2004 (1955.01–2004.12). We reserved
the final 58 data points, 2005.01–2009.10, for an out-of-sample forecasting comparison. The idea is to estimate the model up to 2004.12,
as if we are actually in 2004.12, and use that information and parameter estimates to forecast in 2005.01. Then we update the sample to
1955.01–2005.01 and use that information to forecast 2005.2. We
continue this exercise through our last data point, forecasting 2009.10
using the sample 1955.01–2009.09. In this way our forecasts are all
constructed using only information available at the time of the forecast.
The above description is an ideal, however, as data revisions occur after the fact, and we have used data available to us late in 2009.
If data revisions occurred—and they certainly did to industrial production—then our entire sample in 2009 contains data different from what
a forecaster would have available in real time. This is a topic of great
interest in the current literature but not one we deal with in this study.
Fortunately, financial series such as stock prices and returns are not
typically subject to the data revision problem.
An important issue is how to judge forecasting performance. We
can calculate how far off each individual forecast is for the various
models, and average the forecast errors over our 58-data-point forecasting sample. More often, we calculate the average of the squared
forecast errors, and still more often we calculate the square root of the
average of the squared forecast errors, or the root mean square forecasting error (RMSFE). This is probably the most widely cited measure of
forecast accuracy. Another widely used measure is the average of the
absolute value of the forecasting errors, the mean absolute forecasting
error (MAFE). Other loss functions are possible, including measures of
turning points and loss functions based on utility or profit functions, but
we will not pursue those alternatives here.
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Table 5.12 provides the out-of-sample measures of the RMSFE and
MAFE for our three variables (DINT, DLIP, ER) and our four models
(linear, TAR, STAR, CDR). For excess returns we also provide a random walk model. We highlight the model that achieves the best (lowest)
value for each variable. For the RMSFE criterion, the best DINT model
is the linear model. The TAR model does a particularly poor job. For
DLIP, the best RMSFE values are given by the STAR model, followed
by the TAR model. The linear model only does better than the CDR
model. Finally, for ER the best RMSFE value is provided by the CDR
model, and both models beat a random walk.
For the MAFE criterion, we again find that the best forecasts of
DINT are provided by the linear model, although here the STAR model
appears to do almost as well as the linear model. For DLIP, the best
forecasts are from the TAR model, followed by the STAR model, with
the linear model third. Again the CDR model does the worst of the four.
For ER, the best forecasts come from the CDR model, followed by the
linear model, with the random walk bringing up the rear.
More insight into the relative forecast performance can be gleaned
from examining the forecasts and forecast errors. Figure 5.10 plots the
values for the changes in the bond rate, DINT, along with forecasts of
DINT from the linear model and the TAR model. These are graphed on
the left-hand scale. The actual values are represented by the line identiTable 5.12 Performance Measures for Out-of-Sample Forecasts, January
2005–October 2009
RMSE loss
Random
criterion
Linear
TAR
STAR
CDR
walk
DINT
1.76E-04
3.40E-04
1.92E-04
—
DLIP
8.28E-03
7.64E-03
7.54E-03
8.64E-03
—
ER
4.52E-02
—
—
4.46E-02
4.77E-02
MAE loss
criterion
DINT
DLIP
ER

Linear
1.33E-04
5.67E-03
2.90E-02

TAR
1.82E-04
5.16E-03
—

STAR
1.35E-04
5.28E-03
—

CDR
5.72E-03
2.84E-02

Random
walk
—
—
3.11E-02

NOTE: — = model not estimated; blank = not applicable.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 5.10 Changes in the Bond Rate and Forecasts, January 2005–
September 2009
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fied in the legend as “DINT_M12,” and the forecasts are the other lines.
There is a big difference between the actual values and the forecast
from the TAR model in the middle of 2008. The TAR model predicted a
large value for DINT at this time, but the large value failed to materialize. The difference between the actual value of DINT and the forecast
from the TAR model is about −0.002, a large value that led the TAR
model to perform quite poorly based on the RMSFE. The forecast errors themselves are plotted at the top, and on the right-hand scale, of
Figure 5.10. The large downward spike in mid-2008 is the TAR model
forecast error we have just discussed.
Figure 5.11 plots the forecasts, actual value, and forecast errors for
changes in the log of industrial production. The line with black squares
in the lower part of the graph is the actual value of DLIP, which experienced large upward and downward moves in the latter half of 2008.
These movements in DLIP were not forecast by either the linear or TAR
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Figure 5.11 Forecasts, Actual Value, and Forecast Errors for Changes in
the Log of Industrial Production, January 1955–September
2009
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models. Hence this movement generated forecast errors, which can be
seen in the top of Figure 5.11 on lines graphed against the right-hand
scale. The forecast errors from the linear and TAR models seem similar
in Figure 5.11, although there is some discrepancy near the end of 2008
and at the beginning of 2009. During this period the TAR model does
slightly better, and this leads to the TAR model having a lower RMSFE
in Table 5.12.
Finally, Figure 5.12 plots linear and CDR forecasts of excess returns. Again we see there was a large downward spike in ER in the
fourth quarter of 2008 that was not forecast by either the linear or the
CDR models. Thus this spike shows up in the top of Figure 5.12 as
forecast errors for both the linear and CDR models. As with industrial
production in Figure 5.11, it is difficult to see much difference in the
forecasts, or forecast errors, from the linear and CDR models. The main
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Figure 5.12 Linear and CDR Forecasts of Excess Returns, January 1955–
September 2009
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difference appears beginning in the middle of 2009, and this small
difference leads to the CDR model having somewhat lower RMSFE
values compared to the linear model.
One issue with results such as in Table 5.12 is the lack of a measure for saying just how much better one model’s forecasts are over
another’s. We would like a way of answering this question. Usually
this is phrased as an issue of statistical significance. We want to know
whether, for the ER model, the CDR model forecasts are statistically
significantly better than the forecasts of the linear model.
There are a variety of tests available for answering this question. A
classic test of forecast accuracy is the Diebold and Mariano (1995) test,
which has as its null hypothesis that two forecasts are equally accurate
by the chosen criterion (say RMSFE), and the alternative that one of
the two is better. Another test is called the encompassing test, which
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compares two forecasts and asks whether, given one forecast, there is
additional useful information in the second forecast. If the answer is
yes, then you might want to combine the two forecasts. If the answer
is no, then you might want to use the best forecast and ignore the second
forecast as containing no additional information once you have the first
forecast. Encompassing tests have been in use for quite some time, and
some early advocates include Chong and Hendry (1986) and Harvey,
Leybourne, and Newbold (1989).
In conducting these tests, an important practical issue is whether or
not your forecasting models are nested. The initial Diebold and Mariano
test was designed for use with nonnested forecasting models, which are
basically two unrelated forecasting models. Nested forecasting models,
in contrast, are models where one model is a subset of another model. In
our models, the linear model is nested inside the CDR model. If we just
eliminate the CDR terms—say, by setting the coefficients on the CDR
terms to zero—we get back the linear model. Similarly, our TAR and
STAR models also nest the linear model. If we just set the terms multiplying the transition variable all to zero, then we have a one-regime
linear model.
Statistical comparisons of nested models bring up complications
relative to comparisons of nonnested models. This issue has been explored by a number of authors, including work by West (1996), Clark
(1999), McCracken (2000), and Clark and McCracken (2001), and we
refer the interested reader to those papers.
Giacomini and White (2006) suggest a new approach to statistical
comparisons of forecasts from nested models. Basically they have a
version of the Diebold and Mariano test that works for nested models,
a model based on the idea of conditional forecast comparisons, and we
use their approach here. In Table 5.13 we report tests of the RMSFE
loss function for our various models. In these tests we select a baseline
model and compare our other models to the baseline. For the DINT
and DLIP forecasts we use the linear model as the baseline. For the ER
forecasts we use the random walk model as the baseline.
For the DINT forecasts we see in Table 5.12 that the smallest
RMSFE was for the linear model. Thus the test results in Table 5.13
are basically tests of whether the baseline linear model is statistically
significantly better than the TAR or STAR models. The answer is that
while the linear model has a lower RMSFE, it is not statistically sig-
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Table 5.13 GW Version of DM Test (unconditional)—RMSE Loss Function
Variable to
Random
forecast
walk
Linear
TAR
STAR
CDR/CDB
DINT
—
Baseline
1.2871
0.9974
—
(p = 0.203) (p = 0.323)
DLIP
—
Baseline
1.5092
1.2880
−0.7353
(p = 0.131) (p = 0.198) (p = 0.465)
ER
Baseline
1.5329
0.5257
(p = 0.125)
(p = 0.601)
NOTE: — = model not estimated; blank = not applicable.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.

nificantly lower than either of the two nonlinear models. This is even
true for the TAR model, which appeared to perform quite poorly in
terms of RMSFE. Still, this is no victory for the nonlinear models. A
linear model is much easier to estimate and to use for forecasting. If a
linear model gives forecasts that are as good or better than the nonlinear
model alternatives, then we would usually avoid going to the trouble of
forecasting from a nonlinear model.
For the DLIP forecasts, we see in Table 5.12 that the lowest
RMSFE values were generated by the two nonlinear models. In Table 5.13 we see that even though TAR and STAR both provided better
RMSFE values, the improvement was not statistically significant. The
TAR model has the best marginal probability value, 13.1 percent, but
that means that at conventional significance levels of 5 or even 10 percent we would not reject the hypothesis of equal RMSFE for the linear
and TAR forecasts.
For the ER forecasts, we compared both the linear model and the
CDR model to a random walk baseline. In Table 5.12 we see that the linear model had better RMSFE values than the random walk model, and
that the CDR model had better RMSFE values than the linear model,
but in Table 5.13 we see that neither the linear nor the CDR model improves on the random walk model in a statistically significant amount.
The results for the DLIP and ER forecasts are disappointing for
fans of the nonlinear model. In both cases a nonlinear model or models
made improvements in terms of RMSFE values, but these improvements were not statistically significant.
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In Table 5.14 we report a similar exercise using the MAFE criterion. Here we find a bit better news for the nonlinear models. For DINT
we again find that the linear model is best, but for DLIP we find that the
forecasts from the TAR model are statistically significantly better than
forecasts from the linear model. The marginal probability value is 3.2
percent, indicating that at standard significance levels of 5 percent we
would reject the hypothesis of equal forecasting accuracy—in terms of
MAFE—of the linear model and the TAR model.
For the ER model the results in Table 5.14 indicate that forecasts
from the linear model are statistically significantly better than forecasts
from the random walk model. But we find the disappointing result that
forecasts from the CDR model are statistically insignificantly different
in accuracy from forecasts of the random walk model. Even though
the CDR model generated a better MAFE value compared to the linear
model, the variability of the forecasts from the CDR model means that
the difference is judged to be statistically insignificant.
Overall, then, our forecast evaluation indicates only weak support
for the superiority of forecasts of DLIP from a TAR model, and even
weaker support for using a CDR model to forecast ER. We find no support for using anything other than a linear model for forecasting DINT.
Basically we find the result, familiar to many in this literature, that nonlinear models appear to fit well in estimation samples but that these
models don’t fair nearly as well in out-of-sample forecasting exercises.
Table 5.14 GW Version of DM Test (unconditional)—MAE Loss Function

DINT

Random
walk
—

Linear
Baseline

DLIP

—

Baseline

Baseline

2.0097
(p = 0.044)

ER

TAR
1.3157
(p = 0.194)
2.1438
(p = 0.032)

STAR
1.6432
(p = 0.106)
1.4329
(p = 0.152)

CDR/CDB
—
−0.2010
(p = 0.841)
0.7158
(p = 0.477)

NOTE: — = model not estimated; blank = not applicable.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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SOME COMMENTS ON MULTIPLE-STEP-AHEAD
FORECASTING
In the analysis above we have investigated the ability of a set of
nonlinear models to generate forecasts of two financial variables and
industrial production that are better than forecasts from a linear model.
This analysis has looked at one-step-ahead forecasts, or forecasts made
at time t for the value of variables at time t + 1. It is also possible, of
course, to construct multiple-step-ahead forecasts—forecasts made at
time t for the value of variables at time t + 2 or later (better represented
as t + H, where H stands for the horizon) and for multiple-step-ahead
forecasts H > 1.
Nonlinear models present particular challenges when constructing multiple-step-ahead forecasts. For linear models the law of iterated
expectations and the use of the linear expectation operator on linear
equations makes multiple-step-ahead forecasting a straightforward
extension of one-step-ahead forecasts. To see this, consider a simple
AR(1) model:
(5.10)

yt = βyt−1 + εt .

To calculate the one-step-ahead forecast we rewrite Equation (5.10) for
time t + 1 and take expectations conditioned on knowledge of the value
of y at time t:
(5.11)

yt +1 = βyt + εt + 1 .

Then, taking expectations conditioned on knowledge of yt , we have
(5.12)

E(yt +1 │yt ) = βyt .

To think about a two-step-ahead forecast made at time t, rewrite Equation 5.10 for time t + 2 and iteratively substitute to write the result as a
function of the value of y at time t:
(5.13)
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Then, taking expectations conditioned on knowledge of yt , we have
(5.14) E(yt + 2 | yt) = β 2yt .
Thus the two-step-ahead forecast in Equation 5.14 is a simple
extension of the one-step-ahead forecast in Equation 5.12. While the
above is a particularly simple model in terms of notation, the principle
holds more generally in forecasts from linear models.
Consider now a nonlinear model. A simple TAR model would be
(5.15) yt = βyt - 1 + γyt - 1 × I (yt - 1 < c) + εt .
To calculate the one-step-ahead forecast, we rewrite Equation (5.15)
for time t + 1 as
(5.16) yt + 1 = βyt + γyt × I (yt < c) + εt + 1 .
Then, taking expectations conditioned on knowledge of yt , we have
(5.17) E(yt + 1 | yt) = βyt + γyt × I (yt < c) .
So far this looks straightforward, much like the one-step-ahead forecast
from the linear model. However, consider the two-step-ahead forecast made
at time t. Rewrite Equation (5.15) for time t + 2 and iteratively substitute to
write the result as a function of the value of y at time t :
(5.18) yt + 2 = βyt + 1 + γyt + 1 × I(yt + 1 < c) + εt + 2
or
yt + 2 = β[βyt + γyt × I (yt < c) + εt + 1] + γ[βyt + γyt ×
I(yt < c) + εt + 1] × I{[βyt + γyt × I(yt < c) + εt + 1] < c} + εt + 2 .
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Then, taking expectations conditioned on knowledge of yt , we have
(5.19) E(yt+2 | yt ) = β[βyt + γyt × I(yt < c)] + γ[βyt + γyt × I(yt < c)]

(

)

× E I{[βyt + γyt × I(yt < c) + εt+1 ] < c}|yt + E{εt+1
× I[εt+1 < c −βyt − γyt × I(yt < c)]|yt }.
Clearly, Equation (5.19) is not a straightforward extension of Equation (5.17). In fact, the last term in Equation (5.17) involves expectation
of the disturbance term εt + 1 interacted with a function of the same disturbance term εt + 1 . It is evident, then, that the two-step-ahead forecast
involves considerations of higher moments than the mean. To put this
in practice requires distributional assumptions on the error term or else
some sort of bootstrap procedure to calculate expectations from the
empirically realized (i.e., estimated) disturbances. None of this makes
multiple-step-ahead forecasts from nonlinear models impossible, but
they are much more involved than such forecasts in a linear model, and
as this chapter is already quite long we do not pursue such forecasts
here.

CONCLUSION
Our study demonstrates once again how nonlinear models can fit
very well in-sample and yet struggle to outperform linear models in
out-of-sample forecasting. This finding is not unusual, but it is frustrating to proponents of nonlinear modeling. Nonlinear modelers usually
exert care in trying to avoid overfitting within sample, and yet the outof-sample performance difficulties point to overfitting as one possible
source of the problem. The exact reason for these difficulties with forecasts from nonlinear models remains an open issue.
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6
Perspectives on Evaluating
Macroeconomic Forecasts
H.O. Stekler
George Washington University
Over the past 50 or so years, I have been concerned with the quality of economic forecasts and have written both about the procedures
for evaluating these predictions and the results that were obtained from
these evaluations. In this chapter I provide some perspectives on the
issues involved in judging the quality of these forecasts. These include
the reasons for evaluating forecasts, the questions that have been asked
in these evaluations, the statistical tools that have been used, and the
generally accepted results. (I do also present some new material that has
not yet been published.) I do this in two parts: first focusing on shortrun gross domestic product (GDP) and inflation predictions and then
turning to labor market forecasts.
The process of forecasting involves a number of sequential steps.
Part of that process is concerned with evaluating either the forecasts
themselves or the methods that generated the predictions. This evaluation may occur either when past forecasts are examined prior to preparing
the next one or in a postmortem session to determine what went wrong
and what can be learned from the errors. However, there are different
perspectives or approaches for conducting these examinations. These
differences may occur because some forecasts are model-based while
others are derived primarily from the judgmental approach. There is a
second issue. Originally, the evaluations were concerned with judging a
particular model or individual. A more recent development has been to
determine the value that the forecast has for the users of that prediction.
The original approach calculated a variety of statistics that measured the errors of the forecasts and then compared these errors with
those generated by alternative methods or individuals. The newer approach for forecast evaluation is to base it on the loss functions of the
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users (Pesaran and Skouras 2002). Elliott and Timmermann (2008),
in summarizing the theoretical literature on how to evaluate forecasts,
take the same approach. These studies definitely suggest that the preferred evaluation methodology utilize decision-based methods; Pesaran
and Skouras, however, note that it has had limited use, and that most
studies have focused on statistical measures to evaluate the skills of the
forecaster or the accuracy of the model.1 There are many reasons why
the decision-based methods have not been used, including technical difficulties and the huge amount of data required to describe the decision
environment, particularly the loss functions of the users.
The theoretical procedures provide the guidelines for undertaking
forecast evaluations, but since there are problems in applying them,
they have not yet yielded much information about the quality of the
forecasts or an understanding of the types of errors that occur or their
causes. Even though we cannot, in general, evaluate the cost of the
forecast errors in the context of decision functions, I will present one
particular result where it was possible to use this approach.2
Statistical measures have been the most common method for evaluating forecasts, and they have provided many insights about the quality
of the forecasts and their limitations. I will, therefore, focus on that
approach. These measures also provide us with the ability to obtain
information about the forecasting process and why particular errors occurred.
This chapter proceeds as follows. I first present a list of questions
that should be addressed in any evaluation of macroeconomic forecasts;
this list was taken from an old paper of mine (Stekler 1991a). That paper also presented the statistical methods that could be used to address
those questions. In the intervening 20 years, forecasters have both developed new techniques for answering the original questions and asked
additional questions. I will discuss these in the context of the original
questions.
Our macroeconomic forecast evaluations have primarily been concerned with the predictions of GDP growth and inflation. I will, therefore,
summarize some of the findings relating to these two variables. In making macro forecasts, economists also estimate the unemployment rate,
but these forecasts have not been analyzed as extensively. Consequently,
there is a limited amount of information about the quality of these
forecasts.
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Moreover, in analyzing labor markets in a macroeconomic growth
context, long-term projections of annual employment by industry and
occupation are sometimes also issued. Not as much attention has been
paid to the procedures for evaluating these projections. I will present
some findings about these forecasts, utilizing a statistic that has not
conventionally been used in evaluations. There are also many types of
regional forecasts, but I will only discuss the population projections of
the Census Bureau. I conclude with a summary of the findings and suggest topics that warrant further research.

QUESTIONS ADDRESSED IN MACROECONOMIC
FORECAST EVALUATIONS
In 1991, I asked a number of questions, some of which are related,
that can be and have been used in forecast evaluations (Stekler 1991a).
These questions are all statistical in nature and describe the characteristics of the forecasting method or the particular forecaster. The main
questions are
•

How good is Method A (Forecaster X)?

•

Do the forecasts show systematic errors?

•

Are all methods (forecasters) equally good?

•

Is Method A (Forecaster X) significantly better than Method
B (Forecaster Y)?

•

Does Forecast M contain information not in Forecast N?

•

Does Forecaster X produce forecasts that are useful to users?

How Good is Method A (Forecaster X)?
If the forecasts are quantitative, the first question is answered by
using some error metric, usually mean square error or mean square
percentage error, and comparing it with the similar error metric of a
benchmark or naive model.3 On the other hand, different procedures are
used to assess nonquantitative macroeconomic forecasting techniques,
which are primarily concerned with predicting whether a cyclical turn
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will occur. These forecasting methods are based on indicators. Originally,
rules were used for determining whether an indicator was signaling a
turn. (See Stekler 1991b.) More recently, models that predict the probability of a cyclical turn have been developed, and probability scoring
rules such as the Brier Score have been used to evaluate these forecasts.
Further analysis of these qualitative forecasts is beyond the scope of
this paper.
Bias and Efficiency
Accurate forecasts should be unbiased (not have systematic errors)
and should use all available information. Bias and efficiency tests are
used to determine whether there are systematic errors. These tests are
usually derived from the Mincer-Zarnowitz equation:
(6.1a)

At = α + β Ft + et , where

At and Ft refer to the actual and forecast values (Mincer and Zarnowitz
1969). The condition for unbiasedness and weak form efficiency is that
α = 0 and β = 1. An alternative test for bias is
(6.1b)

At − β Ft = c + et ,

with the null that c = 0 (Holden and Peel 1990). These tests are applied
to one individual’s forecasts at one horizon.
A newer and more sophisticated methodology has been developed
by Davies and Lahiri (1995, 1999) and has been applied to surveys
that contain the forecasts of many individuals or organizations, e.g.,
the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) or Blue Chip Forecasters.
The use of this methodology permits an analysis of multidimensional
forecasts, i.e., many forecasters each making a prediction for a target
year at several horizons.4 The errors can be decomposed as
(6.2a)

At − Fith = Φi + λth + eith

and
(6.2b)
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Fith is the forecast made by the ith forecaster for year t at an h month
horizon, Φi represents the specific bias of each individual, and λth represents the shocks that were not anticipated. This model can identify the
specific sources of each forecaster’s errors.
Using the Davies-Lahiri methodology it is no longer necessary to
confine the evaluation of the predictions obtained from a survey to the
“consensus” forecast. It has the inherent advantage that the opposing
biases of individuals can make the mean (median) forecast look unbiased even when, in fact, the individual forecasts from which the mean
is calculated are all biased.
Comparing Forecasters and Benchmarks
Nonparametric procedures have been used to determine whether
all forecasters are equally accurate. For each set of forecasts, the errors of each forecaster are ranked according to their accuracy. If the
accuracy of all forecasters were equal, their rankings would have the
same expected values. It is thus possible to test the hypothesis that all
forecasters have equal rankings (and are equally good). The chi-square
goodness-of-fit test statistic, x2, is used. (See Batchelor 1990.)
The fourth question asks whether a particular method (forecaster)
is significantly more accurate than another method (forecaster). Originally, Theil’s U coefficient was the basis of comparison:
(6.3)

U = √ (ef,t)2/ √ (en,t)2 ,

where (ef,t) is the error of the forecast that is being evaluated and (en,t) is
the error of the naive benchmark. This naive model can be either a nochange or the same change as the last period prediction. At a minimum,
the forecasts should be more accurate than naive models and U must
be less than 1. Statistical models, such as ARIMA, have also been used
as benchmarks, and new statistics for comparing models have been
developed.
Currently the Diebold-Mariano (DM) statistic is the preferred methodology for testing whether there is a statistically significant difference in
accuracy between any two sets of forecasts (Diebold and Mariano 1995).
That statistic (Equation 6.4) has been modified by Harvey, Leybourne,
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and Newbold (1997), and their modification has resulted in an improvement in the behavior of the test statistic for moderately sized samples:
(6.4)

( T  1  2(h  1)T  h(h  1) / T ))

S1*  S1 (

−1/2

,

S1 

d
,
ˆ
[V ( d )]1/ 2

where h is the horizon, d is the mean absolute difference of the prediction errors, Vˆ ( d ) is the estimated variance, S1 is the original DM
statistic, and S1* is the modified DM statistic. The modified DM test
statistic is estimated with Newey-West corrected standard errors that
allow for heteroskedastic autocorrelated errors (Newey and West 1987).
Several procedures have been developed to determine whether
one forecast contains information not embodied in another procedure.
One involves combining the two sets of forecasts. If the variance of
the combined forecasts is not significantly less than the variance of the
prediction that is being analyzed, then this particular forecast does not
contain additional useful information. This analysis is similar to the
concept of encompassing, where a model that encompasses another
contains the information of the latter.
Directional Accuracy: A New Approach
Even though the analysis does not directly use utility functions,
the final question listed above relates to the usefulness of a forecast to
a decision maker. It concerns the directional accuracy of the forecast.
Merton (1981), in analyzing financial forecasts, indicates that they have
value if the signs of the predicted and actual changes are similar. The
various tests that have been implemented seek to determine whether
the sign of the forecast change is probabilistically independent of the
actual change. If the hypothesis that the forecasts are independent of
the observed events is rejected, then the forecasts can be said to have
value.
Schnader and Stekler (1990) provide another interpretation of
this test. We argue that testing whether the forecasts have value is the
same as determining whether (in the sense of predicting the direction
of change) the forecast differs significantly from a naive model that
continuously predicts up (down). The profession now categorizes the
various tests as measuring directional accuracy. This concept can be
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illustrated either when GDP or inflation predictions are made separately
or when both variables are examined together.
One variable
Most macroeconomic forecast evaluations focus on GDP and inflation. Basically, when the real GDP and inflation forecasts are each
evaluated separately, they are grouped into two categories. The GNP/
GDP forecasts are categorized according to whether GDP growth was
positive or negative, and the inflation categories depend on whether inflation increased or decreased.5 A 2 × 2 contingency table is created that
compares the predicted outcome of a variable with the actual outcome
of that variable (Table 6.1).6
Table 6.1 The Relationship between Predicted and Actual Outcomes
Actual outcome
Predicted outcome
>0
≤0
∆Y > 0
n1
N2 − n2
n
≤0
N1 − n1
n2
N−n
N1
N2
N
NOTE: N = total number of observations; N1 = number of observations where the
actual change was positive; N2 = number of observations where the actual change
was negative. Small n’s represent the same variables but refer to predicted changes.
Blank = not applicable.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.

For notation we have a total of N observations where for n1 of them
both the actual and the predicted are positive and for n2 of them both
the actual and the predicted are negative. We have n observations where
the predicted outcome is positive and N − n observations where the
predicted outcome is negative (or zero). We also have N1 observations
where the actual outcome is positive and N2 = N – N1 observations
where the actual outcome is negative (or zero). The Pesaran-Timmerman
(1992) statistic along with the chi-square and Fisher’s exact test can be
used to test this hypothesis.7
The Pesaran-Timmermann statistic for predictive performance for an
m × m contingency table with a total of N observations is
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sn  NVn1/2 S n
where we have the following:

 f ( P) 
ˆ  f ( P)  .
Vˆn  
 

 P  P  Pˆ  P  P  Pˆ
Pˆij  nij / N , where nij is the number of observations in the ij category of
ˆ ˆ , where ˆ is an m2 × m2 diagonal
the contingency table. ˆ ˆ  PP'

matrix with the elements of P̂ on the diagonal.
m





S n   Pˆii  Pˆi 0 Pˆ0i ,
i 1

where Pˆi 0  n i 0 / N .
Pˆ0i  n 0i / N ,

where ni 0 and n0i represent the ith row and column totals, respectively.
Pesaran and Timmermann (1992) present their results based on the
square of this test statistic in order to more easily compare it to the
chi-square goodness of fit statistic. This test statistic has a chi-square
distribution with one degree of freedom.
Several variables
All of the questions discussed above were concerned with evaluating the forecasts of one variable at a time. However, in preparing a
particular macroeconomic forecast, individuals are concerned with the
outlook for both the growth rate and the rate of inflation. The accuracy of this overall forecast thus depends on how well both variables
are predicted simultaneously. Thus, it is necessary to use a different
contingency table for evaluating the directional accuracy of these macroeconomic forecasts. Sinclair, Stekler, and Kitzinger (2010) show that
the simultaneous directional accuracy of the two variables can be evaluated by using a 4 × 4 contingency table rather than the 2 × 2 table that
had been used in assessing each variable individually.8
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In the expanded 4 × 4 table, instead of simply being categorized
based on the separate GDP growth or inflation predictions, forecasts
about the state of the economy are grouped into four categories: 1) GDP
growth positive, inflation increasing; 2) GDP growth positive, inflation decreasing; 3) GDP growth negative, inflation increasing; and
4) GDP growth negative, inflation decreasing. The statistical tests are
generalized versions of those used when the forecasts were analyzed
separately.9 Table 6.2 illustrates a 4 × 4 contingency table when the
directional accuracy of the GDP growth and inflation forecasts of the
Federal Reserve are evaluated jointly.
Test statistics
The statistical methodology tests whether or not the forecasts predict the associated directions of change. There are at least three test
statistics that can be used to test the hypothesis that the forecasts fail to
predict the observed events.10 Two test statistics focus on independence.
These test statistics are the chi-square and Fisher’s exact test. The
Pesaran-Timmermann (1992) statistic specifically focuses on predictive
failure. The forecasts are said to have value only if the null hypothesis
of predictive failure is rejected. Pesaran and Timmermann’s predictivefailure test is particularly useful in the case where we undertake a joint
evaluation of GDP growth and inflation forecasts. Their test does not
require that the two forecasts be independent of each other. Since output
and inflation may be predicted from the same forecasting model, this
is an important consideration. In this particular case, the probability of
the pattern of these forecasts occurring by chance is less than 0.001.
Table 6.2 The 4 × 4 Contingency Table for the Zero-Month Lead
Actual outcome
ΔGDP > 0, ΔGDP > 0, ΔGDP ≤ 0, ΔGDP ≤ 0,
Predicted outcome
Δinf > 0
Δinf ≤ 0
Δinf > 0
Δinf ≤ 0
ΔGDP > 0, Δinf > 0
ΔGDP > 0, Δinf ≤ 0

49
7

13
43

1
0

1
4

ΔGDP ≤ 0, Δinf > 0

1

2

4

2

ΔGDP ≤ 0, Δinf ≤ 0

0

3

5

4

SOURCE: Sinclair, Stekler, and Kitzinger (2010).
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Sinclair, Stekler, and Kitzinger (2010) thus conclude that the Fed forecasts for the current quarter yield an accurate view of the state of the
economy.
Policy Forecast Errors: An Example
In general, to obtain a quantitative measure of the economic costs
of forecast errors, the decision rule of the user of the prediction must be
known, but it generally is not known. However, there is at least one case
where the cost of forecast errors can be measured without knowing an
explicit decision rule because there is another criterion for evaluating
forecasts: are financial market and betting market decisions based on
those forecasts profitable (Leitch and Tanner 1991)?
Macroeconomic forecasts, however, cannot be evaluated in this
way, because there is no generally acceptable way of calculating their
value to policymakers. There is an exception if the rule guiding policy
decisions is known. Sinclair et al. (2009) show that it is possible to evaluate the quantitative forecasts of the Federal Reserve within the context
of the Taylor Rule, which is assumed to be the one that guides the Fed
in setting monetary policy.11 The assumption is that the Fed’s forecasts
of multiple series are usually generated for a specific policy purpose, as
inputs for monetary policy. In this case, an assessment of the quality of
the quantitative forecasts of two or more variables depends on the relative importance of each to the Fed.
Specifically, let Pt ,ft  h be a policy decision at time t that is a linear function of the h-step-ahead forecasts of N ≥ 1 variables
( xif,t  h , i = 1,...N). The superscript f indicates that the policy decision is
based on forecasts rather than on the actual outcomes of the variables:
(6.5)

Pt ,ft  h  p( x1,f t  h ,... x Nf ,t  h ) .

If policymakers had perfect foresight, the policy decision would
simply be Pt , without the superscript f :
(6.6)

Pt,t+h = p(x1,t+h ,... xN,t+h) .

However, because policy is based on forecasts, rather than on the
actual data, policy is subject to errors that are functions of the mistakes
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made in forecasting the underlying variables xi,t , i = 1,...N. The difference between the actual policy and the policy that would have been
pursued under perfect foresight is called the policy forecast error (PFE):
(6.7)

PFEt  Pt ,t  h  Pt ,ft  h  p ( x1,t  h ,...x N ,t  h )  p ( x1f,t  h ,...x Nf ,t  h )
 e(e1,t  h ,...eN ,t  h ) ,

where e1,t  h ,...e N ,t  h are the forecast errors associated with the individual series. Thus the PFE is composed of the individual forecast errors
weighted by their importance in the policy rule. According to the
forward-looking Taylor rule,12 the Fed sets a target federal funds rate,
itTf , based on Equation (6.8), where, as above, the superscript f denotes
that the target is based on forecast variables.13 The Fed’s policy decision
( Pt ,ft  h ) is written as
(6.8)

Pt ,ft  h  itTf  r *  t f h  0.5( t f h   *)  0.5( ytf h  y*) ,

where r* is the equilibrium real interest rate, π* is the Fed’s implicit
inflation rate target, and y* is the potential output growth rate.14
The actual outcome in period t + h, however, may differ from the
Fed’s forecasts. Therefore, if the members of the FOMC had known the
actual values for t + h and yt + h (i.e., if they had perfect forecasts or perfect foresight), they would have chosen a (potentially different) federal
funds rate. Consequently, their policy decision under perfect foresight
( Pt ,t  h ) would have been
(6.9)

Pt ,t  h  itT  r *  tA h  0.5( tA h   *)  0.5( ytA h  y*) ,

where  tA h and ytA h represent the actual realizations of t + h and yt + h .
The difference between iTf and iT measures the difference in the federal
funds rate that occurs because of inaccurate forecasts of output growth
and inflation and thus represents the Federal Reserve’s policy forecast
error, PFEt :
(6.10)









PFEt  itT  itTf  1.5  tA h   t f h  0.5 ytA h  ytf h .









The differences,  tA h   t f h and ytA h  ytf h , are the Fed’s forecast errors for the inflation rate and real output growth, respectively.
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Given the PFEs, the evaluation procedures are similar to those used in
judging individual forecast errors.
Using this methodology, Sinclair et al. (2009) were able to evaluate the impact that forecast errors had on the Fed’s monetary policy
as characterized by the Taylor rule. They found that the Fed’s policy
forecast error was in general unbiased and significantly smaller than
the errors that would have resulted from naive forecasts, but not always
significantly smaller than the errors that would have resulted from the
SPF predictions. Nevertheless, the mean absolute policy forecast error
of the Fed forecasts was approximately 1 percent (100 basis points).

FINDINGS FROM FORECAST EVALUATIONS (OF GDP
GROWTH AND INFLATION)
There have been many studies that have reported on the accuracy
of the forecasts of the growth of GDP and inflation. I have been involved in two survey papers that have summarized and synthesized the
results of these studies. One looks at U.S. and U.K. forecasts (Fildes
and Stekler 2002). The other does a similar analysis of the G7 (excluding the U.S.) predictions (Stekler 2008). By comparing the forecasts of
various countries, we can determine whether the findings are robust.
The focus will be on five topics: 1) directional errors; 2) biases and
systematic errors; 3) the magnitude of the errors; 4) the source of the
errors; and 5) the trend, if any, in forecast accuracy.
Directional Errors
There are very few analyses about directional errors, because most
forecast evaluations focus on the magnitude of the quantitative errors.
However, Fildes and Stekler (2002) note that most U.S. and U.K. recessions were not predicted in advance, but neither did economists make
many predictions of peaks that did not occur.15 In a more recent study,
Sinclair, Stekler, and Kitzinger (2010) analyze the directional accuracy
of the Fed’s forecasts of GDP and inflation and show that the predictions of increases and decreases in the inflation rate are not associated
with the actual changes in that rate. When, however, the directional ac-
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curacy of the GDP and inflation predictions were analyzed jointly, on
average the Fed’s forecasts for the current quarter and the one-quarterahead period yielded an accurate view of the state of the economy.
The record for other countries is no better. The turning points in German GDP were not predicted, but the accelerations and decelerations of
the growth rate were forecast accurately. (Stekler [2008] summarizes
the literature relating to the forecasts of the G7 countries and indicates
that the results apply equally to private forecasters, research institutes,
and international organizations.) The evidence suggests that forecasters
are not able to predict turning points in advance and may even have difficulty in detecting them quickly once they have occurred.
Biases and Systematic Errors
Most evaluations examine the rationality and efficiency of the predictions in order to determine whether they could have been improved.
Stekler (2002) reviews a large number of studies and concludes that
there is no definitive evidence that the U.S. inflation forecasts display
weak-form informational efficiency. While more of the U.S. growth
forecasts did not reject the null of informational efficiency, these results
were also mixed.16 The results were dependent on the database that was
examined, the years that were examined, and the methodology that was
employed. However, most of these analyses did not test whether the
forecasts were truly inefficient or whether the errors could be attributable to asymmetric loss functions.
Forecasters also made systematic errors. They overestimated the rate
of growth during slowdowns and underestimated it during recoveries
and booms. Similarly, inflation was underpredicted when it was rising
and overpredicted when it was declining. (See the surveys of Fildes and
Stekler [2002] and Stekler [2008] for the specific studies from which
these results were obtained.) Fildes and Stekler conclude, “These errors
occurred when the economy was subject to major perturbations, just the
time when accurate forecasts were most needed” (p.442).
Magnitude of the Errors
Although these qualitative findings about directional and systematic errors are important to our understanding the forecasting process,
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most evaluations have also provided quantitative estimates of these errors. Fildes and Stekler (2002) report that the mean absolute error of
annual U.S. and U.K. GDP growth forecasts is around 1 percent. Newer
studies have found similar results for the G7 countries, but previously
Öller and Barot (2000) had found that the errors were larger for some of
the other European countries (Stekler 2008).
When quarterly GDP estimates were examined, the previous papers
did not all use identical procedures for calculating the mean absolute
errors.17 Consequently, our findings are not as complete. We do know
that there is a substantial improvement in accuracy when the forecasting task switches from predicting what will happen in the next quarter
to estimating the level of activity in the current quarter. This is largely
attributable to the availability of actual data for the current period.
The inflation forecasts seem to have improved. The earlier U.S. inflation forecasts had mean absolute errors between 1.0 and 1.4 percent,
but Stekler’s (2008) survey of G7 forecasts shows that those errors are
now between 0.5 and 0.75 percent. The reduction may be attributable
to the lower inflation rates that have been observed in the past several
decades.
Have the Forecasts Improved?
Given the number of papers that have evaluated macroeconomic
forecasts, it is surprising how few have asked whether the quality of
the predictions has improved over time. The problem is not the lack
of data, for we have 40 years’ worth of forecasts for some countries.
However, the findings of those studies that have examined this issue
are contradictory, and thus there are no definitive conclusions. For example, Heilemann and Stekler (2003) examine German forecasts and
adjust the errors for the difficulties in predicting the relevant periods,
but the results are mixed. Dopke and Fritsche (2006) also look at German forecasts and suggest that accuracy may have improved. As for the
predictions of international organizations, Vogel (2007) shows that the
accuracy of the OECD forecasts has improved, but Timmerman (2007)
indicates that the quality of the International Monetary Fund forecasts
has deteriorated. These findings are consistent with those summarized
by Fildes and Stekler (2002). We conclude that despite all the resources
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that have been devoted to forecasting, there is no clear evidence that
accuracy has improved.
This finding suggests that we may have reached the limits of
forecastability. Heilemann and Stekler (2003) have investigated this
hypothesis. We calculated the ex post forecast errors generated by simulations obtained from econometric models. These models can serve as a
benchmark of the maximum accuracy that is attainable because they are
free from errors caused by wrong assumptions about the predetermined
variables and the inability to capture the dynamics of multiperiod forecasts. We find that the model’s inflation errors are very similar to those
that were made ex ante for the same period. This result indicates that
the accuracy of the inflation forecasts could not have been improved
substantially. On the other hand, the model’s growth rate errors are substantially smaller than the ex ante errors, suggesting that the quality of
the ex ante real-sector forecasts can still be improved.
Sources of Error: Recessions
A model-based forecast can be decomposed into various sources.
The forecast depends upon the econometric specification, the exogenous variables and the corresponding predictions of these variables, and
any adjustment that the economist makes to the model output. There are
analytical difficulties associated with determining why each of these
errors occurred. One example of this difficulty occurs when econometricians make assumptions about the exogenous variables rather than
model adjustments to subjectively influence their forecasts.
Nevertheless, there is agreement that recessions are a significant
cause of some of these errors. A large portion of GDP forecast errors
are attributable to the failure to predict the occurrence of recessions.
If recessions and booms are caused by events such as changes in asset
prices that, it is assumed, cannot be predicted, then the recessions are
themselves unforecastable. Fair (2009) finds that, ex post, some recessions could be predicted even if some key exogenous asset variables
were estimated using only baseline paths.18 The failure to adequately
predict the other recessions could be explained by the inability to estimate some or all of these key exogenous variables.
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What Have We Learned?
The evidence about the macro forecasts that has been presented
here is very robust.19 The findings of Fildes and Stekler (2002) that
primarily related only to U.S. and U.K. forecasters are similar to those
relating to the G7 economists. Both types of studies find that recessions
are not predicted in advance and account for a significant portion of the
quantitative errors. Neither type of study is able to show that forecast
accuracy had improved, and both find that there were systematic errors.
There may be a quantitative limit beyond which forecast accuracy cannot be improved (Heilemann and Stekler 2003).
Finally, we now have a somewhat better understanding of the forecasting process. We have learned that forecasts for a horizon longer
than 12–18 months might not be valuable (Isiklar and Lahiri 2007;
Vuchelen and Gutierrez 2005). We also know more about the causes of
bias. Batchelor (2007) shows how the systematic errors or “biases” are
related to the forecasters’ optimism (or pessimism) and conservatism in
revising their predictions. He notes that standard rationality tests are not
appropriate if there has been a structural break. The pattern of the errors
can then provide a way of understanding the forecasters’ learning process about the impact of this structural break. Isiklar and Lahiri (2007)
use forecast revisions to explain the behavioral characteristics of forecasters—i.e., how do they react to news and when is news important?20
We know that there is much more work to be done in determining the
importance of asymmetric losses, the sources of biases, the limits of
accuracy, etc. Much can be learned about the sources of error if we undertake more studies like Heilemann’s (2002).

LABOR MARKET FORECASTS
We now turn to a discussion of labor market forecasts. There are
many fewer studies of these types of forecasts. Consequently, our results will be less informative. Before I discuss the results of evaluations
of the forecasts of these variables, I want to briefly note that several
labor market series are used as indicators or predictors about the overall state of the economy. These are outlined in the next section. Next
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I consider the short-run quantitative forecasts of the U.S. unemployment rate. Finally, I consider long-run projections and the procedures
for evaluating them. I also show that the methodology for evaluating
long-run labor market forecasts can be used to analyze other types of
long-run projections.
Labor Market Series as Indicators
The U.S. unemployment rate moves countercyclically and may display an asymmetric relationship with changes in GDP. It may have a
short lead (or be coincident) at business cycle peaks, but it lags at the
troughs (Montgomery et al. 1998). The unemployment rate is not considered either a leading or a coincident indicator. There are, however,
two other series that are considered leading indicators of cyclical movements and one series that is considered a coincident indicator. These
are series that are included in the various indicator indexes currently
compiled and published by the Conference Board.
The two leading series are 1) average weekly hours in manufacturing and 2) average weekly claims for unemployment insurance.21
While Diebold and Rudebusch (1989, 1991) have evaluated the composite leading indicators, I have found only one paper that examined
the forecasting behavior of either of those series—Seip and McNown
(2007). Seip and McNown examined the behavior of average weekly
hours, but their analysis produced contradictory findings. For example,
they examined the Granger causality between movements in the weekly
hours series and changes in the Federal Reserve Board Index of Industrial Production. Their results show that the hours series is a lagging
indicator with respect to the Index of Production, which is a coincident
indicator. On the other hand, using sophisticated phase analysis, they
find that the timing at turning points suggests that it is a leading indicator, but not that accurate of one.
It is possible that there may be another labor market series that
could be a leading indicator. The official U.S. unemployment rate series
is not the only measure of labor slack in the economy; the U.S. Department of Labor also compiles other measures of unemployment. The
official or conventional unemployment rate is called U3 and measures
the total number of unemployed persons as a percentage of the civilian
labor force. The broadest BLS measure of unemployment is called U6.
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It includes two additional categories: 1) people who have left the labor
force because they have become discouraged at failing to find employment and 2) individuals who are working part time but would prefer to
be full-time employees.
The difference between the two rates, therefore, represents the
degree of labor underutilization that is not captured by the traditional
unemployment rate. Figure 6.1 displays the difference between the U6
and U3 series and seems to indicate that this difference becomes larger
before the cyclical turns of the U.S. business cycles for the period
1970–2009. The NBER-dated recessions are shaded. However, there
has been no rigorous and systematic evaluation of this series to determine whether, in fact, this series is an adequate leading indicator.
The Conference Board also compiles and publishes a composite
index of coincident series. The movements in this index roughly track
the cyclical movements of the economy. There are four series in this
composite index, with “employees on nonagricultural payrolls” representing the labor market. We should note the importance of using labor
market data for forecasting cyclical movements, but the procedures for
evaluating these time series as indicators are beyond the scope of this
chapter.
Modeling and Forecasting the Unemployment Rate
Neftçi (1984) finds that the U.S. unemployment rate has an interesting characteristic: it displays asymmetric behavior because the
probability of a decline following two previous declines differs from
the probability of an increase given two prior increases. This suggests
that a linear model would not adequately explain the behavior of this
series. Subsequently, a number of univariate nonlinear models were developed to explain and then forecast this series.22 More recently, Milas
and Rothman (2008) go one step further by developing multivariate
nonlinear models to explain the U.S. unemployment rate.
Only a small number of these nonlinear models have actually been
used to forecast the U.S. unemployment rate. Rothman (1998) uses
six models and, based on out-of-sample recursive simulations, concludes that their performance is better than that of a linear model.23
Montgomery et al. (1998) undertake a more comprehensive evaluation.
They use a threshold autoregressive (TAR) model to generate simulated
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Figure 6.1 Difference between U6 and U3, 1970–2009
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NOTE: U3 = The percentage of U.S. workers unemployed according to the conventional measure. U6 = The percentage of those people plus two other categories:
1) people who have left the labor force because they became discouraged at not finding work and 2) people working part time who would prefer to be working full time.
The NBER-dated recessions are shaded.
SOURCE: Dougherty (2009).

recursive forecasts. These forecasts displayed smaller errors than were
generated by the linear ARIMA model. Moreover, although no formal
statistical tests were used, the forecasts of the TAR model appeared
to be unbiased. Similarly, neural network models (Moshiri and Brown
2004) and nonparametric nonlinear models (Golan and Perloff 2004)
were superior to linear models in forecasting the unemployment rate.
In fact, Golan and Perloff indicate that their model is superior to the
nonlinear TAR model.
Unfortunately, it is unlikely that any of these models will become
the standard methodology for forecasting the unemployment rate. The
median SPF forecast was more accurate than either the TAR or the non-
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parametric nonlinear models. In addition, Golan and Perloff find that
the Michigan structural model also generated smaller errors.
Given these results, it is appropriate to also report some findings
about nonmodel forecasts of the unemployment rate. The median SPF
forecast was not only more accurate than the model predictions, but it
was also superior to the Federal Reserve’s Greenbook estimates for the
period 1983–2004 (Baghestani 2008). The SPF errors are asymmetric,
with mean errors during expansions amounting to less than 0.1 percent, while during recessions those errors sometimes exceed 1.0 percent
(Montgomery et al. 1998). The Greenbook estimates are unbiased, but
the errors are also asymmetric (Sinclair, Stekler, and Joutz 2008).
There is additional information about the quality of nonmodel unemployment rate forecasts. Carroll (2003) notes that the SPF forecasts
were more accurate than those obtained from the Michigan Household
Surveys (MHS). The MHS eventually did update its forecasts to conform to those of the professional forecasters. Professional forecasters’
estimates of the unemployment rate were also consistent with Okun’s
Law, given their predictions of the change in real GDP (Pierdzioch,
Rülke, and Stadtmann 2011).
These results suggest that we economists recognize the asymmetric
behavior of the unemployment rate but have not yet been able to develop an appropriate model that captures the asymmetries better than
our judgment does.
Long-Term Labor Market Forecasts: Methodology
The Bureau of Labor Statistics makes long-run projections of a
number of variables. The variables include the size of the labor force,
employment by industry, and employment by occupation. Because the
projections are for a horizon of 10 or more years, they may be evaluated
differently from analyses of short-term macroeconomic predictions.
For example, an evaluation of these BLS long-term projections poses
three methodological issues that usually are not encountered in analyses
of short-term macroeconomic forecasts.
First, no other organization made projections of these variables.
Consequently, there is no benchmark for judging the BLS forecasts.
Second, these projections are long-term, not the short-term macroeconomic forecasts that have been evaluated in the past. Thus, the questions
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that must be addressed in such an evaluation can differ from those
addressed in the macro forecasts. Finally, such a projection is a onetime forecast.24 I will illustrate these issues with an example and show
how the labor-force, employment-by-industry, and occupation projections that BLS made in 1989 for the year 2000 were evaluated (Stekler
and Thomas 2005). Although these forecasts had already been evaluated individually (Fullerton 2003), it was possible both to ask additional
questions that had not been addressed in earlier studies and to use evaluation methodologies different from those employed previously.
Benchmarks
There are no other forecasts that are comparable to the BLS projections; it is, therefore, necessary to construct a benchmark for the
projections of each variable. In each case, BLS projections are compared with similar data obtained from the forecasts of these benchmarks.
The benchmarks that were selected all use data that were available at
the time when the BLS projections were prepared. In actuality, the
benchmarks are taken from one of two naive models that are either
1) projecting the latest available information or 2) predicting that the
change over the forecast period is equal to that observed over the previous time interval, which is of the same length as the forecast period.25
The projections that are being analyzed in this article were prepared in
1988; thus the forecast period is 12 years in length. Consequently, the
change from 1976 to 1988 was used as the benchmark here. At a minimum, the BLS projections should be more accurate than the forecasts
of these naive models.
Questions in evaluating long-term projections versus shortterm forecasts
The questions that are appropriate for evaluating the short-term
forecasts have been examined in detail, but the questions that should
be asked in analyzing longer-run projections have not been given the
same degree of attention. Because BLS projections primarily focus on
long-run trends, the questions asked and the statistics used in evaluating these forecasts should be related to the primary emphasis of the
forecast.
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Thus, the two basic questions to be asked in evaluating these projections are as follows:
1) Have the trends, specifically structural changes, been predicted
correctly? and
2) Were these forecasts better than those that could have been produced by a benchmark method?
Additional questions concerning the sources of the errors and
whether the forecasts improved over time can also be posed.
The statistics that can answer these questions include the following
four:
1) the percentage of components where the direction of change
was predicted correctly;
2) dissimilarity indexes that measure the structure of the labor
force;
3) contingency tables that determine whether the actual and predicted directions of change are related; and
4) Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients, which measure the
relationship between the predicted and actual changes in the
components of an aggregate forecast.
Questions about the labor force projection are listed in Table 6.3.26
These include the following four:
1) What is the projected size of the labor force, by age and gender?
2) What is the growth rate of the labor force?
3) What are the participation rates of the various groups? and
4) What is the distribution of the total labor force by age and
gender?
The error measures that were used in evaluating these projections
are also presented in Table 6.3. They include the direction of error, the
absolute and percentage error, the dissimilarity index, etc. The limitations of these questions and statistics are also noted.
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Measuring structural change: dissimilarity indexes
In order to determine whether the structural changes and major
trends that occurred between 1988 and 2000 were predicted accurately,
a statistic is used that directly addresses this question. The forecast of
the total labor force is an aggregated estimate, and it is important to also
examine the disaggregated component predictions. Such an analysis enables one to determine whether the structure of the aggregate has been
predicted accurately—i.e., whether the distribution of the labor force
across various categories is accurate.
If the aggregate, X, is predicted according to some scenario (for
example, full employment), one would want to determine whether
the structure is accurate even if the total is wrong. Kolb and Stekler
(1992) developed a procedure for decomposing the total error into two
components, where the first measures the scenario discrepancy and the
second the structural error. They calculated the proportion of the aggregate predicted and actual totals that were associated with each of the i
components. While their analysis was based on an information-content
statistic, using dissimilarity indexes would yield the same result.
A dissimilarity index is a statistic that can be used to determine
whether one distribution approximates another one. Specifically, it
measures the amount by which the forecasted distribution would have
to change to be identical to the actual distribution. The formula for the
dissimilarity index is
(6.11)

D = 0.5 ∑ | (Pfi / Pf ) − (Pai / Pa) | ,

where Pfi is the forecast proportion of the labor force that will be in the
ith group, and Pf is the forecast for the total labor force. Similarly, Pai
and Pa are the corresponding actual data. D is bounded in the interval
of 0 to 100 percent. The smaller the value of D, the smaller the difference between the predicted and actual distributions—that is, the more
accurate the forecast.
The dissimilarity index for the BLS labor force projections was
based on the 14 age/gender categories that had been used in 1989 to
prepare the estimates for 2000. Similar dissimilarity indexes were
constructed for the other distributions that serve as standards of comparison. The values of the various dissimilarity indexes are presented
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Problem with
measure or question
Does not distinguish between
census population errors and
participation rate errors;
no standard of comparison
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Table 6.3 Questions Asked about the Labor Force Forecasts
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Questions
What is the size of the total
labor force?

Accuracy measure
Mean absolute error;
percentage error; direction
of error

New question or measure
How much of total labor
force error is the result of
participation rate errors?
Standard of comparison:
1988 participation rates

What is the size of the labor
force by gender?

Mean absolute error;
percentage error; direction
of error

Same as total labor force

Same as total labor force

What is the growth rate of
the total labor force?

Error in percentage points

Same as total labor force

How much of the error in
the growth rate forecast is
the result of participation
rate errors? Standard
of comparison: 1988
participation rates

What are the participation
rates of total labor force?
Of men? Of women?
By age and sex?

Error in percentage points,
or absolute error/
participation rate; mean
absolute percentage error

Does not indicate whether
direction of change in
participation rate was
predicted; no standard of
comparison

Were the directions of
change in the participation
rates accurately predicted?
Standard of comparison:
number of changes accurately
predicted vs. predictions by
chance (binomial, p = 0.5)
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What is the distribution of the
labor force by age and sex?

—

No standard of comparison

Comparison standard:
dissimilarity index based on
1988 distribution

NOTE: — = no established accuracy measure.
SOURCE: Stekler and Thomas (2005).
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in Appendix Table 6A.3. The benchmarks were the projections based
on various estimates of the population and alternative estimates of the
participation rates.
The results are mixed. In some cases, the dissimilarity indexes obtained from the BLS projections are smaller (and thus more accurate)
than those of the standards of comparison. In other cases, the opposite
results were obtained. However, the dissimilarity index for the actual
BLS forecast never exceeds 2 percent for any age/gender category or
for men or women separately. The values of the dissimilarity indexes
of the standards of comparison were comparable. While there is no
statistical distribution for the dissimilarity index, the BLS projection
substantially predicted the structural changes that occurred in the labor
force between 1988 and 2000. On the other hand, similar results were
obtained from the naive models that served as the benchmarks.
Similar procedures were used to evaluate the employment-byindustry and occupational projections. The BLS employment and naive
projections were again similar, but the BLS occupational estimates were
more accurate than the naive benchmark. Stekler and Thomas (2005)
conclude that the accuracy of the BLS projections are comparable to the
estimates obtained from naive extrapolative methods.
The applicability of the long-term evaluation methodology
The methodology that was applied in evaluating the BLS longterm projections has not been widely used. I want to show that it has
a wider applicability by evaluating some long-run census population
projections. One benefit of this analysis is the existence of multiple projections for a given date, permitting us to determine how the accuracy
changes with a reduction in the forecast horizon.
The Census Bureau makes periodic forecasts of the population of
the United States 5, 10, or more years into the future. These forecasts
are both for the total U.S. population and for the number of inhabitants
of each of the states. There have been many evaluations of these state
forecasts (e.g., Campbell 2002; Smith and Sincich 1990, 1992; Wang
2002). In all cases, the error measures were based on the magnitude
of the discrepancies between the projected and actual state population
figures.
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In addition to statistics that measure the quantitative errors, one
can use the methodology that was applied to the BLS projections for
these census data. One of the purposes of a long-range projection of
each state’s population is to provide a picture of the distribution of the
aggregate U.S. population among the various states. If one were only
interested in knowing whether the projections captured the important
trends that actually occurred, one might not be concerned with the magnitude of the errors. The accuracy of the quantitative projections of each
state’s total population is then not as relevant.
It is possible that the share of the nation’s population that was in
each state was predicted correctly, but that the national total and the
estimates for each of the states were inaccurate by the same proportion.
In that case, the projected distribution of the state populations would
have exactly matched the observed distribution. Thus, the evaluation
procedure that is suggested here does not focus on the specific numbers
in the projections or the magnitude of the misestimates. Rather, this
evaluation asks whether the projected share of the total U.S. population
by state was similar to the actual distribution. Such an analysis enables
one to determine whether the state distribution of the aggregate population was accurate even if the aggregate estimate is inaccurate.
Decomposing the errors. Assume that x ta is the actual aggregate
population of the United States at time t and x tf is the aggregate value
that was projected for time t. The error in the aggregate projection is
(6.12)

et  xta  xtf .

In addition, it is possible to examine the errors associated with the
population projections for each of the i states. Accordingly, the proportions of the forecasted ( fi ) and actual (ai) aggregated population
associated with each of the i states are
xif,t  ( fi ,t ) xtf ;

xia.t  (ai ,t ) xta ;

∑ fi,t = 1;

∑ ai,t = 1 ;

and the forecast error for each state is
(6.14)
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If the aggregate forecast is absolutely accurate, the quantitative error for each state would be
(6.15)

ei ,t  (ai ,t  fi ,t ) xia,t ,

which is the difference between the actual and forecast proportions of
the aggregate population in each state. The same holds true if the aggregate forecast is inaccurate. If xta  xtf ,
(6.16)

ei ,t  (ai ,t  fi ,t ) xta  fi ,t ( xta  xtf ) .

Thus the quantitative forecast error for each state, ei,t , is the sum
of two components. The first represents the error in predicting the proportion of the population in each state. The second measures the error
in failing to predict the aggregate correctly. In order to evaluate these
long-term population forecasts, we will focus on the first term, using the
dissimilarity measure as our statistic.
The alternative methodology (benchmark) in this case is a naive
model, because a valid forecasting procedure should be as accurate as
this type of model. In this case, we assume that the naive projection
of the states’ shares of the U.S. population for year t + h is identical to
the known distribution that is available from either the census count or
from the population estimate in year t, the year from which the projection was extended.
Data. We evaluate the census state population projections that were
made between 1970 and 1996 for the years 1975–2005.27 There are
seven such sets of projections. The length of the forecasting horizon
varied between 2 and 25 years. The naive projections were made using
the same starting points and horizons. These projections were compared
either with the actual census counts for 1980, 1990, and 2000 or with
the population estimates that the Census Bureau made for 1975, 1985,
1995, and 2005.
Results. The dissimilarity indexes derived from both the census
and naive projections are presented in Table 6.4. The longer the projection horizon, the larger the size of the dissimilarity index that was
associated with the projections—i.e., the less accurate the projected
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Table 6.4 Values of Dissimilarity Index (%) for Census and
Naive Forecasts
Year
projections
made
1970

1975
1980
1986
1988

1992
1996

Year of projection
1975
a 1.7
b 1.7
[ 0.2]

1980
a 3.9
b 3.9
[ 0.4]
1.8
[ 2.7]

1985
a 5.5
b 5.5
[ 0.7]

1990
a 6.5
b 6.4
[ 0.8]
3.7
[0.7]
2.5
[0.4]
1.0
[0.2]
a 0.6
b 0.8
[0.1]

1995

1.2
[0.3]

0.4
[0.1]

2000

5.3
[0.9]
4.2
[0.7]
1.9
[0.4]
a 2.5
b 1.7
[0.4]
1.4
[0.2]
0.8
[0.2]

2005

2.3
[0.4]

2.0
[0.4]
1.2
[0.3]

NOTE: Numbers in brackets are for naive (benchmark) projections. There were two
sets of census projections issued in 1970 and 1988. They are denoted “a” and “b.”
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.

distribution. This result is similar to findings about the relationship
between quantitative errors and the length of the horizon in short-run
forecasts. As indicated above, the size of these indexes measures the
amount by which the projected distribution would have to change to be
identical to the actual distribution. This ranged from less than 1 percent
for the very short projections to more than 5 percent for some of the
longer horizons.
Moreover, the projections seem to have improved over time. For the
five-year projections, the values of the dissimilarity indexes declined
from more than 1.5 percent to less than 1 percent. The magnitude of the
index for the ten-year projection made in 1970 was almost 4 percent;
the similar measurements for the projections made in the late 1980s and
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1990s were all less than 1.5 percent. A similar trend was observed in the
more recent twenty-year projections.
Nevertheless, the census forecasts associated with the distributions
of the state population forecasts are inferior to the naive forecasts (Table 6.4). In all but one case, the dissimilarity indexes associated with
the naive forecasts are smaller than the ones derived from the comparable census projections. The exception is the five-year projection made
in 1975.

CONCLUSIONS
In providing these perspectives on forecast evaluations, I started
with questions that were posed 20 years ago. While the nomenclature
may have changed, we still ask the same questions today. On the other
hand, the statistical and econometric foundations of our analyses have
been vastly improved, and new methodologies for forecasting have
been developed.
Despite all these efforts, there are not many positive results to report about the quality of our forecasting techniques. We do know that
combining forecasts tends to improve accuracy. We also can test for the
limits of forecastability and can determine whether we have achieved
that limit yet.
On the negative side, our results on the question of whether the accuracy of our forecasts has improved over time are ambiguous. We still
fail to predict turning points, and the short-run forecasts still display biases and inefficiencies. The limited amount of evidence about long-run
labor market and population projections suggests that, in some dimensions, they are no better than naive models.
However, we should not despair but rather focus on another aspect
of these results. We still have immense opportunities for productive
research. Let me suggest a few entries in a laundry list of possible research topics.
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•

How can we improve our forecasting models?

•

Using these models, what are the limits of forecastability?

•

How does one predict turning points?
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•

Why do economists prefer failing to forecast a turn that occurs
rather than predicting a turn that does not happen?

•

How valuable are indicators?

•

Do forecasters have asymmetric loss functions?

•

How are expectations (forecasts) formed?

•

How do individuals go about making and revising their
forecasts?

•

What are the appropriate techniques for evaluating multivariate
forecasts?

•

For evaluating long-run predictions?

•

For evaluating probability forecasts such as those contained in
fan charts?

•

How valuable are market-based (futures) forecasts?

•

Finally, to what extent do real-time data problems affect our
predictive accuracy?

To answer these questions, many more studies, such as those cited
here, are required. It will obviously take time to answer all of these
questions, but the results should provide a substantial payoff in increased forecast accuracy.

Notes
1. West (2006) has still another view about forecast evaluation: he argues that these
evaluations provide inferences about the characteristics of models. Thus the focus is exclusively on forecasts generated by models, whether in sample or out of
sample.
2. In that regard, the aforementioned econometric procedures for conducting evaluations provide a rigorous theoretical methodology for the statistical measures.
3. The mean square error criterion is associated with a quadratic loss function. (See
Elliott and Timmermann 2008.) Another metric is mean absolute error.
4. This method can also be applied to one forecaster making several forecasts for the
same horizon. (See Clements, Joutz, and Stekler 2007.)
5. No change is classified with the negative changes. Note that we are focusing on the
direction of change in the inflation rate, which is equivalent to measuring accelerations and decelerations of the price level.
6. The contingency table methodology is used to test whether the sign of the predicted change is probabilistically independent of the sign of the actual change.
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7.
8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.
16.
17.
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This is also a test of the hypothesis that the forecasts are more accurate than those
of a naive random-walk model in predicting the direction of change. (See Stekler
1994, p. 497.)
The chi-square and Fisher’s exact test are well known and are not presented here.
Naik and Leuthold (1986) also use a 4 × 4 contingency table in their qualitative
analysis of forecasting performance. Their study focuses on a different topic—the
ability to predict turning points. (Also see Kaylen and Brandt 1988.)
There is, however, a difference in interpretation once we go beyond the simple
2 × 2 case. In particular, the 2 × 2 contingency table tests for predictive failure
of only one variable, whereas the 4 × 4 contingency table tests for predictive failure of both variables. Moreover, in the 2 × 2 case, the hypothesis of predictive
failure is equivalent to the hypothesis that the actual and predicted values of the
variable are independent of each other. As discussed in Pesaran and Timmermann
(1992), however, for the 4 × 4 case they are no longer equivalent. For our contingency table, independence implies predictive failure, but not vice versa.
Merton (1981) and Henriksson and Merton (1981) use a test based on the hypergeometric distribution. This is identical to Fisher’s exact test. Their test assumes
known row and column frequencies, which is not assumed for the PesaranTimmermann test.
The literature assumes that the Taylor rule is an approximation to the decision rule
of the Fed. Also note that this procedure is in the framework of a decision-based
forecast evaluation, discussed above.
Although Taylor (1993) originally proposed his rule as an empirical description of
past Fed policy actions, Woodford (2001a,b) has shown that the Taylor rule can
also be justified based on a firm theoretical foundation.
Following Orphanides (2001), we assume that the Fed uses the Greenbook forecasts in their decision rule. The members of the FOMC also make their own
forecasts, but they have access to the staff forecasts of the Greenbook when doing
so. For an evaluation of those forecasts, see Romer and Romer (2008).
While the output gap is typically used in the Taylor rule, the growth rate is
typically used in forecast evaluation. The growth rate of the actuals is approximately ln(Yt) − ln(Yt−1), whereas the growth rate of the forecasts is approximately
ln(Y tf ) − ln(Yt−1). Thus, when we subtract one from the other for the policy forecast
error, we have ln(Yt) − ln(Y tf ). Approximating the output gaps in the same manner,
we have ln(Yt) – ln(Y*) and ln(Y tf ) – ln(Y*), so again we have ln(Yt) − ln(Y tf ). It is
this result that permits us to use the growth rate in order to construct the PFEs. This
analysis does assume, however, that potential output, Y*, is known rather than a
forecast. This assumption is based on the lack of forecasts for this variable in the
Greenbook. For a discussion of the role of real time output gap estimates and the
Taylor rule, see Orphanides (2001).
The U.S. false turns predicted in 1978–1979 were an exception, but real GNP did
decline for two quarters during this period.
The U.K. forecasts yielded similar results.
Some authors transform the errors into annual growth rates; others do not.
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18. The exogenous asset variables in the Fair (2009) model are equity prices and housing prices. His simulations also assumed that import prices and exports as well as
the asset variables could only be estimated using baseline benchmarks.
19. This summary refers only to the findings mentioned in the text. There are many
other topics in the forecasting literature that were not reviewed and are beyond the
scope of this paper. These include the quality of the data (Öller and Teterukovsky
2007), leading indicators (Allen and Morzuch 2006), and the role of judgmental
forecasting (Lawrence et al. 2006). In addition, one could investigate the value of
combining forecasts, the value of data revisions, and the question of which actuals
to use in conducting an evaluation.
20. In the forecasts made for year t, the most important revisions occur at the end of
t − 1.
21. The Conference Board has constructed a Composite Leading Index, and these series are included in that index. They have also been included in earlier composite
indexes that have been constructed by the U.S. Department of Commerce.
22. Skalin and Teräsvirta (2002) provide a list of studies that have employed nonlinear
models to estimate unemployment rates. Swanson and White (1997) select models
based on their ability to predict macroeconomic variables, including the unemployment rate, in real time. Clements and Krolzig (2003) survey the development
of asymmetric business-cycle models and develop statistical tests but do not apply
these models to U.S. unemployment data.
23. Pool and Speight (2000) had a similar finding for the U.K. and Japanese economies.
24. In most forecast evaluations, there is a time series of forecasts. It is then possible
to discuss the characteristics of the average forecast. This is not possible with a
single observation.
25. These benchmarks are identical to the ones used to calculate the U coefficients in
short-run forecast evaluations.
26. The questions about occupation projections and employment are presented in Appendix Tables 6A.1 and 6A.2.
27. The data were obtained from U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P25, Nos. 477, 735, 937, 1017, 1044, 1053, and 1111.
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Which occupations Compare the number of
No standard of comparison;
will grow fastest? occupations projected
no analysis of all occupations’
projected and actual growth rates
to grow the fastest with
those that did grow fastest;
distribution of growth rates
by growth adjectives
Which occupations Compare the number of
will have the largest occupations that were
job growth?
projected to have largest
job growth with those
that did
What is the
distribution of
employment by
occupation?

No standard of comparison

Absolute percentage error No standard of comparison
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Table 6A.1 Questions about Occupational Forecasts
Problem with question
Question
Accuracy measure
and/or accuracy measure
How many people Absolute error; absolute
No standard of comparison; gives
will be employed in percentage error
equal weight to large and small
each occupation?
occupations

New question and/or measure
Standard of comparison: naive
model—same growth; mean
weighted percentage error
Spearman’s rank correlation
coefficient; standard of comparison
not possible because of definitional
changes

Standard of comparison not possible
because of definitional changes

Dissimilarity index: comparison
with naive model
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What were the
sources of errors?

Model simulations

None

NOTE: Blank = not applicable.
SOURCE: Stekler and Thomas (2005).
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Table 6A.2 Questions Asked about the Employment-by-Industry Forecasts
Problem with
Questions
Accuracy measure
measure or question
How many people will be
Percentage error; mean
No standard of comparison;
employed in each industry? absolute percentage error
gives equal weight to large
and small industries

New question or measure
Standard of comparison: rates
of growth equal to previous
rates of growth; mean
weighted percentage error

Which industries would
have the highest (lowest)
employment growth rates?

Compare the number of
industries projected to grow
the fastest (slowest) with
those that did grow fastest
(slowest)

No standard of comparison;
no analysis of all industries’
projected and actual growth
rates

Standard of comparison:
forecasts of fastest- (slowest-)
growing industries from naive
model; Spearman’s rank
correlation coefficient for all
industries

What is the distribution of
employment by industry?

Dissimilarity index

No standard of comparison

Standard of comparison: same
share as in 1988; shares are
based on previous growth rates

What were the sources of
the industry employment
forecast errors?

Model simulations

None

NOTE: Blank = not applicable.
SOURCE: Stekler and Thomas (2005).
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Table 6A.3 Dissimilarity Indexes for Labor Force Projections (%)
Standards of comparison

BLS projections
Gender, age
Men, age
Women, age

1.83
1.63
1.91

Actual population
and
BLS partic- 1988 participation rate
ipation rate
2.02
2.24
0.91
0.62
2.86
2.40

Census population
estimate and
1988 participation rate
2.32
1.37
1.32

NOTE: Numbers represent the dissimilarity indexes using alternative standards of
comparison.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
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Combining Forecasts with
Many Predictors
Tae-Hwy Lee
University of California, Riverside

In practice it is quite common that one forecast model performs well
in certain periods while other models perform better in other periods. It
is difficult to find a forecast model that outperforms all competing models. To improve forecasts over individual models, combined forecasts
have been suggested (Bates and Granger 1969). Researchers including
Newbold and Granger (1974), Granger and Newbold (1986, Ch. 9),
Granger and Jeon (2004), and Yang (2004) show that forecast combinations can improve forecast accuracy over a single model and show
why the forecast combination can achieve a better forecast in terms of
mean squared forecast error. Bayesian model averaging may be used to
form a weighted combined forecast. (See, e.g., Lee and Yang [2006].)
A matter frequently discussed in the literature is how to combine forecasts to achieve the most accurate result. (See Granger and Ramanathan
[1984]; Deutsch, Granger, and Teräsvirta [1994]; Palm and Zellner
[1992]; Shen and Huang [2006]; and Hansen [2008].) Clemen (1989)
and Timmermann (2006) provide excellent surveys on forecast combination and related issues.
Granger and Jeon (2004, p. 327) put the forecast combination in
a general context of thick modeling and write, “An advantage of thick
modeling is that one no longer needs to worry about difficult decisions
between close alternatives or between deciding the outcome of a test
that is not decisive. In time series such questions are whether the process has a unit root or not, or how many cointegrations are in a vector
of a series. For thick models one considers all plausible alternatives and
uses the outputs of the various models.”
Even when we have a single model, a combination of forecasts can
also be formed over a set of training sets. While, in practice, usually
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we have a single training set, it can be replicated via bootstrap, and the
combined forecast trained over the bootstrap-replicated training sets can
improve upon the original forecast of the model. This is the idea of bootstrap aggregating (abbreviated as “bagging”), introduced by Breiman
(1996).
Huang and Lee (2010) consider the situation in which one wants to
predict an economic variable using the information set of many relevant
explanatory variables. As Diebold and Pauly (1990, p. 503) point out,
“It must be recognized that in many forecasting situations, particularly
in real time, pooling of information sets is either impossible or prohibitively costly.” Likewise, when models underlying the forecasts remain
partially or completely unknown (as is usually the case in practice—for
example, with survey forecasts), one would never be informed about
the entire information set. Quite often the combination of forecasts is
used when the only things available are individual forecasts (for example, in the case of professional forecasters), while the underlying
information set and the model used for generating each individual forecast are unknown.
In this chapter we consider how to combine forecasts in a situation where many predictors (in other words, a large information set) are
available, or in a situation where many forecasts are given but models
and predictors used for generating each individual forecast are not necessarily known. In each of these situations, we explain how to use factor
models. Much of the results presented here are studied in Chan, Stock,
and Watson (1999); Hillebrand et al. (2010); Huang and Lee (2010);
Stock and Watson (2002); and Tu and Lee (2009).

DATA-RICH ENVIRONMENT
Bernanke and Boivin (2003) emphasize that the use of a large data
set is a common practice, such as in the central bank’s policymaking
analysis. They write, “Research departments throughout the Federal
Reserve System monitor and analyze literally thousands of data series
from disparate sources . . . Despite this reality of central bank practice,
most empirical analyses have been confined to . . . exploit only a limited
amount of information. For example, the VAR methodology generally
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limits the analysis to eight macroeconomic time series or fewer. This
disconnect between central bank practice and academic analysis has
several costs . . . It thus seems worthwhile to take into account the fact
that in practice monetary policy is made in a data-rich environment”
(p. 526).
For example, in forecasting stock market volatility, we can use
many predictors from many options’ implied volatilities. In predicting output growth and inflation, we can use many available economic
predictors (Bernanke and Boivin 2003; Hillebrand et al. 2010; Stock
and Watson 2002; Tu and Lee 2009; Wright 2009). Ang and Piazzesi
(2003); Ang, Piazzesi, and Wei (2006); Bernanke (1990); Hillebrand
et al. (2010); and Stock and Watson (1989) use many yields and yield
spreads. To predict retail default probability, a retail credit model uses
many borrower-specific predictors.
Bernanke and Boivin (2003, p. 525) confirm the merit of the large
data set: “[It] explores the feasibility of incorporating richer information
sets into the analysis, both positive and normative, of Fed policy making. We employ a factor-model approach . . . that permits the systematic
information in large data sets to be summarized by relatively few estimated factors. With this framework, we confirm Stock and Watson’s
result that the use of large data sets can improve forecast accuracy . . .”
A natural question arises as to how we should use all those vast
data in predicting a target of interest. Using large data, there are advantages to accessing rich information and robustifying against structural
instability, which plagues low-dimensional forecasting. While we can
exploit these advantages, there are also difficulties attached to using
large data due to overwhelming information, which may be highly correlated and noisy.
When there are many predictors in columns of the predictor matrix
X with the column number N being large, the dimension N needs to be
reduced. One way is to select r ( N) factors of X, and another way is to
select r ( N) columns of X. The former way, known as a factor model,
has recently been a popular approach in economic forecasting, because
of pioneering work by Stock and Watson (2002), Bai (2003), and Bai
and Ng (2002, 2006), who have explored theoretical and empirical
analysis of factor models based on principal components. The latter
way, known as variable selection, has been widely studied in statistics.
The variable selection serves to reduce N by ranking and selecting a
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subset of X that is most predictive for a forecast target y, through such
methods as LASSO (least absolute shrinkage and selection operator)
(Tibshirani 1996), least angle regression (Efron et al. 2004), and elastic
net (Zou and Hastie 2005), among many other methods.
While the data-rich environment usually refers to the situation
where there are many predictors, it also refers to the situation where
there are many forecasts provided by many firms, many departments in
an organization, many analyses in an investment bank, many different
government agents, and so on. In this paper we consider both cases—
namely, the data-rich environment with many predictors with N-vector
xt =  xt1 , xt 2 ,, xtN ', and the data-rich environment with many fore
1
2
casts with N-vector of forecasts ŷt + h  yˆth , yˆt h ,  , yˆt(Nh) . Below
we discuss how we form a forecast under these two types of datarich environment. In both cases the idea is to combine multiple forecasts. Therefore we begin with a review of the literature on combining
forecasts.
When multiple forecasts of the same variables are available, it’s
typically argued that a combination of those forecasts should be used
instead of using any single forecast, even if it’s a dominant one (e.g.,
Timmermann 2006). This is because forecast combinations offer diversification gains, and it’s almost impossible to identify ex ante a
dominant forecast model. The success of the forecast combinations will
in turn depend on how well the combination weights are determined.
1
As summarized in Clemen (1989), a simple average (with weights N )
of the multiple forecasts is typically found to be a good forecast com1
bination. However, the equal weights N will be very small when N is
very large in a data-rich environment, giving little chance for a better
model to work dominantly against bad models. Before we deal with the
data-rich environment, we first consider a simplest-case scenario, that
of N = 2.





COMBINING FORECASTS
Bates and Granger (1969) first introduced the idea of combining
forecasts. Let us begin with their brief review of what happens when
1
N = 2. Let yˆt  and yˆt 2 be forecasts of yt 1 with errors
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et1  yt 1  yˆt  ,

i  1, 2 ,

so that Eet1  0,
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Eet11et21   1 2 .

Define a combined forecast with the weight w (–∞ ∞),

yˆt c   wyˆt1  1  w  yˆt 2 ,
its forecast error

et c1

yt 1  yˆt c

wet 11  1  w et 21 ,

and its expected squared forecast error loss
 c2  w   w2 12  1  w   22  2w 1  w   1 2 .
2

Minimizing the loss, the optimal combining forecast weight is obtained.
This expression is minimized for the value of k given by
(7.1)

wopt  arg min c2  w  

 22   1 2
.
   22  2  1 2
2
1

Substitution yields the minimum achievable error variance as



2
c

w   
opt

 12 22 1   2 
2
1

  22  2  1 2

.

Bates and Granger (1969) show that the optimal combined forecast error loss is smaller than the smaller of the two individual forecast error
losses:

 c2  wopt   min  12 ,  22  .
Thus, a priori, it is reasonable to expect in most practical situations that
the best available combined forecast will outperform the better individual forecast. It cannot, in any case, do worse.
This result has been used across various disciplines (e.g., economics, finance, operations research, meteorology, management, computer
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science, and machine learning) under the names of combining forecast,
ensemble predictor, committee of learners, team of forecasts, consensus
of learners, mixture of experts, expert system, and others.

WHY COMBINE?
The forecast combination problem is similar to that of minimizing
the variance of a portfolio, with the errors from the individual forecasts playing the role of asset returns (Aiolfi and Timmermann 2006).
In practice it is quite common that one forecast model performs well
in certain periods while other models perform better in other periods.
It is difficult to find a forecast model that outperforms all competing
models. Forecast combinations can improve forecast accuracy over a
single model. Hong and Lee (2003) find that the combined forecasts are
generally the best performer for the mean, and sign prediction for the
foreign exchange rate changes.
Aiolfi and Timmermann (2006) consider a forecasting strategy that
takes the average over the models in the top quartiles or cluster. There
is clear evidence that, in general, a strategy of selecting one best (top)
model based on past forecasting performance does not work well. This
holds true both for linear and nonlinear forecasting methods. This is
analogous to portfolio selection in the stock market.
Why do we combine? Aiolfi and Timmermann (2006) answer this
way: “Forecast combination entails using information from a typically
large set of forecasts and emerges as an attractive strategy when individual forecasting models are misspecified in a way that is unknown to
the modeler. Misspecification is likely to be related not simply to functional form (neglected nonlinearity) but also to instability (structural
changes) in the joint distribution of forecasts and the target variable.
In this situation, the identity of the best forecasting model is likely to
change over time and a key question is for how long the relative performance of forecasting models persists” (p. 33).
Aiolfi and Timmermann (2006, pp. 31–32) also write the following:
Forecasts are of considerable importance to decision makers
throughout economics and finance and are routinely used by private enterprises, government institutions and professional econ-
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omists. It is therefore not surprising that considerable effort has
gone into designing and estimating forecasting models ranging
from simple, autoregressive specifications to complicated nonlinear models or models with time-varying parameters. A reason why
such a wide range of forecasting models is often considered is that
the true data generating process underlying a particular series of
interest is unknown. Even the most complicated model is likely to
be misspecified and can, at best, provide a reasonable “local” approximation to the target variable.

I would add that this is particularly so in practical forecasting
situations in macroeconomics with a large cross section of forecasting models and a short time-series dimension. Aiolfi and Timmermann
(2006, p. 32) go on to make a second point about forecasting models:
Model instability is a source of misspecification that is likely to
be particularly relevant in practice, c.f. Stock and Watson (1996).
In its presence, it is highly unlikely that a single model will be
dominant uniformly across time and the identity of the best local
approximation is likely to change over time. If the identity of the
best local model is time-varying, it is implausible that a forecasting
strategy that, at each point in time, attempts to select the best current model will work well. Most obviously, if (ex-ante) the identity
of the best model varies in a purely random way from period to
period, it will not be possible to identify this model by considering
past forecasting performance across models. Similarly, if a single
best model exists but only outperforms other models by a margin
that is small relative to random sampling variation, it becomes difficult to identify this model by means of statistical methods based
on past performance. Even if the single best model could be identified in this situation, it is conceivable that diversification gains
from combining across a set of forecasting models with similar
performance will dominate the strategy of only using a single forecasting model.

HOW TO COMBINE?
The optimal combination weights in Equation (7.1) for N = 2 may
be extended to a general case with a larger N. However, the estimation
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of the weights from the regression of the form (Equation [7.2]) may
suffer from a large estimation error, especially when N is large, and the
forecasts may be highly correlated. The following methods have been
widely used in applications.
A natural way is to estimate forecast combination weights by least
squares regression or, equivalently, by using portfolio variance minimization methods. The usual problem with this estimation method is that,
given the sample sizes typically available in practice, the combination
weights are often imprecisely estimated. In particular, this is a problem
when the number of models is large relative to the length of the time series, so that the covariance matrix of the forecast errors either cannot be
estimated or is estimated very imprecisely. The assumption of a stable
covariance structure is unlikely to be satisfied in practice, and weights
may be time-varying.
A simpler way is to use the equal weights (simple mean). This
becomes a common strategy when the models are of similar quality
or when their relative performance is unknown or unstable over time.
Stock and Watson (1999) use trimmed mean and median to robustify
the simple mean–weighted combined forecasts.
Aiolfi and Timmermann (2006) use ranking of the forecasting
model and also use clustering. The premise of this approach is that,
when combining forecasts from a large cross section of models, it is
generally difficult to distinguish between the performance of the top
models, but one can tell the difference between the best and worst models. This suggests including a subset of “good” models in the combined
forecast. Another popular method is Bayesian model averaging, which
is used in many applications, for example, Lee and Yang (2006) and
Wright (2009).
The formula for the optimal combination weights in Equation (7.1)
for N = 2 has an important aspect that has been ignored in many applications in the literature, although it was discussed in Granger and
Newbold (1986, Ch. 9) in some length and detail. That is the role of correlation ρ on the forecast combination as studied in Lee, Li, and Huang
(2010). Note that the forecast combination need not be convex, and it is
permitted that the weights can be any real number, w (–∞ ∞). Therefore the optimal forecast combination weight w in Equation (7.1) may
be negative (< 0) or larger than 1. What does this mean? How does ρ affect the combined forecast? To combine multiple forecasts when these
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forecasts are highly correlated or close to collinear, the optimal combination places negative weights on the inferior forecasts and larger than
1 on the dominant forecasts, similar to the pairs-trading strategy that
profits from the high correlation of the two sock returns. This optimal
forecast combination outperforms any individual forecast and explains
why an inferior forecast can be included in the combination to improve
the forecast. The optimal combination weight has a pattern similar to
that of the pairs-trading strategy. Without loss of generality, we assume
all the forecasts are one-step-ahead forecasts. The following results can
be easily generalized to multistep forecasts. The situation where wopt  0
is interesting. In light of the above condition, it appears that an inferior
forecast may still be worth including with negative weight. This happens
when  22   1 2  0 or  2 /  1  ρ—i.e., when ρ is a very large positive value (say, close to 1) and f t 1 is the inferior forecast, with larger
forecast error variance  1 .
As shown in Granger and Newbold (1986, p. 268), the optimal
combining weight wopt can be estimated from

  e 
t

(7.2)

wˆ t 

 es1 es 2

2 2
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s 1

 e
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1 2
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 22
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which can be obtained from the regression
(7.3)





et21  w et21  et11  etc1 .

However, a common popular recommendation is to ignore ρ. For
example, Clemen (1989, p. 562) suggests “to ignore the effect of correlations in calculating combining weights.” While the optimal weight wˆ t
can be negative or overweighted (larger than 1) depending on the value
of ρ, the use of a simpler form obtained with the restriction ρ = 0 has
been a popular recommendation:
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Note that, if we ignore ρ, wˆ t is always constrained on the (0,1) interval (analogous to the short-sale constraint).
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When ρ is large and positive, the optimal weight on the inferior
forecast can be negative. The forecast combination problem is analogous to that of minimizing the variance of a portfolio, with the forecast
errors playing the role of asset returns (Timmermann 2006). Gatev,
Goetzmann, and Rouwenhorst (2006) show that “pairs trading” in financial trading strategy profits from the high correlation in the returns.
Analogously, the profitability of using the optimal weight is linked to
the high correlation ρ in the forecasts. Without loss of generality, let us
1
assume that yˆt  is the inferior forecast, with larger forecast error variance. In combining forecasts, when   0, we short the loser (the worse
forecast) with w < 0 and buy the winner (the better one) with (1 – w) > 1.
In this case, the use of wˆ t while ignoring the correlation ρ would be too
restrictive.

FORECASTING IN A DATA-RICH ENVIRONMENT
So far, we have looked at the case of N = 2. Most of the combining
forecast literature has been limited to the case in which N is small. Now
we take up the case of combining forecasts when N is large. Consider a
kitchen-sink model with all predictors xt in one large model

yt  h  1 xt  b  ut

 t  1, 2,  , T 

to generate the h-step forecast

yˆT  h  1 xT  bˆT .
However, when N is large, the OLS estimator bˆOLS may not be feasible to compute, and the mean squared forecast error (MSFE) increases
2
N
with N as MSFE = E yt  h  yˆt  h   O   . A solution to these probT 
lems is not to use OLS estimation of the large model but to reduce the
dimension N, either by selection of relevant variables for the forecast
target to reduce N or by using a factor model to reduce N, or both. The
variable selection is to reduce N by ranking variables in X and select-
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ing a subset of X that is most predictive for a forecast target y, through
such methods as forward and backward selection, stepwise regression,
LASSO (Tibshirani 1996), least angle regression (Efron et al. 2004),
elastic net (Zou and Hastie 2005), and so on.
Alternatively, one can combine the large information in xt indirectly
i
through individual forecasts yˆT  1 (i = 1, . . . , N), and then combine the
N individual forecasts

yt11  x1t 1  1, t 1

N 

yt 1  xNt  N   N , t 1

to form the combined forecast (at time T using the estimated ˆi ’s)
c
1
N
yˆT 1  w1 yˆT  1    wN yˆT 1 .

Here each partition of the predictor vector xt need not contain only
one predictor at a time but may contain more, and each partition need
not be disjointed. In practice, generally the predictor vector xt may not
be observed when only forecasts are available (e.g., in survey forecasts).
Therefore, we will consider two types of data-rich environments. The
first is where there are N predictors

xt   xt1 , xt 2 ,  , xtN  ,
and the second is where there are N forecasts, with





1
2
N 
ŷt  h  yˆth , yˆt h , , yˆt h .

In each type of data-rich environment, we use factor models assuming there are latent factors of the predictors xt or of the forecasts ŷt  h .
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FORECASTING WITH MANY PREDICTORS
First, let’s consider forecasting when there are N predictors xt = (xt1,
xt2 , . . . , xtN)′ and N is large. Following Stock and Watson (2002), we use
a factor model that is based on the factors ft of the predictors xt:
xt   f t   t ,

(7.4)

where Λ is the factor loading. Once the factors have been extracted
from the predictors, the forecast of the target can be formed from the
regression of
(7.5)

yt  ft  ut .

As noted in Hillebrand et al. (2010) and Tu and Lee (2009), in this
approach, the factors are obtained from the marginal model of xt rather
than the joint model of (yt , xt). We write the above model in Equations
(7.4) and (7.5) as follows:
yt = E  yt xt ;1   ut  f t  ut
xt = E(xt ; θ2) + υt = Λft + υt

1    ,
(θ2 = ft ,Λ) .

Note that this assures that the joint density

D  yt , xt ;   D1  yt xt ;1   Dt  xt ; 2  ,
where 1  2  1   2 are variation free and we estimate the conditional model (Equation [7.5]) and the marginal model (Equation [7.4])
separately.

FORECASTING WITH MANY FORECASTS
Next, we consider forecasting when there are N forecasts
1
2
N 
ŷ t  h  yˆth , yˆt h , , yˆt h and N is large. In this situation, many fore-
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casts are given either from many survey forecasters or from many
analysts. There are various organizations that operate as an aggregate
or a group, based on many individual analysts who may or may not
use the same information sets. Depending on the shared intersections
of various information sets used by survey forecasters or analysts, the
correlations among the many individual forecasts may be strong. When
the number N of individual forecasts is large, we wish to estimate the
weights to form the aggregate forecast (a combined forecast). The N
individual forecasts may be given with or without the prescription on
how they have been generated. We apply principal component analysis
on the forecasts to extract factors

ŷt  h  ft  h  t  h
and
ˆ  ŷ
fˆt  h  
t h

and estimate the following forecasting equation,
(7.6)

yt  h  fˆt h  ut  h ,

to form the eventual forecast

yˆT  h  fˆT hˆT .
From the above calculations, note that the weights to combine many
forecasts are





ˆ aˆ  yˆ  wˆ ,
yˆT  h  fˆT hˆ  yˆT  h 
T h

and therefore the optimal forecast combination weights are
ˆ ˆ .
wˆ : 

Hillebrand et al. (2010) and Tu and Lee (2009) consider the above
i
model when each individual forecast yˆth is generated by using one
i
predictor xt  at a time. In their applications, the combined forecast with
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this weight vector ŵ  ˆ ˆ outperforms the equally weighted combined
forecast. However, it is not necessary to know how each individual
i
forecast yˆth is generated. In practice, there are various situations where
only the forecasts are given to econometricians, without telling about
how the forecasts are obtained.
It is generally believed that it is difficult to estimate the forecast
combination weights when N is large. Therefore the equal weights  N1 
have been widely used instead of estimating weights. An exception is
Wright (2009), who uses Bayesian model averaging for pseudo out-ofsample prediction of U.S. inflation and finds that it generally gives more
accurate forecasts than simple equal-weighted averaging. He uses N =
107 predictors. It is often found in the literature that equally weighted
combined forecasts are the best. Stock and Watson (2004) call this the
“forecast combination puzzle.” (See also Timmermann [2006].) Smith
and Wallis (2009) explore a possible explanation of the forecast combination puzzle and conclude that it is due to estimation error of the
combining weights. However, the empirical results occur when N is not
very large. When N is very large, the equal weights  N1  put too little
weight to good models, especially when N → ∞, and the equal weights
can hardly be justified. Note that we can consistently estimate the comˆ ˆ , as long as 
ˆ and ̂ are estimated consistently.
bining weights ŵ  
ˆ ˆ takes the
Note also that combining forecasts with the weights ŵ  
i 
ˆ
correlation structure among the forecasts yt  h into the calculation of
the weights, as it is based on the regression in Equation (7.6), just as in
the regression in Equation (7.3) to get Equation (7.2).

FURTHER TOPICS IN COMBINING FORECASTS
We have discussed the combining forecasts for one-step-ahead
forecasting, for the conditional mean, of continuous random variables.
This can be extended to the following three things:
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1) multiple-step-ahead forecasts;
2) conditional variance forecasts, conditional quantile forecasts,
conditional density forecasts, and conditional interval forecasts; and
3) discrete random variables (categorized data, binary data).
Combining Multistep Forecasting
Lin and Granger (1994) classify the multistep mean forecast methods into five alternative categories. Let’s assume the true DGP can be
characterized by the following equation:

Yt 1  g Yt    t 1 ,
where εt is a zero-mean, independent, and identically distributed sequence with distribution function Φ.
The optimal one-step forecast using a least square criterion is
Yt,1 = E Yt 1 Yt  j , j  0   g Yt 1  .
When g(·) is known, there should be no problem in generating a
one-step-ahead forecast. When g(·) is not known in practice, we can
approximate g(·) by a flexible function form such as the polynomial
family or the neural network family. However, the multistep forecasts
for nonlinear models are much more complicated than the one-step
forecast. Consider the simplest h = 2 case as an example to illustrate
the multistep forecast methods. The optimal two-step-ahead forecast at
time t is as follows:
(7.7)

 E Yt  2 Yt  j ,
Yt ,2 =

j  0 

=
 E  g Yt 1    t  2 Yt  j ,

 E  g  g Yt    t 1  Yt  j ,
=
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Of the five multistep mean forecast methods, there are four possible
ways to do multistep forecasts by iterating one-step-ahead forecasts, as
is discussed by Brown and Mariano (1989):
1) Naive (or deterministic):

Yt ,2n  g  g Yt   ,
so that the presence of εt+1 is ignored by putting its value at zero. For
most nonlinear function g(·), Yt ,2n will be biased, and the direction of the
bias depends on whether g(·) is convex or concave, as discussed by
Granger and Newbold (1976).
2) Exact (or optimal, or closed form):
Yt e,2   g  g Yt    t 1  dФ .




3) Monte Carlo:
Yt ,2m 

1 J
 g  g Yt    j  ,
J j 1

where εj = 1, . . . , J are random numbers drawn from the distribution Φ.
If J is large enough, Yt ,mh and Yt e, h should be virtually identical.
4) Bootstrap (or residual-based):
Yt b,2 

1 t
 g  g Yt   ˆ j  ,
t j 1

where ˆ j , j = 1, . . . , t are the t values of the residual estimated over the
sample period.
An alternative way of doing a multistep mean forecast is to model
the relationship between Yt+h and Yt directly by a new function gh(·) :
5) Yt  h  g h Yt   et , h ,
though et,h is usually not white noise, as mentioned by Lin and Granger
(1994). Therefore, a fifth method for doing a multistep forecast is
Yt ,dh  g h Yt  .
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With any of these five methods, the factor models considered in the
previous sections may be used for multistep forecasts when there are
many predictors or many forecasts.
Combining Quantile Forecasts
The optimal forecast yˆt 1 may be estimated, for a given    0,1 ,
from minimizing the check loss:

min yˆt 1   et 1     1 et 1  0    et 1 ,
where et 1  yt 1  yˆt 1 . Since ρα(·) is convex, the results of Bates and
Granger (1969), as discussed in the next section, can be carried over.
Note that the optimal forecast yˆt*1  q  yt 1 xt  satisfies the following first-order condition:





E   1  yt 1  yˆt*1  xtt  0 ,

a.s.

(See, e.g., Giacomini and Komunjer [2005].) Hence,
gt 1    1  yt 1  yˆt*1 

may be called the generalized residual or generalized forecast error.
From this we obtain





  E 1 yt 1  yˆt*1  xt  Pr  yt 1  yˆt*1 xt  .
It is interesting to note that this corresponds exactly to Equation
(7.8) on page 169 for evaluating interval forecasts, whereas here we
apply it to the optimal forecast yˆt*1 .
We consider two types of data-rich environments—one where there
are N predictors,
xt   xt1 , xt 2 , , xtN  ,
and another where there are N quantile forecasts, with



ŷt  h  yˆt1h , yˆt2h , , yˆtNh
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It is necessary to generalize the principal component regression for
conditional quantiles under the check loss ρα(·) .
Combining Density Forecasts
Suppose that  yt t  is a time series (e.g., the return of a portfolio over a certain period) with unknown conditional density function
ft  y   ft  y xt 1  . Let pt  y,    pt  y xt 1 ,   be a one-step-ahead
conditional density forecast model, where θ is a finite-dimensional parameter. Suppose that pt  y, 0   ft  y  for some θ0. Then, show that the
one-step-ahead density forecast is optimal in the sense that it dominates
all other density forecasts for any loss function (Diebold, Gunther, and
Tay 1998; Granger 1999; Granger and Pesaran 2000). In practice it is
not uncommon that a suboptimal forecast model does better than another in predicting a certain aspect of the distribution (e.g., value at risk
at the 5 percent level) but worse than another in predicting a different
aspect of the distribution (e.g., value at risk at the 1 percent level). This
makes it difficult for forecast users (who may not be forecast producers)
to choose a suitable forecast model. The fact that the optimal forecast
model is preferred by all forecast users regardless of their loss functions resolves this difficulty. It is therefore useful to check whether a
density forecast model is optimal, and, if not, to determine what useful
information can be provided from it for further improvement in density
forecasts. In fact, even if point forecasts are of interest, the optimal
conditional density forecasts are needed to construct optimal point
forecasts under a general asymmetric loss function (Christoffersen and
Diebold 1996, 1997).
Suppose that {yt} is generated from conditional densities {ft(y)}. If
a sequence of density forecasts {pt(y,θ0)} coincides with {ft(y)}, then
under the usual condition of a nonzero Jacobian with continuous partial
derivatives, {Zt} is IID U[0,1]. That is, when the forecast model pt(y,θ)
is optimal, the series of PITs, {Zt}, where


yt

Z t   pt  y, 0  dy ,


is IID U[0,1]. (See Diebold, Gunther and Tay [1998].) Berkowitz (2001)
considers the inverse normal transformation of the PIT, which follows
IID N(0,1). Bao, Lee, and Saltoglu (2007) discuss how the Kullback-
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Leibler Information Criterion (KLIC) of Kullback and Leibler (1951),
based on PIT, may be used to compare the density forecasts. (See
Mitchell and Hall [2005] for combining density forecasts.) Combining
many density forecasts (with large N),

 fˆ    y  , fˆ    y  , , fˆ 
1
t h

N
t h

2
t h

 y 



,

would require combinations of conditional moments or conditional
quantiles, with mixtures of several distributions, which would be
complicated.
Combining Interval Forecasts
Consider a stationary series  yt t 1 . Let the one-period-ahead conditional interval forecast made at time t from a model be denoted as
T

J t ,1     Lt ,1   , U t ,1    ,

t  R,  , T ,

where Lt,1(α) and Ut,1(α) are the lower and upper limits of the ex ante interval forecast for time t +1 made at time t with the coverage probability
α, i.e.,   Pr  yt 1  J t ,1   xt  . If we define the indicator variable as
T
dt 1    1  yt 1  J t ,1    , the sequence dt 1  t  R is IID Bernoulli
(α). The optimal interval forecast would satisfy
(7.8)

E  dt 1   xt    ,

so that dt 1      will be a martingale difference sequence. As the
dt 1   has the expected Bernoulli log-likelihood
1 dt 1   

E dt 1   1    

,

we can choose a model with the largest out-of-sample mean of
T



1 dˆt 1   


p 1  log  dt 1   1   
tR

ˆ

.

(See Bao, Lee, and Saltoglu [2006].)
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To combine interval forecasts that are generated from multiple
models, one can use the conditional quantile forecasts derived from using regression quantiles for Lt,1(α) and Ut,1(α) and combine them; or one
can use the conditional density forecasts, combine them, and invert the
combined density forecast to get the conditional quantile forecasts for
Lt,1(α) and Ut,1(α), using the methods discussed in Section 9.2.
Combining Binary Forecasts
Lee and Yang (2006) consider binary forecasts using bagging to
form a (weighted) average over all bootstrap training samples drawn
from the same distribution. The idea can be extended to cases where
there are many predictors or many forecasts to form a combined forecast of many binary forecasts. As in Lee and Yang, the combined binary
c
predictor yˆt  can be constructed by the majority voting on the N indii 
vidual binary forecasts yˆt (i = 1, . . . , N), i.e.,

N
1
c
yˆt   1   wi yˆt(i )   ,
2
 i 1
N

where  wi = 1. It is not clear how to estimate the combination weights
i 1

{wi} when N is large. Simple cases are those where we assume a perfect
democracy, with wi = N1 for all i, and those where we assume a dictator, with wi = 1 for some i. Neither case can be optimal in terms of the
binary loss functions.

CONCLUSIONS
We have considered how to combine forecasts in a data-rich environment with many predictors, xt   xt1 , xt 2 , , xtN , or with many
1
2
N 
forecasts, ŷ t  h  yˆth , yˆt h , , yˆt h (when N is large). In practice
there are situations where we, whether econometricians or forecasters,
do not observe the predictors but only the forecasts (e.g., survey forecasts of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia). In such situations
one needs to aggregate many forecasts into a consensus group forecast.
A common way is to use the simple average, or majority voting. While
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many empirical results from out-of-sample forecasting have shown
that the simple average of multiple forecasts tends to work well, such a
conclusion assumes that all individual forecasts are equally good by assigning equal weights. The accuracy can be improved if the weights can
be estimated consistently without experiencing errors from the usual
large N problem (the so-called curse of dimensionality). We use a factor model of many forecasts to derive the forecast combination weights
without succumbing to this problem.
In a data-rich environment with many predictors or many forecasts,
it is often necessary to use reduced-dimension specifications that can
span a large number of predictors. In the recent forecasting literature,
the use of factor models and principal component estimation has been
advocated for forecasting in the presence of many predictors. In this
situation, we decompose the space spanned by many predictors using
the principal components, as in Stock and Watson (2002). We can also
project the forecast target to many subspaces spanned by the predictors,
obtain many artificially generated forecasts, and then combine those
forecasts generated from the subspaces, as in Chan, Stock, and Watson
(1999); Hillebrand et al. (2010); and Tu and Lee (2009).
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Company, to seek ways to counteract the loss of employment income during
economic downturns.
The Institute is funded largely by income from the W.E. Upjohn Unemployment Trust, supplemented by outside grants, contracts, and sales of publications. Activities of the Institute comprise the following elements: 1) a research program conducted by a resident staff of professional social scientists;
2) a competitive grant program, which expands and complements the internal
research program by providing financial support to researchers outside the Institute; 3) a publications program, which provides the major vehicle for disseminating the research of staff and grantees, as well as other selected works in
the field; and 4) an Employment Management Services division, which manages most of the publicly funded employment and training programs in the
local area.
The broad objectives of the Institute’s research, grant, and publication programs are to 1) promote scholarship and experimentation on issues of public
and private employment and unemployment policy, and 2) make knowledge
and scholarship relevant and useful to policymakers in their pursuit of solutions to employment and unemployment problems.
Current areas of concentration for these programs include causes, consequences, and measures to alleviate unemployment; social insurance and income
maintenance programs; compensation; workforce quality; work arrangements;
family labor issues; labor-management relations; and regional economic development and local labor markets.
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